The cultural anatomy of decision making: The 'problem' of organ donation and ethnicity by Cooper, Jessie
  
 
THE CULTURAL ANATOMY OF DECISION MAKING: ORGAN 
DONATION AND THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF ETHNICITY 
 
Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of 
Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy  
 
Jessie Claire Cooper 
February 2012 
2 
 
Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... 8 
Declaration ........................................................................................................................................ 9 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... 10 
Dedication ........................................................................................................................................ 11 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... 12 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 14 
Organ transplantation: the development of a medical technology .................................... 15 
The problem of donation: brain death and inequality of access ......................................... 16 
Overview of the thesis .......................................................................................................... 21 
Chapter 1. Literature Review: The Problem of Understanding Transplant 
Inequalities in ‘Ethnic’ Terms .................................................................................................. 24 
    Introduction and search strategy ......................................................................................... 24 
Part 1. Situating the ‘problem’: transplantation and ethnicity............................................ 26 
Representing transplant inequalities by ethnicity ........................................................... 29 
The development of UK transplant policy and the ‘problem’ of biology as ethnicity ..... 30 
Part 2. Policy, promotion and research responses: the responsibility of organ donation .. 39 
Policy responses to transplant inequalities ...................................................................... 39 
‘Black’ and ‘Asian’ organ donor campaigns: making a moral imperative ........................ 42 
3 
 
Research responses: fixing ‘culture’ as the solution ........................................................ 47 
Mistrust of the medical establishment .................................................................................... 48 
Knowledge and understanding of donation ............................................................................ 49 
Bodily integrity after death ...................................................................................................... 50 
Religious beliefs and the involvement of ‘community’ ........................................................... 51 
Critiquing the donation research ..................................................................................... 51 
Part 3. Understanding organ donation: the role of medical institutions ............................ 57 
Race and ethnicity in donation practice ........................................................................... 57 
Family experiences of donation requests ........................................................................ 59 
Part 4. Institutional assemblages of organ donation ........................................................... 62 
The biosocial domains of transplant medicine ................................................................ 63 
The problem of brain death  ............................................................................................ 65 
Medical practice organises death  .................................................................................... 67 
Producing organ donors and transplant recipients  ......................................................... 70 
The work of medicine  ...................................................................................................... 73 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 75 
Chapter 2. Epistemological and Methodological Considerations .......................... 77 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 77 
Outline of the research objectives ....................................................................................... 77 
Part 1. Approaching the ‘world’ of organ donation: phenomenological positions ............. 80 
The researcher as ‘professional stranger’ ........................................................................ 82 
4 
 
Reflexively researching organ donation and ethnicity ..................................................... 83 
Part 2. Methodological approach: (multi-sited) ethnography ............................................. 91 
Part 3. Methods: accessing specialist domains and doing the research ............................. 95 
Access: gatekeeping, research sites, and tricky recruitment ........................................... 95 
Doing ethnography in the field: observations and narrative interviews ....................... 102 
Analysis: understanding my data ................................................................................... 107 
Ethical considerations .................................................................................................... 115 
Conclusion and overview of the results chapters .............................................................. 118 
Chapter 3. Donation Pathways: Standard (and Idealised) Processes .................121 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 121 
Part 1. The development of organ donation guidelines in the UK .................................... 125 
Part 2. The organ donation  pathway ................................................................................ 127 
The shift from ‘patient’ to ‘potential donor’  ................................................................. 131 
Breaking news of death: reaching consensus on medical decisions .............................. 132 
Confirming brain death .................................................................................................. 134 
Requesting donation and taking consent for organs ..................................................... 135 
Coroner consent ............................................................................................................. 140 
Backroom activities: testing, managing, and allocating organs ..................................... 141 
The organ retrieval ......................................................................................................... 142 
Final (and continuing) acts of care ................................................................................. 143 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 144 
5 
 
Chapter 4. From Patient to Potential Donor: Standardised Recommendations, 
Localised Practices .....................................................................................................................147 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 147 
Part 1. Making donation work in local settings ................................................................. 149 
DCD at Hillview: translating national recommendations in local contexts ............... 150 
Part 2. Navigating professional relationships: Making donation happen ......................... 159 
Donation practices and clinical hierarchies ............................................................... 159 
Re-appropriating power in donation practice ........................................................... 169 
Part 3. Donation and its discontents: medical and public concerns .................................. 176 
The personal becomes public: donation concerns .................................................... 177 
The emotional work of organ donation ..................................................................... 180 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 184 
Chapter 5. Consent Complexities: Death and the ‘BME’ Family ...........................187 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 187 
Part 1. Donation refusals and death discussions ............................................................... 189 
Conflicting decisions on death ................................................................................... 190 
Negotiating death diagnoses ..................................................................................... 196 
Mediating death ......................................................................................................... 200 
Continuing treatment on dying patients: moral struggles ........................................ 204 
6 
 
Part 2. Multiple consent constituents: the ‘BME’ family ................................................... 208 
Donation decision-making: the complexity of ‘family’ .............................................. 210 
Questioning the legitimacy of donation decisions .................................................... 218 
Part 3. The ‘BME’ family as outsiders ................................................................................ 223 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 230 
Chapter 6. Consent Practices and the (Re)Production of Ethnicity in Organ 
Donation .........................................................................................................................................232 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 232 
Part 1. Formal requests, informal practices: producing donation consent ....................... 233 
Obtaining consent: adaptation and adjustment ....................................................... 241 
The precarious process of consent: interpreting families ......................................... 245 
Part 2. Ethnicity and expectation: (re)producing the ‘BME’ donor ................................... 250 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 260 
Chapter7. Conclusion: Re-Thinking Ethnicity and Organ Donation .....................262 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 262 
Making donation possible: negotiated practices and the production of decision-making 264 
The production of the ‘BME’ donor and the ‘BME’ donor family ...................................... 268 
Epilogue: Reflections on the Research Process ............................................................272 
References .....................................................................................................................................279 
7 
 
Appendices ....................................................................................................................................319 
Appendix 1:  Example Literature Search Strategy .............................................................. 319 
Appendix 2:  Advertisement for Recruiting ‘Community’ Members ................................. 320 
Appendix 3:  Participant Covering Letters, Information Sheets and Reply Slip ................. 321 
Appendix 4:  Consent Form ................................................................................................ 339 
Appendix 5:  Letters of Ethical Approval from the NHS ..................................................... 341 
Appendix 6:  Letters of Research and Development Approval .......................................... 346 
Appendix 7:  Narrative Interview Guides ........................................................................... 352 
Appendix 8:  Example Section of a Narrative Analysis Table ............................................. 355 
Appendix 9:  Initial Categories and Analytical Questions from the Narrative Analysis ..... 358 
List of Figures: 
Figure 1. One of NHSBT’s Prove It poster campaigns (2009)  .............................................. 27 
Figure 2. NHSBT’s (2009) ‘South Asian’ Prove It campaign poster ...................................... 28 
Figure 3. UK Transplant’s (2007) Can We Count On You? ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ leaflet 
campaign .............................................................................................................................. 44 
Figure 4. NHSBT’s (2009) ‘black’ Prove It campaign poster ................................................. 45 
Figure 5. Donation pathways for DBD and DCD................................................................. 123 
Figure 6. The first page of NHSBT’s consent form for organ donation .............................. 211 
Figure 7. Example pages from NHSBT’s Patient Assessment Form ................................... 238 
8 
 
Abstract 
The Cultural Anatomy of Decision Making: Organ Donation and the 
‘Problem’ of Ethnicity 
Organ transplantation is considered the optimal treatment for those in kidney failure, yet 
there is a growing gap between the global demand for transplantable organs and their 
supply. Transplant medicine has largely concentrated upon solving this problem by securing 
the willingness of the public to donate their organs after death. In the UK context, attention 
has been trained upon black and minority ethnic (‘BME’) groups, who make up 28% of the 
kidney transplant waiting list, yet just 4% of organ donors. Since transplant medicine has 
traditionally favoured sharing organs between similar ethnic groups, ‘BME’ patients have a 
greatly reduced chance of receiving a transplant, despite their higher levels of need. 
Searching for ways to solve this problem, policy and research responses have focused upon 
understanding the ‘cultural’ barriers which ‘BME’ ‘communities’ present for organ donation, 
with subsequent interventions aimed at promoting organ donation to these groups. In so 
doing, minority ethnic groups have been positioned as the cause of transplant inequalities, 
and handed responsibility for solving an issue originally created within the practices of 
transplant medicine itself.  
This study aims to resituate this ‘problem’ by focusing upon the institutional organ donation 
encounter: where potential donors are decided upon and families are requested to donate 
their relative’s organs. A multi-sited ethnographic approach was taken to examine the work 
involved in organ donation in two acute hospital Trusts in the North of England, and wider 
‘community’ domains, such as religious temples. Narrative and observational methods were 
used to understand the experiences of Intensive Care staff and donation nurses involved in 
requesting donation from minority ethnic families, and those connected to the ‘problem’, 
such as religious leaders and minority ethnic transplant recipients. Findings reveal (‘BME’) 
organ donation to be an embedded, negotiated practice, which goes far beyond the 
willingness, or reluctance, of an individual to donate their organs after death. Instead, this 
study demonstrates that donation is dependent upon the practices of health professionals, 
who make decisions on the suitability of dead and dying patients for donation. Moreover, it 
shows how donation decisions are produced in the negotiations between families and 
health professionals over the medical diagnosis of death; in the discussions of the 
immediate and extended family of the potential donor; and by the ability of donation nurse 
to secure a family’s consent for donation. This study therefore illustrates how the ‘problem’ 
of ethnicity in organ donation is far from an isolated matter, created as a result of the 
‘culture’ of ‘BME’ populations. Instead, it argues that the categories of the ‘BME organ 
donor’ and the ‘BME donor family’ – as problematic for donation – are maintained and 
reproduced within the very processes which make organ donation possible.  
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Introduction 
Organ transplantation is commonly held up as an “icon” of medical progress (Sharp, 2006: 
1). This status has been sustained by the fact that, today, people with kidney, heart, liver 
and lung failure, among others, are able to survive for longer with the transplantation of an 
organ from the one person (dead or living) into the body of another. Alongside its iconic 
status, developments in surgical techniques and the ability of immunosuppressant 
medication to suspend the body’s attack on the presence of a ‘foreign’ organ, mean that 
transplantation has also evolved as the optimal form of treatment for conditions such as 
chronic kidney disease (CKD) in the West. However, despite its now routine practice, 
transplantation remains the subject of intense debate in public, medical, and academic 
domains over the host of ethical conundrums it engenders. In addition, transplantation’s 
ability to function is dependent upon the publics’ participation in, and acceptance of, organ 
donation. This relationship has opened up a vast gap between the demand for 
transplantable organs and their available supply. It is in this gap that inequities of access and 
availability of transplantation for different populations in diverse socio-political contexts has 
arisen. One such disparity can be seen in the UK: with the problem of the lack of available 
donor organs for black and minority ethnic (‘BME’) populations waiting for transplant. It is in 
looking at how this inequality has been produced in transplant medicine and discursively 
presented in policy, health campaigns, and research as a problem of organ donation 
amongst ‘BME’ groups, with which this thesis begins. However, before doing so, it is 
important to trace how we got to this stage, by mapping a brief history of the mutually 
related development of transplantation and deceased organ donation. 
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Organ transplantation: the development of a medical technology  
It was during World War II that the problem of renal failure began to receive public 
attention in Europe; when soldiers who had survived severe injuries later died from related 
renal failure. This attention led to the development in the Netherlands of the artificial 
kidney machine in 1944 by Willem Kloff. This early form of dialysis – a technology which 
mechanically filters harmful waste (urea and creatinine) and excess water out of the blood 
of those without adequate kidney function – allowed those with damaged kidneys to be 
kept alive. The ability of dialysis to maintain life was key for early experimenters of 
transplant medicine, leading to hope that kidney transplantation could become a reality in 
the future.  
However, there was also the problem of the immune system and its rejection of outside 
matter, which had resulted in the failure of previous transplant attempts. In 1954 the first 
successful kidney transplant was carried out in the United States by Joseph Murray, using 
live donation between genetically identical twins. This was to confirm the importance of the 
immunological reaction for transplantation. When the body receives an organ which it 
deems to be “foreign”, i.e. from another body, its response is to attack and destroy the 
invader. This has been theoretically referred to as a battle between “self” and “nonself” 
(Martin, 1994; Joralemon 1995: 337) – which leads to inevitable graft failure. Nineteen fifty 
four was thus a turning point for transplant medicine. It subsequently began to focus upon 
the importance of blood and tissue matching to reduce the effect of immune system attack, 
and ways of manipulating the immune system to allow for the transplantation of organs 
from non-identical related donors (Saeb-Parsy and Watson, 2011). 
The gradual development of immunosuppressant drugs and their combination with steroid 
treatment in the 1960s and 70s led to the dream of transplantation – for kidney and other 
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forms of organ failure – becoming a reality. In the 1980s the introduction of Cyclosporine, a 
drug able to sufficiently suppress the recipient’s immune reaction to foreign organs, without 
the need for dangerously high combinations of steroids, led to dramatic improvement in 
graft, and thus patient survival from transplantation. With this, the number of transplant 
operations, and demand for the treatment – understood to be the best option for kidney 
failure, both in biological and economic terms – dramatically increased (Jorelamon, 1995; 
Saeb-Parsy and Watson, 2011). 
However, along with the problem of rejection, another major stumbling block in transplant 
medicine’s development has been its reliance upon the public to donate their organs after 
death, and thus their acceptance of this new medical technology. This focus has led to the 
public definition of organ donation as the “gift of life”. This concept is understood as both 
ethically troubling1, yet necessary to promote the “altruistic” act of donating organs to a 
“known or unknown other” (Fox and Swayzey, 2001: ix).  Despite the first successful 
transplant resulting from a living kidney donation (with the body’s ability to function with a 
single kidney), transplantation has traditionally relied upon the donation of organs from the 
bodies of the dead. However, that this is a very specific form of death is understood to add 
further to the ethical dilemmas of transplant medicine, as I detail below.  
The problem of donation: brain death and inequality of access 
Supplies of transplantable organs traditionally originate from brain dead donors. These are 
individuals who have been pronounced brain dead, yet are still breathing – and thus their 
                                                          
1 The construction of the gift discourse around organ donation has been well debated in the literature (see e.g. 
Titmuss, 1997 [1970]; Healey, 2004; Davies 2006; Svendsen, 2007; Parry, 2008; Shaw, 2010). The general 
argument is that, in promoting donation as an altruistic act, the very process of gift exchange – originally laid 
out by Mauss (1954), as a reciprocal act of giving and receiving which constructs and reinforces social 
relationships – is cut short. By disavowing the expectation of return for donor families, and limiting the 
possibility for recipients to reciprocate, it is argued that suffering is amplified on both sides (see e.g. Kierans, 
2005; Sque, Payne, and Macleod Clark, 2006).  
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organs functioning – with the assistance of a mechanical ventilator. The re-formulation of 
death as occurring in the brain, rather than its traditional locus in the respiratory system 
(heart and lungs), was catalysed by the development of Intensive Care medicine – 
specifically with the ability of the artificial ventilator to keep the ‘dead’ ‘alive’, and with the 
use of deceased organ donors in transplantation2. Following the initial formalisation, in 
1968, of medical criteria for diagnosing whole brain death in the United States (US), by the 
Harvard Ad Hoc committee, the British Conference of Medical Royal Colleges laid out clinical 
criteria in 1978 for brain death in the UK context. This differed in one main respect from the 
Harvard Criteria, in that brain-death is verifiable with the diagnosis of brain-stem death (the 
lower part of the brain), rather than whole brain death. The brain stem is understood as the 
part of the brain which controls our heartbeat, our ability to be conscious, and our ability to 
breathe. In other words it is taken as “the body’s control centre” (Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges 2008: 34), which allows us to function as sentient persons. This new form of death, 
despite its now commonplace practice in many countries, continues to cause debate in 
terms of what death actually means and thus when, exactly, it can be pronounced (Lock, 
2002). 
The introduction of brain death was the first in a proliferation of measures to increase the 
supply of donor organs for transplant medicine (Fox and Swayzey, 2001). Such measures, all 
of which have their own practical and ethical debates, include increasing the prevalence of 
donation after cardiac death – where organs are procured after cardiac arrest; increasing 
the use of living organ donors3; relaxing the criteria for what constitutes viable donor organs 
– including the increasing use of marginal donors, considered previously too risky for 
                                                          
2
 Until developments in Intensive Care medicine and the subsequent recognition of brain death as a legitimate 
form of death, transplantation traditionally utilised organs procured from donors who had died after cardiac 
arrest, known as donation after cardiac death.  
3
 In the UK, kidneys, liver, and lung lobes can now be donated for transplantation from patient’s friends, 
colleagues, and even strangers. 
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recipients (e.g. over 80 years of age; diabetic; and donors deemed at high risk of HIV) (Fox 
and Swayzey, 2001; Sharp, 2006); the introduction of presumed consent (opt-out) for organ 
donation in countries such as Spain and Sweden – where organs can be legally procured 
after death unless the donor or their family has specifically objected; the implementation, in 
certain countries like Spain and the US, of measures to provide compensation for donor 
families in the form of funeral expenses; the ever growing market for organ-selling and 
trafficking – despite the consensus of condemnation surrounding these practices – in 
countries such as India and Pakistan (e.g. see Scheper-Hughes, 2001; 2002; Lundin, 2010, 
and Yea, 2010 for recent ethnographic accounts); and research into xenotransplantation 
(using animal organs) as a workable alternative to the reliance on human organs for 
transplant.  
What is clear then is that this icon of medicine remains mired in ethical, practical, and 
theoretical debates around its future. Despite the hosts of measures described above, organ 
scarcity persists on a global context. This has engendered questions about equality of access 
to transplantation for different patient population groups, both within and across national 
boundaries (Fox and Swayzey, 2001). In the US, for example, with its private healthcare 
system, problems persist for those on low incomes without healthcare insurance; and, in 
conjunction, for ‘Black’ patients who are less likely to be placed on a transplant waiting list, 
and have less chance of receiving a transplant once on the waiting list (Hall et al., 2011).  
In the UK context, despite the presence of the National Health Service – free for all at the 
point of service – similar disparities exist for patients from minority ethnic backgrounds.  In 
general terms, the UK has a poor record of deceased donation levels compared with some of 
its European equivalents: 16.3 deceased donors per million population (pmp) (NHSBT, 2011), 
compared to levels in Italy of 21 pmp, and Spain of 35.1 pmp (Commission of The European 
Communities, 2007). Despite the fact that between 2010 and 2011 transplant waiting lists 
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decreased (2% overall and by 4% for kidney waiting lists) for the first time in ten years, there 
are still 7800 patients actively waiting for an organ transplant, of which, 6871 are waiting for 
a kidney (NHSBT, 2011). This represents 111 patients pmp (NHSBT, 2011), which is starkly 
contrasted to the figure of 16.3 deceased donors pmp in the UK each year. This disparity has 
been singled out as particularly affecting individuals from what are routinely referred to as 
black and minority ethnic (‘BME’) ‘communities’.  
The shortage of organs for ‘BME’ groups has been understood through a number of related 
issues, namely that ‘BME’ populations are 3-5 times more likely to develop End Stage Renal 
Disease (ESRD) than the majority population. As a result, these groups4 make up 28% of the 
kidney transplant waiting list, yet just 8% of the UK population, and 4% of organ donors 
(NHSBT, 2011). High rates of ESRD and low rates of deceased organ donors from ‘BME’ 
groups, in the context of the UK’s opt-in donation system, have had material effects upon 
those waiting for transplant. The UK currently favours good tissue matching in kidney 
transplantation, to maximise survival time and decrease the potential of graft rejection 
(Saeb-Parsy and Watson, 2011). This translates into a preference for sharing organs between 
individuals from similar ethnic backgrounds (largely understood as mapping on to similar 
blood groups and tissue types). In the context of low rates of organ donors from ‘BME’ 
populations and a majority white donor pool, waiting times for ‘BME’ patients on the kidney 
transplant list are almost double those of the white population. As a result of these factors, 
individuals from ‘BME’ groups have a vastly reduced chance of receiving an organ transplant 
than their white counterparts, despite their higher level of need (Wright, 2000).  
                                                          
4
 National Health Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) currently categorises minority ethnic patients under the 
categories: ‘Asian’, ‘black’, ‘Chinese’, and ‘other’ (NHSBT, 2011). In the context of the ‘BME’ transplant 
problem, this refers to patients from African, Caribbean, and South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and 
Sri-Lankan) backgrounds. 
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In public, policy, and research domains these inequities have been understood as a specific 
problem of ethnicity. This is shown by the way in which problems of access to 
transplantation have been largely discussed in terms of ‘BME’ communities’ failure to 
donate their organs after death. This failure is attributed to the ‘cultural’ – such as religious 
beliefs – barriers which ‘BME’ groups present for attempts to increase organ donation rates. 
In turn, interventions to solve the inequality have come in the form of targeted campaigns to 
promote organ donation to ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ ‘communities’. In this way, lack of 
access to transplantation for ‘BME’ populations has been discursively constructed as a 
‘problem’ of low rates of deceased organ donation from these groups (Kierans and Cooper, 
2011).  
In a recent BBC Radio 4 documentary, Blood for Blood (2010), the programme looked at the 
disparity between the need for blood and organ donors in the UK’s ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ 
populations by beginning with the question: “What lies behind the reluctance of black and 
Asian people in Britain to act as blood and organ donors?” It is the way in which questions 
such as these set up the ‘problem’ as a problem of minority ethnic populations with which 
this thesis begins. Rather than retain the focus upon transplant inequalities as directly 
caused by the supposed “reluctance” of ‘BME’ groups to donate their organs, this study 
examines the way in which such a focus has come about, and how this ‘problem’ can be 
traced to institutional domains. It therefore aims to understand the ‘problem’ by looking at 
the contextual experiences and practices around the organ donation encounter5 – where 
                                                          
5
 I define practices as the assembly and (re)production of knowledge and social orders by means of the 
“situated accomplishments” (Lynch, 2001: 141) and “arrays of activities” (Schatzki, 2001: 11) of different 
actors. According to Schatzki (1996; 2001), practices assemble, arise from, and make sense of existing 
knowledge (which is tacitly performed); available resources; objects; bodily (embodied) activity; emotions; and 
skills. In this thesis, the term practice therefore refers to both what is done – the actions of different actors in 
the organ donation encounter – and how this ‘doing’ interacts with and transforms wider contexts and 
institutional norms (Casper and Berg, 1995) in organ donation – such as end of life care pathways and the 
Human Tissue Act’s (2004) legislation on consent. 
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patients are referred as potential donors and families are requested to donate their relative’s 
organs. This it does by taking a phenomenological ethnographic approach, to examine the 
institutional processes of, and decision-making around organ donation within two hospital 
Trusts in the North of England. In aiming its focus towards institutions, rather than 
‘communities’, this study differently asks: just what happens when (‘BME’) families are 
approached after the death of their relative and asked to donate their organs? 
In writing a critical study about the relationship between organ donation and ethnicity it is 
important to outline, from the outset, my own understanding of the term ‘ethnicity’ 
(Bhopal, 2007). In this study I understand ‘ethnicity’ to refer to malleable, rather than static 
identities, constituted at both personal and structural levels (Smaje, 1996). ‘Ethnicity’ 
therefore encompasses both commonly defined characteristics including language, religion 
and country of origin etc (Bhopal, 1997), alongside how an individual’s self-image interacts 
with wider factors, such as the impact of racism (Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002). Throughout this 
thesis I deliberately draw on commonly deployed categories such as ‘South Asian’, ‘black’, 
‘BME’, ‘community’, and ‘culture’, to bring attention to their problematic construction 
within the literature and in the research field. It is for this reason that these terms are 
presented within inverted commas throughout.  
Overview of the thesis 
This thesis is presented in 7 chapters, beginning with a review of the literature connected to 
the phenomenon of organ donation and ethnicity, and moving through to the study 
methodology and its subsequent findings. In chapter 1, I outline and critique the literature 
relating to the ‘problem’6 of organ donation and ethnicity. This begins with an examination 
                                                          
6
 I place the notion of the ‘problem’ in inverted commas throughout this thesis, in recognition of my 
understanding of ethnicity in organ donation as a constructed, rather than innate, ‘problem’. 
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of how the focus upon the ‘problem’ has developed: from the discovery of high rates of 
renal failure among ‘BME’ groups, and the subsequent disparities in access to 
transplantation, to the way in which policy, health promotion, and research responses have 
attributed these inequities to low rates of organ donation from ‘BME’ groups. Broadening 
the perspective, I then consider wider research into minority ethnic health inequalities and 
the practices of donation and transplant medicine, to justify the study’s institutional focus, 
and highlight the myopia of current research approaches. 
In chapter 2, the methodology, I describe and rationalise the study’s phenomenological 
ethnographic approach. This I used to alternatively examine the ‘problem’ of ethnicity and 
organ donation from the perspective of the organ donation encounter. I provide an 
overview of the phenomenological epistemology which underpinned the research, and the 
ethnographic methodology I employed. I then describe the research settings and 
participants; the subsequent development of the study’s focus; and the methods which 
were used to do the study and analyse the data, before finally exploring the ethical issues 
involved in undertaking such research. Chapters 3 through to 6 present the study findings. 
In chapter 3, I provide a procedural overview of how deceased organ donation actually 
happens and who and what it involves, according to policy guidelines. This gives initial 
insight into the complexity of the donation process, and illustrates the variety of different 
actors involved in making decisions around donation, beyond ‘BME’ individuals and their 
families. 
Chapter 4 moves to explore the work which gets done within local hospital settings to 
increase organ donor rates. It takes recent policy recommendations for the re-organisation 
of donation services, and looks at how these are made to happen in practice by the key 
figure of the donation nurse. Here I highlight the way in which organ donors, and thus donor 
organs are made possible as a result of the situated practices and decisions of health 
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professionals. In chapter 5, I focus upon the issue of consent in organ donation. Here, I 
evidence the ways in which standard procedures for, and representations of what consent 
for donation entails, break down in practice with ‘BME’ families – represented by health 
professionals as problematic groups for donation. I show that consent for donation begins 
with the agreement of a family to the medical diagnosis of the death of their relative; and 
how, rather than necessarily being the product of the donor’s wishes, donation is an 
outcome of the negotiations of a variety of family and ‘community’ members. In so doing, I 
demonstrate how the ‘BME’ family are produced as a problem for donation by virtue of the 
fact that they fail to conform to the procedural norms which underpin donation.  
The final results chapter, 6, scrutinises the practices and procedures involved in securing 
legal consent from a patient’s family for donation. I reveal consent to be a precarious and 
interactional process, with families’ formal decisions on donation dependent upon the 
interpretative work of the donation nurse. I also show these practices to be problematic, 
however, when they turn upon preconceived notions of a family’s ethnicity; illustrating the 
way in which health professionals reflect and reconstruct the ‘problem’ of ethnicity in their 
practice. The insights from these chapters lead me to ultimately conclude, in chapter 7, that 
the ‘problem’ of ethnicity in organ donation is not something which can be simply attributed 
to the ‘culture’ of ‘BME’ ‘communities’. Instead, as this thesis shows, it is a phenomenon 
which can be traced to institutional domains, and to the procedures, practices, and 
practitioners who, whilst responsible for increasing donor rates, simultaneously reproduce 
the ‘problem’ itself.  
 
 
24 
 
Chapter 1. Literature Review: The Problem of 
Understanding Transplant Inequalities in ‘Ethnic’ Terms 
Introduction and search strategy 
This study aims to move beyond current research, policy, and public understandings which 
relate inequalities of access to organ transplantation for ‘BME’ populations to a problem of 
low rates of organ donation from ‘BME’ groups. To do this, I begin by examining the 
literature related to this ‘problem’. Rather than presenting a systematic review, this chapter 
offers a comprehensive examination and critique of the literature which deals explicitly with 
the study topic, along with wider research relating to this complex area. For example, 
alongside reviewing research and policy directly relating to organ donation and ethnicity, I 
also look at studies linked to ethnicity and transplantation, the experiences of donor and 
non-donor families, and the institutional practices of transplant medicine – all of which have 
direct bearing upon the ability to fully understand the study ‘problem’.  
The literature was searched by scouring electronic databases, including JSTOR, MEDLINE, 
CINAHL, Cochrane library, and Web of Knowledge, at regular intervals throughout the study, 
until September 2011. Different search terms were combined in advanced search options, 
and included: “organ donation”; “organ transplantation”; “minority ethnic”; “black”; 
“Asian”; “African”; “ethnicity”; “donor family”; “health professional”; and “request”, among 
others (see Appendix 1). Sources were retrieved and critiqued according to their relevance 
to the topic; the methodological approach and methods employed; whether analytical and 
classificatory terms pertinent to the study topic, such as ‘BME’, were explained and the 
researchers’ perspective made clear; and whether the conclusions drawn were justified (see 
Mays and Pope, 2000; Greenhalgh, 2001). Reference lists were scanned from retrieved 
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articles and further papers and book sources were subsequently generated. 
Recommendations from my supervisors, colleagues, and the health professionals who 
participated in my study were also taken up. In addition, I retrieved policy documents, 
medical guidelines, promotional material, and recent statistics for organ donation and 
transplantation from Google searches and the Department of Health (DH) and NHS Blood 
and Transplant (NHSBT) websites. The internet sites of charitable organisations, such as 
Kidney Research UK and the Donor Family Network were also searched for unpublished 
reports and grey literature. As this topic has featured widely in the media in recent years, 
various media websites, such as the BBC, and the Guardian, were additionally searched for 
relevant news articles and coverage. This accumulated evidence is presented in this chapter 
in four parts, which I outline below.  
 In part 1 of the literature review I show how evidence of high rates of renal failure amongst 
the UK’s ‘BME’ groups has developed into a focus upon the problem of ethnicity for 
transplant medicine, specifically around requirements for organ matching from donor to 
recipient. I discuss how such focus has led to an understanding of ethnicity as a ‘problem’ 
for organ donation, and the concurrent responsibility given to ‘BME’ ‘communities’ to solve 
disparities of access to transplantation by donating more organs. In part 2, I demonstrate 
how this responsibility has been fixed in place by transplant policy, public campaigns, and 
research responses to the ‘issue’. These position low rates of organ donation in terms of the 
‘culture’ of minority ethnic groups – conceptualised through notions of religious beliefs, 
traditions, and practices. This literature I critique by utilising wider social science work to 
argue that such understandings result from the conflation of the concepts of biology, 
ethnicity, and ‘culture’, and by the misuse of the culture concept. 
In part 3 I show how wider research, which examines families’ experiences of being asked to 
donate their relative’s organs, highlights the importance of looking at institutional practices 
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to understand donation decision-making. This research provides an opening for an 
alternative understanding of the ‘problem’ of ethnicity in organ donation: that low donation 
rates cannot be simply attributed to ‘BME’ ‘communities’ and, instead, need to be seen in 
the context of the interactional nature of decision-making. This leads to the focus upon the 
socially-constructed practices of transplant medicine in part 4 of the literature review. Here, 
I highlight how anthropological and sociological research into brain death in organ donation, 
and the organisation of death in medicine, illustrate donation decisions to be contingent 
upon the ability of medicine to render death acceptable to families. In addition, I highlight 
research on the work of donation and transplant professionals, which shows how donation 
is made possible by the locally-constituted practices around dead and dying patients. In this 
way, I argue that the ‘problem’ of organ donation and ethnicity can only be fully grasped by 
examining the way in which ethnicity is experienced, practiced, and produced within 
institutional donation domains.  
Part 1. Situating the ‘problem’: transplantation and ethnicity 
In 2009 National Health Service Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), the organisation responsible 
for managing transplant and donation services in the UK, brought out a new campaign to 
promote organ donation to the general public. The Prove It (fig. 1) campaign sets out to urge 
the public to “prove” their belief in organ donation by joining the organ donor register. This 
it does by directly appealing for individuals to identify with the potential for needing a 
transplant in the future: with the image of a healthy individual juxtaposed alongside their 
sick doppelganger. In this way, the campaign secures a moral imperative for the public to 
donate their organs by appealing to a possibility. Rather than something which happens to 
other people, organ failure is pictured as something that can happen to anybody, even to 
you. 
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Figure 1. One of NHSBT’s Prove It poster campaigns (2009) 
 
A further arm of the campaign specifically targets its message at ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ 
‘communities’ (see figs. 2 and 4). Here, rather than individuals, the campaign is re-
formulated around a notion of ‘communities’. ‘Black’ or ‘South Asian’ people are asked to 
prove their belief in organ donation for their community. This is done by the marrying of 
statistics: revealing the stark fact of high need for transplant amongst ‘black’ or ‘South 
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Asian’ people, alongside the 1% figure of people from these ‘communities’ on the organ 
donor register.  
Figure 2. NHSBT’s (2009) ‘South Asian’ Prove It campaign poster  
 
It is in drawing these co-dependent boundaries of responsibility and belonging in relation to 
organ donation from minority ethnic groups, with which this literature review begins. It will 
chart how we have arrived at this stage; where the problem of transplant inequalities within 
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minority population groups has come to be represented as a problem of deceased organ 
donation within these same groups. As I will show, however, this ‘problem’ has emerged 
within the organisation of transplant services, and in the drawing of boundaries of 
difference through a “complex interweaving of biology/genetics and ethnicity/race [...] that 
both modifies and reinforces ideas of culture and responsibility” (Kierans and Cooper, 2011: 
21). 
Representing transplant inequalities by ethnicity 
In the last fifteen years, inequalities of access to organ, particularly kidney, transplantation 
have been increasingly discussed in terms of the difference in waiting times to transplant 
between ‘white’, ‘black’, and ‘South Asian’ patients with End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD). 
This difference, however, has been understood in a way which implicates the disparity with 
low rates of deceased organ donation from black and minority ethnic (‘BME’) groups. The 
‘problem’ is commonly represented by the interwoven statistics below: 
 ‘BME’ (denoting ‘black African’, ‘Black Caribbean’ and ‘South Asian’ here) groups 
have been found to have a higher prevalence of chronic illness, like diabetes and 
hypertension, which means they are 3-5 times more likely to develop ESRD than the 
majority (‘white’) population (ODT, 2008; Randhawa, 2010). 
 At present, ‘BME’ groups represent around 8% of the UK population, yet make up 
28% of the kidney transplant waiting list, and just 4% of organ donors (NHSBT, 2011). 
In addition, reported refusal rates for deceased donation stand at 75% for the ‘BME’ 
population, compared with 40% for the ‘white’ British population (ODT, 2008). 
 As current UK transplantation practice favours tissue and exact blood group 
matching, to decrease the potential of graft rejection (Saeb-Parsy and Watson, 
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2011), this translates into a preference for sharing organs between individuals with 
similar ethnic backgrounds (meaning similar blood group and tissue type).  
 The result is that, in relation to kidney transplantation, for those of minority ethnic 
background who do receive an organ, the waiting times are almost double those of 
the white population who have an average wait of 719 days, compared to 1,368 days 
for ‘South Asian’ patients and 1,419 days for ‘black’ patients (ODT, 2008). This means 
that individuals from ‘BME’ groups have a vastly reduced chance of receiving an 
organ transplant than their white counterparts, despite their higher level of need 
(Wright, 2000). 
As we see then, the problem of inequalities of access to transplantation for patients from 
‘BME’ populations has been discursively tied to the ‘problem’ of low organ donation rates, 
from these same populations. Underpinning the transplant-donation domains is the 
requirement for Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA [tissue]) matching in UK kidney transplant 
practice. Here, the relationship between the identities of those in need of transplantation, 
and those (potential donors) able to ease this need, has been concretised by classificatory 
boundaries drawn around notions of biological relatedness (genetic, HLA). This, in turn, is 
linked to ethnic and ‘cultural’ group membership. As I show below, however, the 
conventional understanding of the ‘BME’ organ transplant/donor ‘problem’ has been 
created within the practices of transplant medicine itself.   
The development of UK transplant policy and the ‘problem’ of biology as ethnicity 
We can map the genealogy (Foucault, 1977) of the BME transplant/donation ‘problem’ to 
the recognition, nearly 2 decades ago, of growing rates of renal failure amongst minority 
ethnic populations. In the 1990s, UK researchers began to report on the high numbers of 
31 
 
‘BME’, specifically ‘black’ and ‘Asian’7 patients with ESRD. One of the earliest studies was by 
Clark et al. (1993) who found a larger proportion of ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ patients with ESRF, 
compared to ‘white’ patients. The researchers put this down to the fact that there was 
higher prevalence of hypertension and vascular disease, as a cause of ESRF, in these 
patients. Such findings, the authors argue, had important ramifications for provision of renal 
services. In similar studies, Roderick et al. (1994; 1996) found greater rates of Renal 
Replacement Therapies (RRT) among ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ groups, compared to the 
‘white’ population. They warn of this need only increasing as ‘BME’ populations’ age, 
recommending interventions to prevent renal failure, and pointing out the limited possibility 
of the most cost effective form of treatment for ESRD – transplantation – being used. This, 
they argue, is due to low donor rates generally, and specifically because of difficulties with 
tissue (HLA) matching for ‘BME’ groups (Roderick et al., 1994; 1996; Raleigh, 1997).  
What stands out from these early studies is the absence of transplantation as a suggested 
intervention. Here, access to suitable organs for the UK’s BME populations was constrained 
by an explicit orientation towards cadaveric organ donation, alongside an ‘opt-in’ system for 
organ donation8. However, this began to shift with the introduction of the organ donor 
register in 1994, in attempts to improve overall rates of organ donation, and with growing 
recognition of transplantation as the optimal treatment for kidney failure in both clinical 
and economic9 terms. 
                                                          
7
 Commonly understood to represent individuals of Caribbean origin, or Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi 
background, respectively. 
8
 This means that organs can only be procured with the explicit consent of either the donor (i.e. by being on 
the organ donor register) or their relatives after their death. 
9
 This is laid out by the National Service Framework for Renal Services (2004) where, compared with the daily 
regimes of dialysis, a kidney transplant is understood to allow patients to lead a near normal life (DH, 2004: 
13). In economic terms, compared with the enormous costs of keeping a patient on haemodialysis, a kidney 
transplant saves the NHS around £241,000 over a ten year period for each patient (NHSBT, 2009). 
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In 1997 Higgins et al. reported on Coventry’s kidney transplant programme, which 
distributed locally-donated kidneys in line with HLA matching policy at the time. Their 
records showed only a tiny proportion (2%) of their transplants were done with HLA 
mismatches, with a higher proportion of “Indo-Asian” patients, compared with white 
patients, waiting for transplant after two years (33% and 19% respectively). They also 
discovered significantly lower organ donation rates amongst ‘Indo-Asians’ than ‘white’ 
groups. Despite this discrepancy, the authors assert: “We believe that Indo-Asian patients 
should not be denied access to renal transplantation because there is a low rate of organ 
donation from their ethnic group” (Higgins et al., 1997: 1355). In attempts to improve these 
inequalities, the hospital subsequently changed its allocation policy to ensure that HLA 
matching was relaxed for patients waiting more than two years for transplant. This shows 
how, for those categorised as a ‘BME’ patient, constraints on access to transplantation have 
been tied to the reliance upon strict HLA and (as I will show) blood group matching between 
donor and recipient. In this way, the problem of inequality of transplant access becomes not 
simply one related to organ donation, but also one which has been fixed in place by the 
allocation policies of transplant medicine. 
In 1998 Gurch Randhawa warned of the future economic and human “crisis” which would 
happen if the discrepancy between the number of ‘Asians’ on the kidney transplant waiting 
list, and the number of kidney transplants performed, was not resolved (Randhawa, 1998a: 
265). In a reflection of these growing inequities, the UK National Kidney Allocation Scheme 
(NKAS) has twice shifted its criteria to widen transplant access. In 1998 a new scheme was 
introduced which, whilst still favouring HLA matching, brought in a second-tier points 
system. This meant that if no recipient could be found with a zero HLA mismatch (the 
optimal type of match between donor and recipient) the organ would be allocated on the 
basis of time waited, amongst other factors. In other words, patients who had a lower 
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likelihood of receiving a match received a larger score and therefore higher priority. Such 
patients included those from ‘BME’ backgrounds – less likely to receive a HLA matched organ 
(Fuggle et al. 2004).  
Despite these changes, the scheme left inequalities of transplant access little changed. 
Writing in 2007 Rudge et al. found that under the 1998 criteria, ‘Asian’ and ‘black’ patients 
waited nearly twice as long for a transplant compared to their ‘white’ counterparts. They 
assert that such discrepancies were down to low rates of deceased donation from ‘BME’ 
groups, as well as the fact that the:  
[...] allocation system [is] based on white blood group distribution and HLA 
phenotypes. This system accurately represents the donor population but not the 
recipient waiting list, largely as a result of the biological diversity of different 
ethnic groups. (Rudge et al., 2007: 1171-1172).  
Crucially, Rudge et al. (2007) point out that even if donor consent rates from these 
populations were improved, the problem would remain because of higher rates of ESRF in 
the UK’s ‘Asian’ and ‘black’ populations. In other words, they saw the allocation system, 
rather than low rates of donation from minority ethnic groups, as the main factor in 
transplant inequalities.  
I want to look at these points about blood group and HLA matching in transplantation more 
closely here. Beginning with blood group distribution, kidneys have been traditionally 
allocated on the basis of strict matching by ABO blood type10. In theoretical terms, 
individuals with A, B, or AB blood types are able to donate to and receive blood (and thus 
                                                          
10
 This is because of the presence of different antigens in the blood. ‘Foreign’ antigens set off the production of 
antibodies in the body to get rid of the invader. This means that if blood or organs were received from a donor 
with an incompatible blood group (e.g. a blood group A organ went to a blood group B recipient), the 
recipient’s immune system would produce antibodies to fight against the foreign antigen, resulting in graft 
failure. 
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organs) from different groups. For example, those with blood group B can donate blood to 
an individual with blood type B or AB, and can receive blood from an individual with type B 
or type O blood. In contrast, someone with blood group O can only receive blood and organs 
from those with the same blood type, yet they can donate to any other blood group. Despite 
this, until relatively recently, blood group O donor organs were restricted to blood group O 
recipients. As blood group O is the most common blood type in the UK, therefore 
constituting the majority of the organ donor pool, this had material ramifications for 
patients waiting for transplant from different blood groups. This was especially so for ‘Asian’ 
patients, who make up the majority of the UK’s blood group B population: with 38% of 
‘Asian’ people having blood type B, compared with 24% of ‘black’ people, and just 10% of 
‘white’ people (Davies, 2006; Rudge et al., 2007). As such, ‘Asian’ patients waiting for 
transplant were disadvantaged due to the strict criteria for exact blood type matching in 
organ allocation (Davies, 2006). It was not until 2002 that blood group O organs were 
allowed to be donated to blood group B recipients, in reflection of the inequalities the 
previous policy had brought about (Rudge et al., 2007). 
The role of tissue matching in UK organ allocation policies has also had similar effects. Tissue 
matching refers to the use of HLA -A, -B, and -DR matching in transplantation to improve the 
chances of graft success. Human Leukocyte Antigens are proteins on the surface of the 
body’s white blood cells and other tissues. They are vital for the workings of the immune 
system as they present “foreign” substances in the body to the “killer” T- and B-cells, which 
produce antibodies to “destroy” these invaders (Joralemon, 1995: 337; Tinckam and 
Chandraker, 2006); of which transplanted organs are included. As such, the better a HLA 
match between organ donor and recipient, the less of a chance that the organ will be 
rejected. The distribution of HLAs in humans is hugely diverse and have been traced to the 
geographic origins of populations, along with migration (and thus conversion of HLAs into 
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different types), and disease history (Marsh et al., 2000).  Despite the reported diversity of 
HLA types within population groups, HLA matching in transplantation has generally been 
mapped to an understanding of biological difference, by stratifying HLA type to racial/ethnic 
groups (Gordon, 2002; Duster, 2003; 2005). In this way, ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ people have been 
differentiated from ‘white’ people by HLA type.  
In the UK context, minority ethnic patients have been ascribed through “rare” HLA types, 
which are compared with more “common” (white) HLA types in the donor population (see 
Fuggle et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2010: 388). As such, HLA types are differentiated by 
(BME) recipient and (white) donor, generating a focus upon the shortfall in HLA aligned 
donor kidneys at the same time. With the UK’s focus upon close HLA matching this has also 
had material effects upon BME transplant waiting times.  
Although evidenced that poor HLA matching in kidney transplantation may lead to increased 
risk of graft failure, developments in immunosuppressant therapy and the importance of 
other factors, such as recipient age, have led to acknowledgments of the “diminishing 
significance” of HLA compatibility in kidney transplantation (Held et al., 1994; Su et al., 2004: 
1501; Cecka, 2007). In the US this – alongside the fact that HLA matching was adversely 
impacting ‘African American’ renal patients – was recognised with the alteration of the 
kidney allocation scheme to remove priority points for HLA-A and HLA-B matching in 1990 
and 2003, respectively  (Cecka, 2007; Hall et al., 2011; Malek, et al., 2011). This has seen a 
significant decrease in waiting inequities between ‘white’ and ‘African American’ patients 
(Hall et al., 2011). However, it was not until 2006 that the UK altered its kidney allocation 
policy, in recognition of such developments. Here, the scheme attempted to balance 
“equality” of access with “utility” of transplant outcome (Johnson et al., 2010: 393). One 
way this was done was by “defaulting” rarer HLA types, less common in the donor 
population, to more prevalent forms. For example, HLA-A36 occurs in 0.2 per cent of 
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patients on the transplant list, yet is present in only 0.05 per cent of donors. In contrast, its 
more “common” form, HLA-A1 occurs in 18 per cent of the donor population. In this way, by 
re-categorising HLA-A36 as HLA-A1, patients with the former have a greater likelihood of 
receiving a matched organ (Johnson et al., 2010: 393). Initial analyses of the scheme suggest 
that whilst waiting times for “difficult to match [BME] patients” (Johnson et al., 2010: 392), 
have not decreased, the disparity in waiting times between ‘white’ and ‘BME’ patients has 
significantly lowered (Johnson, 2011 – personal correspondence). 
Despite the fact that the 2006 allocation changes effectively shifted biological boundaries – 
and thus the gap between ‘white’ and ‘BME’ transplant waiting times – by the re-labelling of 
HLA types, the fact remains that boundaries of ethnic identity have been drawn around 
these notions of “rare” and “common” HLA types.  This, in turn, means that the focus on 
minority ethnic transplantation remains tied to notions of genetic sameness or genetic 
difference. Writing about the construction of the UK’s ‘BME’ transplant problem, Kierans and 
Cooper (2011) argue that: 
the criteria that are used to determine who may be matched with whom treat 
membership of social and cultural groups (understood in terms of ‘race’ and 
‘ethnicity’) as proxies for genetic makeup. In its attempts to accommodate ‘rare’ 
HLA types, transplant medicine has fallen back on the same classificatory 
schemas that were implicated in the creation of the inequalities that recent 
policy shifts were intended to address – schemas that are based, primarily, on 
the assumption of a ‘natural’ basis for cultural differences. (P.13) 
 
This biological inscription of ‘cultural’ difference – in which the categories of race and 
ethnicity have been mapped as the biosocial basis (e.g. Rabinow, 1996) for HLA types, and 
thus the main reason for transplant inequalities – has been taken up by the anthropologist 
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Elisa Gordon. Gordon (2002) describes a similar process in the US in relation to ‘African 
American’ transplant inequalities. She contends that the focus on, and assumptions of, HLA 
difference between population groups obscures alternative understandings about 
transplant inequalities. These assumptions she relates to the way in which ‘races’ are 
represented as genetically differentiated groups. This fails to account for the high level of 
HLA diversity within ethnic groups, rather than simply across them; and how HLA types in 
‘white’ people are used as the scientific default, meaning that ‘BME’ groups get positioned 
as the “nonstandard” in transplant medicine (Gordon, 2002: 136). As Gordon argues, this 
has the effect of essentialising racial/ethnic difference.  
 
Troy Duster has also taken up a parallel analysis of scientific accounts of minority ethnic 
health inequalities in the US. Similar to how the UK ‘BME’ transplant issue has been 
constructed, Duster (2003; 2005) argues that race and ethnicity become the primary 
organising factor by which minority ethnic health disparities are understood. This leads to 
“complex interactive feedback loops between biology and culture and social stratification” 
(Duster, 2003: 258), where the categories deployed by science to understand inequalities 
come to have very real effects upon the health outcomes of individuals (see also Bowker 
and Star, 1999).  Duster (2003) describes the feedback loop involved in the mapping of 
blood group types to ethnic groups, in the context of blood transfusions in the US.  
This feedback begins with the “biological fact” (Duster, 2003: 258) of the greater prevalence 
of antigens in blood from Americans with European heritage, compared to those with 
African or Asian ancestry. As such, ‘blacks’ and ‘Asians’ have more risk of having a serious 
reaction to a blood transfusion from a white person, and vice versa. In turn, the “social fact” 
that white people constitute the majority general and blood donor population has biological 
effects on ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ transfusion recipients (Duster, 2003: 258). This relates to how 
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the majority of blood banks only test for the most common blood group antigens in the 
general population. This practice, Duster argues, effectively leads to a greater risk of 
transfusion reaction for people from minority ethnic groups. Despite this fact, the problem 
has been largely discussed and acted on by relating it to the need to increase blood 
donation from minority populations. This effectively veils the production of inequality within 
medical practice; positioning it, instead, at the door of ethnic (biological) difference. In a 
similar way, Avera (2009) utilises Duster’s feedback concept to understand the drive in 
South Africa to increase ‘black’ and ‘coloured’ bone marrow donors: where ‘black’ and 
‘coloured’ potential donor identities are produced by their conflation with HLA type.  
These feedback processes which Duster and Avera describe provide us with a way of seeing 
how the ‘problem’ of transplant access for ‘BME’ groups in the UK has been understood. In 
this case, the feedback relates to how, what began as an inequality around renal failure and 
disparities in access to transplantation, has been later related to the biology (HLA and blood 
type) of population groups. These ascribed biological identities have been used to stratify 
these groups, which we see in the classification of ‘BME’ transplant patients by ‘rare’ HLA 
type. This has the effect of furthering the original social inequality, with transplant 
allocation policies which utilise understandings of racial difference in the context of the 
‘social fact’ of a majority ‘white’ donor pool.  In turn, with the growing focus upon ‘black’ 
and ‘Asian’ populations’ reluctance to donate their organs after death, differences in access 
to transplantation – as a problem described as originating within bodies – have 
subsequently been fixed in place as a problem between the bodies (Strathern, 2009) of 
ethnic/’cultural’ groups. 
These shifts have determined the specific character of kidney disease in this context, giving 
us insight into how the categories of the ‘BME’ transplant patient and organ donor have 
been conceived in response to a specifically defined health inequality. That minority ethnic 
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people donate less than their ‘white’ equivalents is thus a conditional problem: understood 
as the product of transplant medicine’s development. Around the time of the first change in 
organ allocation policy, research also began to emerge which attempted to explain the 
minority ethnic transplant ‘problem’ through the lens of low donor rates from these 
populations. However, before moving to this literature, I want to expand on policy which 
specifically discusses the ‘issue’ of, and interventions for, increasing organ donation from the 
UK’s ‘BME’ groups. This will then be followed by an analysis of the academic research which 
addresses transplant inequalities. 
Part 2. Policy, promotion, and research responses: the responsibility of 
organ donation 
In this section, I show how UK policy and research responses to ‘BME’ transplant inequalities 
are symptomatic of the way in which the problem has been practically and discursively 
constructed around notions of biological difference. Drawing on Duster’s feedback loop 
(2003; 2005), we went from the social inequality of transplant access, into the biology of 
transplant matching. This, in turn, has been used to stratify population groups, resulting in 
material effects on the potential for ‘BME’ patients to receive a transplant, in the context of 
a majority ‘white’ donor pool. As I demonstrate in the following section, this moves back to 
society in the responses to solving the issue: namely in how ‘BME’ groups are further 
rendered by the construction of their collective responsibility to donate organs. 
Policy responses to transplant inequalities 
Organised policy responses to recognised donor organ deficits began to crystallise with the 
introduction of the NHS organ donor register in 1994; the Department of Health’s (DH) 
transplant strategy (2003); and the related National Service Framework for Renal Services 
(NSF) (2004). These represented the first comprehensive policy responses in recognition of 
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the growing ‘problem’ of a gap between the supply of, and demand for organs for 
transplant. Despite the general drive to increase the number of organs for transplant across 
the board, UK policy addressing the organ shortage has tended to isolate minority ethnic 
populations as a specific and difficult-to-tackle group.  
In positioning transplantation as the optimum form of treatment for ESRF, the NSF (2004) 
pointed to the critical need to increase organ donation, specifically from ‘BME’ groups, to 
ensure equity of transplant access. This was reflected in the Saving Lives, Valuing Donors 
strategy (DH, 2003). Here, the challenge for a new transplant framework revolved around 4 
aspects, including prevention of disease (thus limiting the need for transplantation), and 
increasing the number of donor organs. In discussing the ‘problem’ of higher need for renal 
transplants amongst ‘South Asian’ and ‘African Caribbean’ ‘communities’, the strategy 
points out that: “because the best-matched organs are likely to come from people with the 
same ethnic background, it is important to ensure that all groups have the willingness and 
opportunity to donate organs” (DH, 2003: 9). It later charges UK Transplant with increasing 
the “profile” of organ donation within ‘South Asian’ and ‘African Caribbean’ groups through 
targeted promotions. In 2007 the organ donor taskforce established a specific ‘Cultural’ 
Working Group, which had the explicit remit of looking at prevailing ‘cultural’ attitudes to, 
and their implications for organ donation. The strategy of awareness-raising around 
donation is also discussed in the Organ Donor Taskforce’s (ODT) more recent Organs for 
Transplant (2008) policy report.  
This report laid out drastic plans for an overhaul of donor-transplant services within the 
NHS, in order to increase deceased donation rates by 50% over five years. Using evidence 
from Spain and the US, where high organ procurement rates are linked to institutional 
donation practices, recommended changes included increasing the workforce of donor-
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transplant coordinators11; hospital-wide recording and monitoring of potential and actual 
donors; required referral of all potential organ donors to a donor-transplant coordinator; 
and the introduction of collaborative approaches to donation requests between donor-
transplant coordinators and hospital staff. While the main changes to increase donation are 
concerned with altering the organisational structure of donation processes, the report also 
recommends attention towards public promotion and recognition of donation.  
The report points out how, with family consent for donation averaging 60%, there are a large 
number of potential organs not obtained. This, it asserts, means that “the public as well as 
the NHS has a major role to play” (ODT, 2008: 26). In addition, it singles out the issue of 
higher rates of kidney disease amongst ‘Asian’ and ‘African-Caribbean’ populations, and the 
corresponding ‘problem’ of low rates of organ donation from these ‘communities’. It details 
the importance of understanding the “barriers” (p.49) to donation within ‘BME’ 
communities, and finding ways to tackle these. In comparing the UK’s donation refusal rates 
to Spain’s record (just 20%), the report touches on the importance of institutional practice in 
gaining consent for donation. However, when it comes to recommending how to tackle low 
donor consent rates, this institutional connection disappears. It states:  
There is an urgent requirement to identify and implement the most effective 
methods through which organ donation and the ‘gift of life’ can be promoted to 
the general public, and specifically to the BME population. (ODT, 2008: 48) 
In this way, by simply placing targeted promotion as the only way of talking about the ‘BME’ 
donor 'problem', the report fails to link together its focus on institutional practice with low 
‘BME’ donor consent rates.  
                                                          
11
 Donor Transplant Coordinators have since been re-named as Specialist Nurses in Organ Donation (SN-OD). 
These are clinical nurse specialists whose job it is to manage all aspects of the donation process; from 
requesting donation from families, to organising theatre teams for organ retrievals, as well as providing 
education to hospital staff around donation. 
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With this recommendation, the production of transplant inequalities resulting not just from 
the historical outcome of transplant allocation schemes, but also the structural organisation 
of donation services, recedes from view.  The classification of ‘BME’ groups within transplant 
allocation policies therefore feeds back into how these groups have come to be defined as 
the main solution to this problem in the public/policy domain.  As Ian Hacking (2006: 23) has 
argued, individuals get “made up” by their transformation into objects for scientific inquiry. 
In this way, the classification of ‘BME’ transplant recipients and ‘BME’ potential donors have 
been constructed around the high need for transplant and the fact of low donation rates. 
They are then further categorised and overlapped as groups-in-need (of transplant) and 
groups-as-solution (donors) to those in need. In “making up” population groups in this way, 
the “engines” of transplantation and donation policies involved in their formation are 
rendered invisible (Hacking, 2006: 24). This process is continued in public interventions 
which have been taken up to tackle the transplant problem and the related donor shortage 
within ‘BME’ groups, which I turn to next. 
‘Black’ and ‘Asian’ donor campaigns: making a moral imperative 
Reflecting the gradual shift from the focus upon preventing kidney failure through to organ 
donation, the first significant public response to ‘BME’ renal health and transplant 
inequalities came with Kidney Research UK’s ABLE campaign (A better life through education 
and empowerment) in 2001. On Kidney Research UK’s website, the project’s aims are 
outlined as such: 
[...] to help these at risk communities by raising awareness into kidney disease, 
highlighting the importance of healthy living and finding research into the 
causes, prevention and treatment of kidney disease among the South Asian and 
African Caribbean communities.  
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The ABLE project picked out these “at risk” ‘communities’ by focusing upon urban areas with 
high ‘BME’ populations, such as West London and Leicester. The Leicester project, for 
example, involved research with the ‘South Asian’ ‘community’ and primary healthcare 
professionals to look at knowledge around kidney disease. Findings led to the production of 
educational materials and training of peer educators to promote prevention of risk factors 
for ESRF (Farooqui, Jain, and Freehally, 2008). Whilst not wanting to undermine the 
importance of such projects, the fact remains that the focus has been squarely placed upon 
these “at risk” ‘communities’, who become the target of interventions to reduce kidney 
health inequalities. 
In a similar way, organ donation promotions aimed at ‘BME’ ‘communities’ have become 
the public face of minority ethnic transplant inequalities. In being tasked with increasing the 
profile of organ donation within ‘BME’ groups, UK Transplant bought out its first ‘black’ and 
‘South Asian’ targeted nation-wide donation campaign in 2007. The Can We Count on You? 
leaflet and poster campaign (fig. 3) featured well-known ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ comedians 
delivering the ‘facts’ of the ‘gift’ of organ donation to their community. In a direct appeal the 
leaflets state: “you may not have thought organ donation is something that affects you. But 
as Asian [/black] people, we’re at least three times more likely to need a kidney transplant 
than the rest of the population”. In laying out these stark facts for ‘Asian’ people it then asks 
them to help “their community” by joining the organ donor register. In this way, the 
audience is asked to give the gift of an organ through the binding of individual identities to 
notions of ‘community’ (ethnic) responsibility. This moral appeal to save lives is reflected in 
NHSBT’s most recent (2009) ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ arm of their general Prove It campaign, 
discussed previously (see figs. 2 and 4).  
Alongside urging ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ people to “prove” their belief in organ donation through 
the re-formulation of individuals as ‘communities’, these groups were also singled out in 
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street plays and faith road shows in cities with high minority ethnic populations, such as 
Birmingham and London. The message is therefore a moral one: as ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ 
people, you have a collective responsibility to help your community by donating your organs. 
 
Figure. 3 UK Transplant’s (2007) Can We Count On You? ‘Black’ and ‘Asian’ leaflet campaign. 
 
Figure. 4 NHSBT’s (2009) ‘black’ Prove It campaign poster. 
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The moral imperative for ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ individuals to register as an organ donor 
has therefore been firmly entrenched by these campaigns. These follow from policy 
responses which have taken the binding of genetically distinguished groups to transplant 
inequalities through to the domain of organ donation – as the key site to tackling these 
disparities. In this way, the campaigns move one further, asking their ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ 
audiences to make a personal, moral connection to the constructed sense of (ethnically 
distinct) ‘community’. Organ donations’ publics then, in the context of transplant 
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inequalities, have been specifically worked-up to denote distinct and distinguishable 
population groups.  
The work of Cori Hayden (2007) helps us articulate this idea more clearly. In her 
examination of debates over calls for a new ethical principle of participant benefit sharing in 
clinical research, Hayden argues for a consideration of who the publics’ benefitting actually 
are. In describing a research project which gathered plant artefacts in Latin America for US 
drug development, Hayden shows how the benefitting Latin American ‘communities’ – who 
would receive royalties from any subsequent drug production – were made by enrolling 
chosen groups, such as traditional healers, as future benefit-sharers. Through such 
processes, Hayden argues, the notion of ‘community’ becomes a “site and mode of 
conversion” (2007: 737). In this way she shows how ‘communities’, such as ‘BME’ potential 
donors and transplant recipients, are not necessarily the precondition for, but rather are the 
result of, research (and, in our case, transplant medicine’s) efforts.   
However, it is not simply policy and its public manifestations which have taken up the 
problem of transplant inequalities as a ‘problem’ of organ donation. Over the past decade, 
researchers have been searching for ways to understand why donor rates from ‘BME’ 
communities are so low, and how to subsequently increase consent rates for deceased 
donation. Existing research on this subject is therefore largely driven by, and constructed 
around policy frameworks. The literature appears to be looking for ways to solve the 
‘problem’ as it is presented, without necessarily fully exploring the issue itself, as I 
demonstrate below. 
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Research responses: fixing ‘culture’ as the solution 
At present, UK research has reflected the concerns of policy which links the origin of 
minority ethnic transplant inequalities to the lack of ‘BME’ organ donors. The research thus 
addresses this disparity by firstly examining the potential for donation within ‘BME’ 
‘communities’, and secondly, assessing how this potential is constrained by ‘cultural’ factors. 
The intention is to use this knowledge to formulate educational interventions to increase 
‘BME’ organ donation in the long-term. This small body of research has largely focused upon 
minority ethnic/minority religious groups in localised geographic areas, such as ‘Muslims’ in 
Birmingham (e.g. Razaq and Sajad, 2007), and ‘black African’ and ‘black Caribbean’ people in 
London (Davis and Randhawa, 2004). It consists of mainly qualitative focus-group and 
interview work, where participants are asked about their general opinions on donation; with 
some quantitative studies also assessing people’s overall willingness to donate organs.  
Findings from the research can be broadly grouped into 4 thematic sets. These cover: 
mistrust of the medical system; knowledge and understanding about organ donation; beliefs 
about the body after death; and religious and wider ‘community’ factors. These are 
positioned as barriers to, and thus openings for, interventions to increase donation rates. In 
this way, as I will later argue, ‘culture’ has been positioned as a barrier to organ donation 
and therefore operates as shorthand for a range of complex issues related to organ donation 
and minority ethnic groups. These assumptions feed into one other, with the effect that 
‘BME’ groups have become racialised and “culturalised” in relation to organ donation 
(Kierans and Cooper, 2011: 11). In addition to UK work, I also draw upon a sample of mainly 
survey-based studies from the US, where there is similar focus upon transplant inequalities 
among ‘African Americans’ and ‘Asian Americans’. I firstly report on the 4 main findings from 
this research, before drawing out my critique of this work. 
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Mistrust of the medical establishment 
The UK research consistently reports that ‘BME’ groups’ mistrust of the medical 
establishment holds weight in their opinions about donation. This includes a general lack of 
confidence in the health care system; the fear that doctors might not do as much to save 
your life if you are registered as a donor; or would even remove your organs before death 
(Exley et al., 1996; Davis and Randhawa, 2004; Alkhawari et al., 2005). For example, 
Alkhawari et al’s. (2005) qualitative study with ‘Muslim Indo-Asians’ in West London found a 
high level of alienation from the UK’s healthcare system, which they partly linked to wider 
racial discrimination. In another study, Davis and Randhawa (2004) researched attitudes 
towards organ donation amongst the ‘Black African’ and ‘Black Caribbean’ population in the 
Lewisham and Lambeth areas of London. Findings from focus groups included negative 
perceptions of donation due to mistrust and fear of the medical establishment, with some 
participants expressing the belief that health professionals would not try as hard to save 
their life if they carried a donor card. They conclude by highlighting the importance of 
effective distribution of information about organ donation to the ‘black’ community. Here, 
the ‘problem’ of donation is attributed to the ‘culture’ of fear around the medical donation 
procedure. The understanding is that education may reduce this ‘cultural’ barrier to 
donation. In this way, ‘culture’ is explicitly placed outside of medical institutions and their 
practices, with the notion that such fear inhibits medicine’s potential to procure organs from 
the ‘black’ ‘community’. 
In the US, reflecting the privatised organisation of the healthcare system, and the lower 
socio-economic status of ‘African Americans’ (Siminoff et al., 2006), this mistrust of medicine 
as a factor in negative donation attitudes has been attributed to wariness of the fairness of 
organ allocation systems. This includes perceptions that donated organs are more likely to 
be given to ‘white’ well-off people, or the ‘rich or famous’ (Cheung et al., 1998; Sing, 2000; 
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Boulware et al., 2002; Siminoff et al., 2003; Sander and Kopp Miller, 2005, Siminoff et al., 
2006). 
Knowledge and understanding of donation 
Another major ‘issue’ highlighted by the research is the lack of understanding and 
awareness about organ donation within minority ethnic ‘communities’. This is taken to 
include whether people know how to register as an organ donor; whether someone has 
thought about donation before; and if they are aware of the conditions for becoming an 
organ donor (Exley et al., 1996; Perez et al., 1988; Randhawa, 1998b; Ahmed et al., 1999; 
Darr and Randhawa, 1999, Davis and Randhawa, 2004; Molzahn et al., 2005). Knowledge has 
also been linked to peoples’ awareness of their religion’s stance on organ donation. In Razaq 
and Sajad’s (2007) questionnaire study among ‘Muslims’ in Birmingham, religion was 
understood as the primary organising factor in peoples’ attitudes towards, and thus 
decisions on whether to become an organ donor. The authors argue that, with the majority 
of respondents believing that donation was not permitted in Islam, “it is the awareness, or 
the lack of, which is the first hurdle in combating low donor rates” (Razaq and Sajad, 2007: 
1529).   
In the US, lower levels of knowledge about organ donation among ‘African Americans’ has 
been used to predict the (decreased) likelihood of consent for organ donation (Morgan and 
Cannon, 2003). Research which suggests possible interventions thus focuses upon the 
potential for individual behaviour change through increased public knowledge about 
donation – delivered via an appropriate means, such as religious leaders, community 
networks (Baines et al., 2002; Randhawa, 2005), and targeted promotion (e.g. Baines et al., 
2002; Davis and Randhawa, 2004). As pointed out above, this therefore produces 
‘communities’ as the primary target for intervention.  
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Bodily Integrity after death 
Another way in which minority ethnic groups are problematised in relation to organ 
donation is in reported concerns over donation as a form of bodily mutilation after death. 
Despite the fact that such worries about donation have been expressed within the general 
population (e.g. Haddow, 2005), BME groups have been focused upon in terms of their 
religious concerns about preserving bodily integrity after death, and the worry that funeral 
customs, such as preparing the body for burial, would not be possible with donation (Exley 
et al., 1996; Hayward and Madhill, 2003; Davis and Randhawa, 2004; Alkhawari et al., 2005; 
Molzahn, et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2008). Similar findings were reported in Albright et al’s. 
(2005) US study on attitudes of Filipino ‘Asian Americans’ towards organ donation and 
Cheung et al’s (1998) comparison survey of ‘Asian-Americans’ and ‘caucasians’. In the UK 
specifically, Alkhawari et al. (2005: 1328) reported on the “culture specific issue” of body 
sacredness in Islam with ‘Muslim Indo-Asians’. Participants reported Islam’s prohibition of 
interference with the body after death, and the belief that organs are not ones’ personal 
property to give away after death. In another example, Hayward and Madhill (2003) looked 
at the meanings of organ donation amongst ‘Muslims’ of Pakistani origin, and ‘white’ English 
nationals in the North of England. They found that both groups conceptualised donation in 
terms of personal costs. For example, some respondents in the ‘Muslim’ women’s group 
expressed their worries over donation in terms of Islam’s stance on bodily integrity after 
death. In comparison, ‘white’ participants felt that the ‘costs’ were related to their mistrust 
of the medical establishment. By juxtaposing attitudes in this way, ‘Muslim’ participants’ 
(religious) views on the body become problematised as a ‘culture’ specific issue for targeting 
‘Muslim’ populations for donation education.  
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Religious beliefs and the involvement of ‘community’ 
Similar to the way in which religion has been specifically linked to bodily concerns around 
organ donation, UK and US studies problematise minority groups’ uncertainty about their 
religion’s stance on donation, and other religious concerns in general (Randhawa, 1998b; 
Boulware et al., 2002; Hayward and Madhill, 2003; Razaq and Sajad, 2007). Religion has also 
been linked to participants’ worries about community responses to, and the need for 
extended family involvement in donation decisions (Exley et al., 1996; Randhawa, 1998b; 
Albright et al., 2005). For example, Randhawa’s (1998b) study of the ‘Asian’ population in 
Luton reported that ‘Muslim’ respondents “relied particularly heavily on the religious 
prescriptive in their faith to direct their beliefs and behaviour towards organ donation” 
(p.1951). This was also related to participants’ expressions of how donation decisions, rather 
than being an individual choice, would be a product of different family members. In 
response to religious concerns, a few studies have pointed to the permitted status of organ 
donation within the UK’s major religions: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism (Exley et 
al., 1996; Randhawa et al., 2010). However, it has been found that even with recognition of 
the legitimacy of donation, e.g. through Islamic Fatwas, the gap between official views of 
religious leaders and the everyday practices and concerns of individuals (Randhawa, 1998b; 
Alkhawari et al., 2005; Arriola et al., 2007; Razaq and Sajad, 2007), means that no simple 
conclusions can be drawn between the position of religion and donation beliefs (Sheik and 
Dhami, 2000; Randhawa et al., 2010). 
Critiquing the donation research 
Not wishing to undermine the insights this work provides around people’s everyday 
concerns over organ donation, the fact remains that in defining ‘BME’ ‘communities’ and 
asking them about their attitudes towards organ donation, the research has rooted itself in a 
pre-defined schema. This schema fixes transplant inequalities to constructed notions of 
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‘BME’ ‘communities’ and ‘culture’, therefore failing to adequately explore any further 
aspects to the ‘problem’. Below, I provide the main points of critique around these studies, 
which I will address by utilising wider social science literature around ethnicity, ‘culture’, and 
health: 
Firstly, in taking ‘BME’ ‘communities’ and their ‘culture’ as the point of departure for 
understanding transplant inequalities, the research continues with the perceived link 
between biology (HLA and blood type), race, and ethnicity, which I described in part 1. This 
has the effect of conflating and assuming a direct association between the categories of 
biology, race, ethnicity, culture, and the ‘fact’ of low donation rates.  
The conflation of categories such as ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ has been evidenced as a common 
phenomenon in scientific research (Pfeffer, 1998; Ahmad and Bradby, 2007, Bhopal, 2007; 
Fujimura et al., 2010). Social science researchers have shown that, despite the continued 
utilisation of categories such as ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in research, there is a lack of 
understanding over what these terms actually mean. For example, Lee (2009) looked at 
researchers’ use of race and ethnicity in journal articles of biomedical cancer studies. She 
found that despite researchers giving weight to the concepts, they did not sufficiently use or 
define them. Similarly, Smart et al. (2008) found there was little consensus on the utilisation 
and understanding of these classifications in their research with UK biobank scientists. 
Amongst interviewees, understandings of ethnicity ranged from genetic ascriptions, to ones 
of ‘culture’ and lifestyle, right through to acknowledgement of their socially constructed 
nature. As Lee argues, such problematic and interchangeable usage of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ 
“reifies” racial and ethnic categories as biologically significant, thereby restricting wider 
interpretations of ethnic health inequalities (Lee, 2009: 1186). 
In the research on ethnicity and organ donation, the category of ethnicity has been 
specifically conflated with the concept of ‘culture’. Such conflation has a distorting effect 
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where, as Ahmad and Bradby (2007: 798) point out, “the disadvantage [i.e. lack of access to 
transplant] of minority ethnic groups is seen as caused by their diseased genetic and 
dysfunctional cultural inheritance” (see also Ahmad, 1993; Taylor, 2007). In a similar vein, 
Bhopal (1997) argues that epidemiology has become racialised through its common practice 
of relating health inequalities to notions of the innate characteristics (including notions of 
‘culture’) of ‘BME’ groups (Nazroo, 1998). Such racialisation of health inequalities has been 
linked to medicine’s long history of pathologising minority ethnic groups (Ahmad, 1993)12. 
This has the effect of veiling wider, structural issues of inequality, such as how racism and 
religious prejudice have been linked to pervasive patterns of deprivation, along with 
persistent health inequalities among non-white groups (Nazroo, 1998; 2003; Karlsen and 
Nazroo, 2002; 2010; Harris et al., 2006a; Ahmad and Bradby, 2007; Krieger, 2010; Priest et 
al., 2011).  
As we see therefore, the alignment of biological difference with groups of people constructs 
knowledge categories in a complex and seemingly unavoidable way in medicine (Duster, 
2003; Epstein, 2007). In merging ideas about the (biological) origins of transplant 
inequalities with notions of ethnicity and ‘culture’, the research has continued with the 
understanding which classifies minority ethnic groups as an innate factor in transplant 
inequalities. Disparities in access to kidney transplantation have therefore been positioned 
as a ‘problem’ of ethnicity; a category which is operationalised through notions of ‘culture’. 
By taking ‘culture’ as the end point of the complex issues around transplant matching, the 
‘problem’ of transplant inequities has been boiled down to the concept of ‘culture’. In 
addition, ‘culture’ has been problematically related to the innate practices and beliefs of 
                                                          
12 One example is the case of ‘Asian’ rickets in the UK in the 1970s. A disease which had previously been seen 
as one of poverty later became understood by specific reference to ‘Asian’ lifestyle habits and ‘Asian’ peoples’ 
genetic inability to absorb vitamin D (Ahmad, 1993). 
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population groups. It is this misuse of the ‘culture’ concept which I offer as my second point 
of critique. 
As demonstrated, research which attempts to find out reasons for low ‘BME’ donor rates has 
largely represented ‘culture’ as a causal factor. ‘Culture’ therefore becomes a variable, which 
is not only aligned with ethnic group membership, but has also been understood as a static 
set of rules relating to religion, traditions, and beliefs etc which merely exist within different 
communities (Ahmad and Bradbury, 2007). For example, we saw how expressions of bodily 
sacredness after death in Islam was understood by Alkhawari et al. (2005) as a “culture 
specific issue”. This has the effect of placing culture as a stable and closed system which 
belongs to mutually exclusive groups of people (Barth, 1969; Rosaldo, 1993; Agar, 2006). In 
this way, ethnicity and culture become mutually derived (Ali et al., 2006), with ‘culture’ 
transformed into the object of inquiry in relation to transplant inequalities.  
As anthropologists have noted, ‘culture’ is a highly contested and complex concept (Rosaldo, 
1993; Agar, 2006; Baker, 2010), with a troubling history relating to colonial projects (Baker, 
2010). Rather than being able to describe ‘a culture’ or behaviour as ‘cultural’, as the 
research on donation and ethnicity does, anthropologists have come to increasingly refer to 
‘culture’ as process, which takes change, time, and different perspectives, rather than 
overarching beliefs or practices, as the focus (Abu-Lughod, 1991; Rosaldo, 1993; Taylor, 
2007). For example, Agar (2006) advocates the notion of ‘translation’, in reflection of the 
intersubjective nature of ‘culture’. Rather than a descriptive label, he tells us, ‘culture’ only 
comes about in the recognition of difference in the interaction between different people. 
Through such understandings, Islamic sacredness around the body (Alkhawari et al. 2005) is 
named as a ‘cultural issue’ only in the context of research on organ donation, and its 
recognition as a potential ‘barrier’ to donation consent.  
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The sole focus in the research upon ‘BME’ populations has also led to ‘culture’ becoming the 
framework by which to distinguish the minority from the majority group (Barth, 1969) in 
relation to organ donation. In this way, ‘culture’ is seen as the main variable for intervention, 
with the assumption that knowledge (about donation) will lead to direct behaviour change 
(in donation consent). In examining research into HIV/AIDS prevention in Africa, Taylor 
(2007) similarly argues that ‘culture’ has been utilised as a catch-all term to describe 
behaviour and beliefs which lead to the transmission of HIV and act as barrier to its 
prevention. ‘Culture’ is therefore understood as a ‘problem’ for medicine to overcome by 
effecting interventions to promote behaviour change around donation. In this way, as I 
thirdly argue below, in positioning ‘culture’ as the sole preserve of ‘BME’ groups it gets 
placed outside of medicine’s domain of practice, which renders invisible the part that 
medicine has played in making and maintaining transplant inequalities.  
As we saw in part 1, with the effect that transplant allocation policies have had on transplant 
inequities, the organisation of healthcare has an important part to play in ‘BME’ health 
outcomes. Yet, despite this, research has continued to ignore medical practice in the debate 
on organ donation and ethnicity. Wider research into healthcare organisation, however, 
reinforces the importance of bringing medicine into the picture. For example, social research 
has consistently called attention to disparities in access to healthcare for minority ethnic 
groups, which may contribute to health inequalities (Commander et al., 1997; Modell et al., 
1997; Szczepura, 2005; Taylor and Marandi, 2008; Kovandzic et al., 2011). In addition, a body 
of qualitative research has shown how minority ethnic health inequalities can also be traced 
to the everyday interactions between health professionals and minority ethnic patients. For 
example, Cass et al’s. (2002) study on Yolngu-speaking, Aboriginal patients and their doctors 
in an Australian dialysis department found general incidents of miscommunication, which 
went largely unrecognised by healthcare providers. These miscommunications related to 
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vital factors in the care trajectory (diagnosis, treatment, prevention), which had the 
potential to jeopardise quality of patient care. Taking a provider viewpoint, Kai et al. (2007) 
found that UK health professionals felt discomfort and uncertainty when encountering 
patients perceived as culturally different from themselves. As a result, health professionals 
felt their ability to adapt their practice to patients’ needs was inhibited, affecting quality of 
care. Divergent understandings of health and notions of identity between health 
professionals and minority ethnic patients therefore has the potential to negatively affect 
quality of care and health outcomes. Other studies have highlighted the detrimental effects 
upon the treatment offered, and how information is communicated to minority ethnic 
patients when provider care revolves around stereotyped notions of ethnicity (Bowler, 1993; 
Atkin et al., 1998).  
These examples differently illustrate the importance of ‘culture’ in minority ethnic health 
inequalities. They show how, far from standing outside of medicine and being drawn around 
‘communities’, ‘culture’ is understood in the context of the organisation of healthcare 
institutions and in the work of practitioners with minority ethnic patients. By ignoring such 
intersubjective understandings of culture, and thus limiting insight on organ donation to the 
‘cultural’ beliefs of ‘BME’ ‘communities’, researchers have failed to draw medicine into the 
debate. Part 3 of the literature review takes up this point to highlight findings from key – yet 
isolated – research on institutional donation practices and the experiences of donor families. 
This research points to the importance of the encounter between ‘BME’ groups, health 
institutions, and their practitioners in donation outcomes. In so doing, we move away from 
the specific focus upon ‘BME’ groups as the sole problem in transplant inequalities, and 
towards an understanding of the production of these disparities within the context of 
medicine. 
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Part 3. Understanding organ donation: the role of medical institutions 
In this part of the literature review I provide evidence from a small body of research on 
organ donation which illustrates the importance of bringing institutional practices around 
donation into an understanding of low ‘BME’ donor rates. I Firstly describe the largely 
survey-based research from the US and Europe, which highlights disparities between how 
‘white’ and ‘black’ families are approached about organ donation, as well as how donation 
decisions can be seen as the outcome of a number of factors; of which healthcare practices 
are an important part. Secondly, I utilise research which has been conducted with donor and 
non-donor families across different national contexts, to highlight how these families draw 
on their institutional experiences to make sense of their decision to donate their relative’s 
organs or not. Taken together, this work points towards the importance of taking a better 
look at medical institutions and their practices in understanding donation disparities. 
‘Race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in donation practice 
A number of studies have come out of North America which provide an entry point for 
beginning to think differently about the relationship between ethnicity and organ donation. 
These mainly survey-based studies explore the organ donation request encounter, along 
with the pre-encounter (where brain-dead patients are transferred to the status of potential 
donors), to look at what goes on between health professionals and families when a patient 
has died with potential for organ donation.  
Perez et al’s. early study (1988) found refusal rates for organ donation in three US cities were 
higher for ‘black’ and ‘Latino’ patients (45% and 43% respectively) compared with ‘white’ 
patients (17%). Along with speculating on the importance of ‘cultural’ factors, such as 
religious beliefs, in understanding these disparities, the researchers also indicate that the 
possibility of organ donation was not followed through as much by staff with non-white 
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families. Here, the suggestion is that despite refusal rates being higher from non-white 
families, there is a factor of non-referral which needs to be brought into the equation. In a 
similar vein, research by Guadagnoli et al. (1999) showed that families of ‘white’ patients 
who met the criteria for brain death were almost twice as likely to be approached about 
donation as the family of an ‘African American’ patient. Hartwig et al. (1993) also found 
‘African American’ families were less likely to be approached about donation by a health 
care professional than any other ethnic group. With this, we begin to see how inequalities in 
organ donation, and thus transplantation, are very much embedded within institutional 
(medical) practices – which seem to further entrench these disparities. 
These insights are supported by Siminoff et al’s. (2003) study of 451 ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
families’ experiences of organ donation requests. They report how ‘black’ respondents 
perceived that they were put under pressure to make a decision on donation and were given 
less chance to discuss their decision with a health professional. Crucially, the authors point 
out that simple measures to increase awareness about the need for more ‘black’ organ 
donors in the US will not, therefore, solve the shortage if ‘black’ families are not given equal 
treatment in the donation encounter to their ‘white’ counterparts.  
Other, more general research in the US, UK, and Sweden strengthens the argument that 
medical institutions need to be brought into understandings of donation disparities. In their 
earlier study with potential donor families and health professionals, Siminoff et al. (2001) 
found 4 factors relating directly to donation decisions. These included the pattern of 
consent: who the request was made by, and who discussed donation with families; and that 
families were found to be five times more likely to donate if they were involved in more 
discussions about donation with staff. If we then compare this with Siminoff et al’s. 2003 
findings that ‘black’ families had less chance to discuss donation, we gain a stark insight into 
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how organ donation inequalities may be produced by institutional donation practices, 
specifically when these differ between ‘white’ and ‘black’ families.  
Further to such insight, Sanner’s (2007) research, comparing the donation experiences of 
potential donor families with Intensive Care doctors in Sweden, found that only half of the 
25 doctors interviewed were comfortable with requesting donation from bereaved families. 
Importantly, when families were unaware of their relative’s wishes around donation, only 
doctors with a “pro-donation” (p. 296) approach in their requests gained consent for organ 
donation. In this way, Lesoeurs et al’s. (2009) findings of how French Donor-Transplant 
Coordinators viewed migrant potential donor families’ situations as more ‘difficult’ than 
other families are important, if it were to affect their subsequent approach to families. And 
in their systematic review of factors influencing families’ decisions on organ donation, 
Simpkin et al’s. (2009) findings mainly related to institutional practices. Reduced rates of 
refusal for donation were linked to the separation of the request for organs from the 
discussion of brain death; the delivery of adequate information about the donation process; 
and the skill and training of the person making the request, among others.  
Bringing these insights together, I argue that it is therefore far from simply about whether 
someone has a positive attitude/belief about organ donation that is the issue in low donor 
rates, as the research on ‘BME’ ‘communities’ would have us believe. Here, the notion of 
‘community’ and ‘culture’ in organ donation widens out to one which involves both families 
and health professionals. This insight is further expanded with research which looks at the 
general experiences of donor and non-donor families across different national settings. 
Family experiences of donation requests 
Studies which have looked at families’ experiences of being asked to donate their deceased 
relative’s organs also attest to the importance of examining medical practices in donation 
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decision-making. Research in the UK, Greece, the US, and Taiwan with donor (those who 
consented to donate) and non-donor (those who refused to donate) families, has identified 
overlapping factors influencing families’ decisions over donation. Specifically of importance 
are those which show how families struggle with accepting organ donation not simply 
because of personal beliefs/’culture’, but as a result of the care they receive, and the 
information provided by health professionals. 
One major issue brought up by families as affecting their decision to donate their relative’s 
organs was around their struggles to come to terms with the concept of brain death (Foulton 
et al., 1987; Sque and Payne, 1996; Franz et al., 1997; DeJong et al., 1998; Sque et al., 2005; 
Bellali and Papadatou, 2007; Sque et al., 2007). This has been theorised around whether the 
deceased’s body and its parts are viewed mechanistically, or whether families perceive their 
relative as still embodied after death (Sanner, 2001; Haddow, 2005). Taken on their own, 
these understandings would fit with a ‘culturalist’ view of organ donation, where families’ 
pre-conceived ideas about what happens to an individual after death dictates their donation 
decisions. However, families who eventually donated were found to demonstrate a greater 
understanding of brain death than those who declined donation (Franz et al., 1997; DeJong 
et al., 1998; Haddow, 2005). This understanding has been linked to the way in which health 
professionals convey this form of death to families (Haddow, 2005). This illustrates the 
importance of how views on death may be produced in the context of how death is 
explained by health professionals, rather than something which can be predicted by peoples’ 
de-contextualised attitudes towards death.  
Families’ experiences with Intensive Care staff and donation professionals were also 
emphasised as important factors in donation decisions. Donor and non-donor families gave 
weight to the perceived quality of care provided; how appropriately information was 
tailored to their needs; and how the request for organs was done – with donation nurses 
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pointed to as key in this (Sque and Payne, 1996; DeJong et al., 1998; Martinez et al., 2001; 
Shih et al., 2001; Haddow, 2004; Bellali and Papadatou, 2007; Sque et al., 2007). This attests 
to the importance of looking at donation procedures, and the practices of health 
professionals around these, in understanding how family decisions are reached. Bellali and 
Papadatou’s (2007) qualitative interview study of Greek parents asked to donate their child’s 
organs provides a good example of this. They found that most families who consented to 
donate experienced a two-fold request process, where the formal request was precluded by 
an informal suggestion of donation. Parents reported the benefit of having a double request: 
it gave them time to think about the possibility of donation before they were formally 
approached by the treating doctor. In contrast, none of the families who refused donation 
experienced this informal pattern of request.  
In addition to the influence of how and when donation requests are made, donor and non-
donor relatives also expressed the importance of having a trusting relationship with 
healthcare staff. This encompasses the perception that staff had done all they could to save 
their relative’s life, and feeling like they were treated with care and compassion (DeJong et 
al., 1998; Shih et al., 2001; Haddow, 2004; Bellali and Papadatou, 2007). In contrast, non-
donor families reported the lack of such a relationship as a factor in their decision to refuse 
donation (DeJong et al., 1998; Sque et al., 2005; Bellali and Papadatou, 2007). In this way, 
the development of rapport between staff and families is a vital factor in the decision 
making process.  
These findings link into the insights by Siminoff et al. (2001; 2003) and Simpkin et al. (2009) 
of the importance of institutional practice in organ donation outcomes. They help us move 
beyond the methodological and theoretical blinkers witnessed in policy, health promotion 
campaigns, and research which ties ‘BME’ transplant inequalities to ‘BME’ organ donor rates 
and ‘BME’ ‘culture’. As I argued in part 1, these inequalities have been produced within the 
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practices and policies of transplant medicine. Yet this is veiled in the discourse and practices 
surrounding the issue, which potently tie transplant inequalities to a specifically formulated 
notion of ‘BME’ ‘culture’.  
In contrast, these studies show the importance of viewing donation decisions as a contextual 
process between families and health professionals in institutional contexts; the outcome of 
which does not simply converge with isolated attitudes towards organ donation (Sque et al., 
2007). However, much like how the Organ Donor Taskforce’s report (2008) failed to make the 
link between ‘BME’ transplant inequalities and institutional donation practices explicit, this 
body of research seems to have been ignored in public and academic domains discussing the 
‘issue’. In addition, these studies provide only a glimpse into the practices which are set up 
as vital in donation decisions. We are given little insight into the context or detail of, for 
example, how brain death is explained, or how families are actually asked about donation. 
This brings us to the fourth and final part of the literature review. Here I take ethnographic 
research into the institutional practices of organ donation and transplantation to illustrate 
the importance of understanding transplant inequalities through the institutional contexts in 
which these are initially produced. In this way, I widen the boundaries of the 
‘community/‘publics’ in (‘BME’) organ donation to also encompass medicine’s domains.  
Part 4.  Institutional assemblages of organ donation 
In this section I focus upon a body of ethnographic research which demonstrates the 
importance of paying attention to national, institutional, and practice contexts in order to 
understand the phenomena of transplantation and donation. To recap on previous 
arguments, I have shown how research, health promotion, and policy responses to 
inequities of transplant access for minority ethnic groups in the UK have fixed ethnicity and 
‘culture’ as both the source of, and solution to, these disparities. In this way, inequalities in 
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transplant access have been largely tackled by the focus upon getting the (‘BME’) public to 
donate more organs. This has the effect of not only veiling the part transplant medicine has 
played in the production of these inequalities, but also renders opaque any further part 
medicine may have to play in the donation decisions of ‘BME’ families. By shifting the focus 
from ‘BME’ ‘culture’ to the institutional contexts of organ donation in the previous section, I 
argued for a different approach to studying ethnicity in relation to organ donation, which 
would take these contexts into account. Such an approach has been taken up by 
anthropologists and sociologists in studies of the practices and wider institutional, political, 
social, and economic contexts which make organ transplantation and donation possible. It is 
to such work that I now turn to provide detailed insight into the importance of bringing 
institutions and their practices into alternative understandings of the ‘problem’ of ethnicity 
in organ donation.    
The biosocial domains of transplantation 
In contrast to research outlined previously, there is a large body of ethnographic, social 
science research which takes up the phenomena of organ donation and transplantation as 
‘biosocial’ (Rabinow, 1996) or ‘sociomedical’ processes (Sharp, 2006: 4). Rather than 
polarising medical with public domains, this work, drawing on the approach of science and 
technology studies (STS), shows how transplant medicine is constituted by diverse actors, 
such as health professionals, brain dead donors, medical technologies, transplant recipients, 
and donor families, among others. This is an area which is thus acknowledged as 
enormously complex, with a variety of debates taken up to explain the phenomenon of 
transplantation.  
These debates encompass: the impact of receiving another person’s organ on a transplant 
recipient’s sense of self, and the un-repayable burden of debt in receiving a donor organ (Fox 
and Swayzey, 2001; Crowley Matoka, 2005; Kierans, 2005; Shimanzono, 2008; Poole et al, 
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2011); the everyday experience of caring for a brain dead cadaver, requesting donation from 
bereaved families, and living with the experience of having donated a relative’s organs 
(Sharp, 2006; Jensen, 2010); and the practices of organ trafficking and selling in non-
Western nations, understood as symbolic of global economic inequalities (Scheper-Hughes, 
2001; 2002; Sanal, 2004; Tober, 2007; Lundin, 2010; Yea, 2010). This work has also 
theoretically tracked the polarised discourses which characterise transplant medicine in 
terms of bodily objectification, commodification, and the reciprocal act of gift giving – 
creating social obligations between recipient and donor (Mauss, 1954; Appaduri, 1986; 
Sharp, 2001; 2006; Lock, 2002; Ben-David, 2006); alongside the shortfalls of using such 
concepts to understand the complexity of donation and recipient experience (Parry, 2008; 
Kierans, 2011).  
To focus such a large body of work for the purpose of this review, I take up in more detail 
research which pays attention to the institutional practices of deceased organ donation and 
transplantation. I will show how this research provides insight into the co-constructed 
relationship (Jasanoff, 2004) between organ donors, the institutions, and their practitioners 
who make donation possible (Healy, 2004). This work I have grouped into two sections, 
summarised below:  
I firstly draw on ethnographic work by the anthropologists Margaret Lock (1996; 2002) and 
Lesley Sharp (2001; 2006; 2007), to show how brain death is a complex, phenomenological, 
concern for all involved constituents. Linking to the ‘BME’ issue, I argue that this work 
demonstrates how organ donation is not simply the product of pre-conceived ‘attitudes’, but 
also a result of the ability of health professionals’ to render death, and thus donation, 
acceptable to families. These insights will be contextualised by (anthropological and STS) 
research on death and dying within medical domains.  
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Secondly, I utilise work by Linda Hogle (1995; 1996), Sharp (2006), and Megan Crowley-
Matoka (2005) on the work of donation and transplant professionals, who actively produce 
organ donors for transplant, and frame transplantation as a desirable form of treatment. 
This I use to argue for the importance of contextualising ‘BME’ transplant inequalities by 
understanding the networks of relations involved in making donation possible. These 
examples will be grounded with a further discussion of research which examines the work of 
scientists and health professionals: providing justification for my research focus upon 
institutional donation practices. 
The problem of brain death  
The figure of the brain dead cadaver13 – from which the majority of donor organs are 
procured in the UK – has been variously conceived as a hybrid of nature/culture, 
human/machine, person/non-person, and alive/dead (Gaylin, 1974; Lock, 2002; Staiano-
Ross, 2005). As Margaret Lock (2002) argues, it is the hybridity of the brain-dead that brings 
about anxiety, precisely because we cannot place them into any “morally absolute” 
categories (p.41).  
As a result, brain death has been commonly held up as a problem for gaining consent in 
organ donation by virtue of the way in which families struggle to accept the death of their 
still-breathing relative (see e.g. Franz et al., 1997; DeJong et al., 1998; Haddow, 2005; Sque 
et al., 2005, outlined in part 3). In medicine, debates have formally clustered around 
standardising criteria for brain death, to provide medical practitioners certainty in the 
legitimacy of their diagnosis (Lock, 2002). Much like how the ‘cultural’ beliefs of ‘BME’ 
‘communities’ have been framed as inhibiting the potential to reduce transplant inequities, 
brain death has largely been understood as a problem of families, or the public – unable to 
                                                          
13
 See thesis introduction and chapter 3 for an overview and explanation of brain death in organ donation.  
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understand the finality of this form of death. However, as Lesley Sharp (2001; 2006) argues, 
organ donation is only possible by virtue of all involved parties (clinical staff, donor nurses, 
potential donor families etc) accepting brain death. Sharp and Lock’s ethnographic research 
therefore provides an alternative perspective on the problem of brain death for organ 
donation. It shows how it as much as an issue for health professionals as it is for families and 
the public, as I describe below.  
Lock’s (1996; 2002) work on brain death in America and Japan contrasts the apparent ease 
in America with which brain death was accepted by both medicine and the public with the 
situation in Japan, where brain death was only legally recognised in 1997. However, when 
scratching beneath the surface, Lock reveals the ambiguities which exist between brain 
death as a notion in principle, and how this is interpreted by professionals caring for brain 
dead donors. This includes the ambivalence of Intensive Care doctors in conceiving of brain 
dead patients as truly dead. All of the 32 Intensivists Lock interviewed discussed the belief 
that brain dead donors were not biologically dead when sent for organ retrieval. Many of 
these doctors understood brain death as “not quite dead but neither alive”; with one 
expressing his belief that “real” death only occurs with the cessation of the heartbeat (2002: 
248). Similar uncertainties over brain death were found in Youngner et al’s. (1989) survey 
research into US health professionals’ understanding of brain death. When presented with 
hypothetical scenarios of brain dead patients, some respondents explained the patient’s 
‘dead’ status by their unacceptable quality of life and their “hopelessly dying” situation 
(p.2207). Importantly, Youngner et al. (1989) argue that, although the criteria for 
recognition of whole brain death has been accepted in the US, there are discrepancies in its 
application in practice. They suggest that if staff are confused, this may impact negatively 
upon their ability to deal with brain dead patients and their relatives, with the implication 
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that the potential for securing donation is dependent upon the knowledge of health 
professionals around brain death.  
From this, I suggest that for healthcare staff involved in donation there may be discomfort in 
the process of asking for, and removing organs from the still-breathing dead. If we link this 
to the research in part 3, which indicates the importance of how the donation request is 
done by health professionals in families’ donation decisions, we begin to see how low organ 
donor rates (and transplant inequalities) can only be understood in the encounter between 
these two (artificially polarised) sides. Lesley Sharp (2006) has also shown how 
ambivalences over brain death are evidenced in the peculiar practice of anaesthetising 
brain-dead donors prior to procurement surgery. Rarely discussed in medical literature, the 
practice is justified as a way of relaxing the donor’s muscles, to ensure donation surgery is 
not jeopardised by residual spinal reflexes. However, in her interviews with anaesthetists, 
Sharp found another explanation: that it is used for the emotional comfort of operating 
staff, to quell distress if a ‘dead’ patient starts thrashing about in theatre. This example also 
indicates the way in which death is put to work in healthcare domains: how the dead are 
made acceptable for both families and health professionals, so as to make donation 
possible.  
This leads us to briefly contextualise such arguments with wider research into the 
organisation and practices around death and dying in medical domains. This literature I 
draw on in light of the above insights into death as an important concern in organ donation. 
Medical practice organises death  
As indicated above, death in organ donation is not simply an issue for families/the public, 
and nor can it be reduced to a simple matter of the technical criteria for determining death. 
Rather, death can be understood as an ongoing process, where the relationship between 
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the dead and the living are contingent upon the contexts in which these are played out 
(Kellehear, 2008: 1540). As Kaufman and Morgan (2005) have argued, the practices and 
technological developments of medicine have come to organise the Western dying 
experience.  
One of the first ethnographic studies into hospital dying was conducted in the US by Glaser 
and Strauss (1965; 1974). They found that dying had a specific trajectory; the most 
important stage they classified as “nothing more to do” (1965: 177). This is when a person’s 
death is certain, with medical practice moving from recovery to comfort and preparing the 
family for death. Glaser and Strauss therefore showed how dying is not only organised by 
medical practice, but is also brought about for families in practices which indicate the dying 
status of their relative.  Similarly, Sudnow’s (1967) ethnography of US hospital staff involved 
in care of the dying shows how death and dying are “constituted by the practices of hospital 
personnel as they engage in their daily routinised interactions within an organisational 
milieu” (p.8, italics in original). For example, Sudnow argues that a distinction can be made 
between clinical, biological, and social death, with social death enacted in activities around 
the patient in preparation for their ‘final’ death. This was evidenced by a nurse trying to 
close the eyes of a dying woman, which she justified by the comparative ease of closing the 
eyes before death occurs, when the muscles have not yet become rigid (Sudnow, 1967: 74). 
Death is thus inscribed on the dying by the practices of health professionals, which indicate 
the shift from dying to dead. Here we might argue that, for the still-breathing brain dead, 
the symbolic status of death, and thus its acceptance, is much harder to achieve. 
More recent research has attested to the enduring relevance of these early studies. For 
example, Kaufman’s (2005: 56) observations of dying in American Hospitals evidences how 
death is routinised or “moved along” in the context of private, economically driven 
healthcare systems. And Seymour’s (2000; 2001) ethnography of death and dying in UK 
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Intensive Care Units (ICU) shows how decisions to withdraw treatment on a patient are 
made when understandings of technical and bodily dying converge. In this way, death is 
rendered as ‘natural’ and thus legitimate for families. Such practices, Timmermans refers to 
as “death brokering”: where deaths are made “culturally meaningful” for families (2005: 
993) and health professionals alike. This he evidences (2005; 1998) in the common practice 
of cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on patients whose situations are deemed hopeless, 
so as to provide a dying stage for families. In a similar way, Johnson et al. (2000) show how 
families are equipped for the death of their relative by health professionals’ construction of 
a narrative-trajectory of dying, which gradually indicates the hopelessness of a patient’s 
condition to the family. Equally, when these communications are done badly, families may 
feel unprepared for their relative’s death (Russ and Kaufman, 2005). Medical practices 
around the dying are not always done for the sake of families, however, as we saw with 
Sharp’s example. Hadders (2007, 2009a) shows how medical technologies and practices 
construct the dead for both families and health professionals. For example, he illustrates 
how ICU nurses’ post mortem care of the dead, such as shrouding the body, allows for an 
“ontological switch” in their re-conception of a patient as a corpse (2007: 215).  
These studies attest to the fact that death and dying are constituted and organised within 
medical spaces and their practices. With this, and the work of Lock, Sharp, and Youngner, 
we see how acceptance of brain death is not just about the personal understandings or 
misunderstandings of families. Rather, they are the product of how dying is organised and 
communicated to families, and how death itself is practiced by health professionals. Here, 
death, and subsequent decisions on organ donation requests are seen as the product of an 
agreement between professionals, patients, and families; made through the practices which 
give meaning to death. The following section of this review picks up on the importance of 
medical practices around donation, to show how the locally-situated work of health 
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professionals makes organ donation possible. This evidence culminates in the justification 
for the orientation of my study into ethnicity and organ donation, which takes the study of 
healthcare institutions and their practitioners as the site for understanding the ‘BME’ organ 
donor ‘problem’.  
Producing organ donors and transplant recipients  
A small body of ethnographic work has looked at the practices by which donor organs are 
obtained, and kidney patients are rendered as potential transplant recipients. This research 
highlights the complex networks of constituents, procedures, practices, and national and 
institutional settings involved in producing organ donors and transplanting donor organs. In 
detailing this work I aim to provide a further perspective to the BME donor ‘issue’: this being 
one which sees medical domains as vital in making organ donation happen; and thus as a 
key site for tackling ‘BME’ transplant inequalities.   
In her ethnography on procurement professionals in the US, Linda Hogle (1995) illustrates 
how the standardised criteria for establishing the clinical viability of potential donors is 
negotiated by staff in their everyday work. Such procedures were brought about in the 
context of increasing need for donor organs: to optimise donor outcomes and make the 
procurement process more efficient. These standards were put in place with the donor 
tracking tool: a form designed to gather information about the donor from, for example, 
clinical testing for the presence of transmissible diseases, to enable judgement on donor 
suitability. Hogle observed how this tool conversely contributed to pluralistic local practices 
in its negotiation by procurement professionals to meet local organ demands, and in their 
personal judgements of patients as “good” or “bad” potential donors (1995: 491). In one 
example, Hogle observed a four-month old baby being assessed for donation. Despite 
testing positive for Hepatitis C, the procurement coordinators decided the baby was a 
suitable donor by judging that the test was likely to be a false-positive. This they justified by 
71 
 
their knowledge of the family history, deciding that because the Mother (and not the baby) 
was a drug user, the virus “was not really there” (Hogle, 1995: 490). Hogle discusses how the 
“facts” (p. 490) in this case, and thus the standardised donor criteria, were adapted to 
legitimise donor suitability in the context of a high demand for baby organs and the relative 
rarity of such donors.  
Hogle’s work suggests that deceased organ donors therefore get made as a result of health 
professionals’ decisions around suitability, and in their manipulation of practice standards. 
This is done in the context of local and national demands where, in the US, procurement 
practices are highly competitive and economically driven. Similarly, Sharp (2006) has shown 
how family counsellors making requests to families for donation readily draw upon a large 
pool of metaphors to talk about brain death. This is done with the understanding that 
imparting too much information may ultimately deter a family from donating their relative’s 
organs. Brain death thus gets interpreted to families in ways which frame it favourably for 
organ donation. Lock (2002) also highlights how, despite the standardised criteria for 
diagnosing brain death in the US, there is little use of formal frameworks for doing this at 
local levels, with the practice differing between institutions and professionals. I argue 
therefore that the practices which get done by health professionals around potential donors 
and their families, prior to any requests for donation, make organ donation happen.  
Other research has highlighted how the demand for organs is not only negotiated at local 
levels, but is also embedded within wider national contexts. Crowley-Matoka and Lock 
(2006) have argued for the importance of considering national, socio-economic, and 
historical contexts to understand donation and transplant practices, and the disparities 
between available donor organs and transplant demand. For example, Hogle (1996), in her 
research on the practices around donor organs in Germany, discusses the “contested 
practice” (p. 676) of acquiring organs from brain dead bodies in the context of Germany’s 
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history of Nazi atrocities. In contrast to the US, where she found widespread use of 
pharmaceuticals to optimise the ‘quality’ of donated organs, in Germany, donation 
professionals practised minimal intervention on donors. For Hogle, these national 
differences reflect the increased sensitivity of medical intervention in Germany, in light of its 
historical past.  
Another example is provided by Megan Crowley-Matoka (2005) in her study of pre- and 
post-kidney transplant patients in Mexico. She showed how the desire for a transplant is 
actively “cultivated” (p. 823) by healthcare staff, by projecting a ‘normal’ future for patients 
in a country with scarce haemodialysis resources. In one hospital, regular meetings were 
held for kidney patients and their families14 to promote the benefits of transplantation in 
attempts to “mobilise motivation for transplant” (p.825). However, in the context of 
Mexico’s largely fragmented and multi-tiered healthcare system – where those who cannot 
pay into social security rely on public, charity-run hospitals which do not provide 
immunosuppressant medication post transplant – Crowley-Matoka (2005) details the 
troubling outcomes of this cultivation for patients not able to hold down or get a job post-
transplant, and thus maintain their new kidney. This provides insight into how national 
contexts shape both transplant practices and patient outcomes. This is important in 
grounding an understanding of how transplant inequalities, such as the ‘BME’ ‘problem’ in 
the UK, are specific to different settings.  
Organ donation procedures and their practices are therefore understood within national, 
local, and institutional contexts15. These affect how donation is done, and the way in which 
                                                          
14
 In Mexico, transplantation is largely done with live donor organs, with family members usually acting as the 
donor. 
15
 In this way, we may also trace the UK’s low rates of organ donors to the organ retention scandals in the 
1990s. Here, the media storm around the use of organs in research, procured after post-mortem without 
adequate consent from the families of the dead, negatively affected donation rates and deterred hospital staff 
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dead or dying individuals come to be potential donors. In public understandings of the ‘BME’ 
donor ‘issue’ these contingencies have been written out of the picture. This study is 
therefore concerned with bringing these processes and experiences back into view, in order 
to alternatively understand the ‘problem’ of ethnicity in organ donation. Before moving into 
detail of how I did this though, I finally demonstrate how wider research into the work of 
scientists and health professionals provides further evidence for the importance of such an 
approach. 
The work of medicine 
Beginning in the 1970s, a body of ethnographic research has documented the institutional 
processes and practices of medical professionals and scientists (Pickering, 1992). This work 
has contributed to an understanding of how things, such as scientific facts –  and in our case, 
organ donors – are produced within practice contexts and in the formal and informal 
networks created between practitioners (e.g. Woolgar and Latour, 1986; Latour, 1987; 
Pickering, 1992; Rabinow, 1996; Knorr Cetina, 1999; Rapp, 1999; Timmermans and Berg, 
2003). Such work, commonly referred to as science and technology studies (STS), is largely 
associated with the approach of actor network theory (ANT). Here, things – such as organ 
donors and donor organs – are made real by the effects of relations between diverse human 
and non-human actors (Law, 1999; Latour, 2005), such as health professionals, brain dead 
patients, potential donor families, mechanical ventilators, and donation consent forms and 
protocols, among others.  
As Woolgar and Latour, in their seminal Laboratory Life (1986) study demonstrated, the 
production of scientific knowledge depends upon: diverse possibilities, institutional 
contexts, competing interests, funding sources, resources, standards, and “microprocesses” 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
from asking families for donation (Seale et al., 2005; Bird and Harris, 2010). I outline this in more detail in 
chapters 3 and 6. 
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of practice, among others (1986: 41).  In addition, as Mol’s (2002) work on atherosclerosis 
demonstrates, medical objects are constituted by the enactments – the ‘doing’ upon and 
around them – of differently involved actors. For example, bringing a donor organ into being 
may involve various actors and practices including: donation procedures and policy, dead 
and dying patients, intensive care staff and wards, brain stem death testing, mechanical 
ventilators, potential donor families, and taking consent, among others.  
In addition, work on standardisation has highlighted how medical objects are formally 
produced through protocols, classificatory devices, and standardised forms, such as the 
donor tracking tool which Hogle described (1995). Such standards – designed to organise 
and co-ordinate the activities of practitioners, to achieve optimal results – are made to work 
in local contexts, according to the diverse preferences of patients and practitioners, and in 
their formal and informal interactions (e.g. Berg, 1998; Timmermans and Berg, 1997; 2003; 
Castel, 2009; Mol, 2009). For example, Struhkamp et al. (2009) show how the standard 
measure used in physical rehabilitation in the US to assess functional independence is 
negotiated by physical therapists in the treatment clinic. This is done by a process of 
“doctoring” (p. 55), where knowledge of patients’ situations are utilised to reach everyday 
solutions for improving their daily independence. Similarly, Singleton’s work on public 
health policy (2005) illustrates how standardised systems for involving the public in locally-
responsive public health interventions can be made to work through their tinkering at local, 
practice, levels.  
The objects of medicine can therefore be traced to the actors and processes which cohere 
around them, and the practices which are done upon them – underpinned by standards 
designed to regulate medical outcomes. In this way, how we conceive of the presented lack 
of ‘BME’ organ donors can only be understood by examining the network of associations – 
beyond that of just ‘BME’ ‘communities’ – which bring organ donors into being.  
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Conclusion 
In this literature review I have gradually demonstrated the importance of removing the 
black box which has been placed around the ‘issue’ of ‘BME’ transplant inequalities and 
organ donation rates in the UK. The black box refers to how, in research, policy, and 
donation promotions, we only see the inputs and outputs which have been linked to the 
‘problem’ (Latour, 1987). These being ‘BME’ potential donors and ‘BME’ patients in need of 
transplant. This means that all other processes and actors involved in the ‘issue’, such as 
brain death diagnoses, negotiations between potential donor families and health 
professionals, and transplant allocation policies, among others, are rendered invisible. To 
reach this view I firstly showed how the reported ‘problem’ of low ‘BME’ donor rates has 
come about within the organ allocation policies of transplant medicine itself. These 
historically privileged ‘white’ patients and disadvantaged ‘BME’ patients, as a result of blood 
and tissue matching requirements. Despite recent changes to these policies to rectify this 
disparity, there is a complex feedback loop (Duster, 2003) at play between the social 
inequality of transplant access and the way in which this ‘issue’ has been linked to the 
biology (‘rare’ blood and tissue types) of ‘BME’ groups, as the source of the problem.      
The linking of transplant inequalities to notions of biology continues in policy, public 
interventions, and research responses to the ‘issue’, which fix ‘BME’ ‘communities’ as the 
solution to the ‘problem’. As a result, the practices and policies of transplant medicine have 
been made invisible in understandings of the ‘issue’; ‘culture’ is configured as something 
which exists outside of medicine; and peoples’ attitudes towards donation are assumed to 
indicate the likelihood of them donating their organs after death. However, insights into the 
experiences of donor families highlight the key part that health professionals have to play in 
families’ donation decisions. Moreover, donation is understood as something which must be 
made available to families by the act of request, which was evidenced as occurring less for 
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‘black’, compared to ‘white’ families (e.g. Siminoff et al., 2003). Additional ethnographic 
insights into brain death, the medical organisation of death, and the work of transplant 
professionals and medical practitioners also highlights the fact that organ donors are 
produced as a result of the locally negotiated work of health professionals, and in the 
interactions between families and health professionals within institutional contexts.  
With these insights I argue that we cannot understand transplant inequalities and low donor 
rates by solely looking at ‘BME’ ‘communities’. To fully grasp the ‘problem’ we need to also 
examine the settings within which organ donation actually occurs; the practices which make 
donation happen; and the people who experience these processes, such as Intensive Care 
staff, donation nurses, and individuals from ‘BME’ backgrounds with direct experience of 
transplantation and donation. In this way, my study into ethnicity and organ donation takes 
experiences of, and practices around the institutional organ donation encounter – where 
patients are identified as potential donors and families are requested to donate their 
relative’s organs – as its starting point. It is to this approach that I now turn, to outline the 
study’s methodological underpinnings, and how I went about doing such a piece of 
research. 
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Chapter 2. Epistemological and Methodological 
Considerations 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the phenomenological ethnographic approach I adopted for this study 
on the ‘problem’ of organ donation and ethnicity. By examining the literature around 
donation and ethnicity in the previous chapter, I concluded that a broader perspective 
needs to be taken up in understandings of low ‘BME’ donor rates. Such a perspective would 
not limit its gaze to looking at ‘BME’ ‘communities’ and their (‘cultural’) attitudes towards 
donation, as previous research, policy, and health promotion interventions have done. 
Instead, to understand the ‘problem’ of organ donation and ethnicity we need follow the 
various people, institutional procedures and their practices, things, and settings which can 
be traced to the phenomenon. This was to be done by initially focusing upon the organ 
donation encounter, which I describe below. 
Outline of the research objectives 
The aim of this research is to therefore examine the ‘problem’ of organ donation and 
ethnicity by looking at the organ donation encounter with ‘BME’ families, and the people, 
practices, and meanings attached to donation from this initial point of contact.  
The principal objective of the study is:  
To understand the ‘problem’ of  organ donation and ethnicity by generating a richly 
detailed understanding of the organ donation encounter, linking it to the social, 
‘cultural’, and institutional contexts with which it outwardly connects. 
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The organ donation encounter encompasses the immediate site where potential donors are 
decided upon and families are requested to provide consent for donation, alongside the 
settings and actors which make up and background this encounter. This may include not just 
people, such as Intensive Care staff and ‘BME’ potential donor families, but also procedures, 
practices and medical technologies, like the mechanical ventilator. To research the 
encounter therefore involves, among others, examining the experiences of health 
professionals involved in organ donation; the practices which get done around organ donors 
in the setting of the Intensive Care Unit (ICU); and the communications which take place 
between health professionals and potential donor families. It would also mean looking at 
how decisions are made to refer potential donors; how consent for organ donation is 
achieved; and the negotiations which take place prior to donation discussions, such as 
around medical decisions of death. 
In order to investigate this area a series of sub-objectives were used to focus the research 
angle. These were:   
1. To understand under what conditions the donation encounter occurs (and in some 
cases does not occur). 
2. Explore how decisions are made to approach potential donors, what training medical 
staff receive, and the practices they enact around donation. 
3. Map out the experience of the donation encounter, and how this is structured. 
4. Map out how decisions are made by potential donor families, and who is involved in 
making these decisions. 
5. Explore how people reflect on this encounter, and how their actions and decisions 
feature in collective donation experiences, understandings of ‘ethnicity’, and 
personal histories. 
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Starting with the encounter, as opposed to preconceived notions of ‘cultural’ factors 
involved in low ‘BME’ donation rates, provides greater theoretical and methodological 
flexibility for the research. It enables the ‘problem’ of donation and ethnicity to be 
understood as a question of meaning and practice; and ‘culture’ as that which comes into 
play in the interaction between different people and things (Agar, 2006), rather than a set of 
static ‘rules’, existing outside of medicine (Good, 1994; Crowley-Matoka and Lock, 2006).  
This way of researching fits with a phenomenological epistemological approach, which 
enables rich insight into the sense-making practices of those involved with the donation and 
ethnicity ‘problem’ on an everyday basis. A phenomenological approach therefore opens up 
an alternative path of inquiry for the ‘problem’ than has been previously presented. 
Beginning with the encounter also assumes an ethnographic methodology. This is concerned 
with documenting the routine ways in which people make sense of their everyday world by 
using in-depth, qualitative methods, such as interviews and observations (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). Such a methodology is different from the current research into organ 
donation and ethnicity, which examines ‘BME’ ‘communities’’ attitudes towards donation, 
thereby representing the phenomenon as if it were isolated from the medical contexts and 
practices of organ donation.    
In part 1 of this chapter I outline the phenomenological epistemology which underpins my 
research approach (Crotty, 2003), including my reflexive positioning as the researcher. I 
then show how this can be put into practice using an ethnographic methodology, in part 2. 
From this I describe, in part 3, how the research was done (the methods), by outlining the 
process of gaining access to donation settings, and interviewing and observing health 
professionals and ‘community’ members. I finally detail the process of analysis which led to 
the study findings, and the ethical considerations involved in researching the topic.  
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Part 1. Approaching the ‘world’ of organ donation: phenomenological 
positions 
Phenomenology is the study of the social world or, rather, the ‘lifeworld’ as it is 
encountered by individuals. The lifeworld can be understood as the world that is common to 
an individual or group, and is constituted by familiar systems of meanings and language 
(Moran and Mooney, 2002). Taking a phenomenological approach in research involves 
looking at peoples’ lived experience: how they make sense of the world around them, what 
they do within this world, and how they understand what they do (Benner, 1994). 
Phenomenology is not concerned with trying to discover the facts of a phenomenon, but 
seeks to describe the quality of an experience in all its fullness, as it is told to us (Van 
Manen, 1997). Adopting a phenomenological perspective for this study therefore allows us 
to focus upon how different people make sense of their donation experiences, the practices 
they enact around this process, and how ethnicity is made sense of and constructed within 
donation contexts. 
In its historical context, phenomenology is focused upon the philosophical nature of 
experience, as a pre-reflective entity. One of the founders of this approach, Edmund 
Husserl, believed phenomenology to be the study of the lifeworld “as it is in itself” (Husserl, 
1981: 12). Husserl developed his philosophy as a way of demonstrating a crisis in the 
positivist tradition of the European objective sciences, which tried to see the world as if it 
were a totality, therefore leaving out the specificity of experience. For Husserl, objects in 
the world are given “purely in consciousness” (Moran and Mooney, 2002: 62), and can be 
distinguished by focusing upon what we access in our pure reflection. In this sense, the 
phenomenologist is tasked with “bracketing” her/himself from her/his pre-existing 
experience to go “back to things themselves” (Husserl cited in Moran, 2000: 9). The body is 
therefore understood to mediate between object (the world) and consciousness (ideas 
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about the world), undermining the Cartesian mind/body dualism (Laverty, 2003). Later work 
by Merleau-Ponty (1962) was to take this idea further and emphasise the corporeal nature 
of experience, referring to the way in which the world (and experience of the world) is 
always embodied within the perceiver (Moran, 2000). 
Husserl’s phenomenology was subsequently taken up by the philosopher Martin Heidegger 
(1967), who developed a theory of hermeneutic phenomenology. This differed from 
Husserl’s approach, in that it takes experience and its interpretation as the point of 
departure.  For Heidegger, in contrast to Husserl, it is impossible to separate our lived 
experience of the world from the (historical) context in which we encounter it (Laverty, 
2003). This he conceptualised as being-in-the-world (dasein): where experience and things 
are mediated by, and thus are a product of one’s specific position, or background (Koch, 
1995). The world is therefore interpreted by individuals, rather than pre-reflexively 
experienced. Influenced by Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer later emphasised an ongoing 
process of interpretation as the key to understanding the world. For Gadamer (2004), there 
are two ‘senses’ of interpretation. In its original form, interpretation is about highlighting 
what is already there, but which may be concealed in its everyday appearance. The second 
level involves interpreting the meaning that we have revealed (Van Manen, 1997). In this 
sense, all description is ultimately interpretation, since in describing the world and its 
objects we have already mediated between it and ourselves.  
To phenomenologically research organ donation and ethnicity then means to aim my gaze 
towards experiences of the donation encounter, and draw attention to the meaning of 
these experiences and the practices around them (Van Manen, 1997). At the same time  – 
taking a hermeneutic phenomenological perspective – it also involves taking into account 
the settings in which organ donation occurs and the historically situated backgrounds of my 
participants. The basis to such lines of inquiry can be traced in the application of the 
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philosophy of hermeneutic phenomenology to a social science methodology, which more 
recent thinkers have taken up, as I describe below. 
The researcher as professional stranger 
In his seminal essay, The Stranger (1944), Alfred Schutz was the first to make an explicit link 
between phenomenology and its potential use in the context of a social science 
methodology. For a researcher to understand how people operate, Schutz argues that it is 
important for them to firstly forego their own familiar frameworks of reference. This is to 
avoid interpreting phenomena along the lines of “thinking as usual” (Schutz, 1944: 502): 
where one understands the research topic in the context of their own, rather than others’ 
understanding of the world. Schutz describes this process using the metaphor of the 
immigrant, whereby the “recipes” (1944: 501) – such as appropriate behaviour and modes 
of communication – for conducting oneself in a strange environment are not yet known. As 
such, the immigrant must go about learning, adopting, and integrating the “new cultural 
pattern” (Schutz, 1944: 504), so that they may actively take part in their new ‘community’. 
However, this recognition of the new “cultural pattern” takes a different form for the 
sociologist compared to the immigrant. According to Schutz (1944), the sociologist must act 
as a disinterested observer, with the intention of obtaining knowledge about peoples’ 
taken-for-granted behaviour, rather than necessarily integrating themselves within their 
‘world’. Here, Schutz aligns the process of knowledge construction with an objective, 
scientific, approach, in his view that the researcher should objectively classify and analyse, 
in order to interpret peoples’ commonsense ‘recipes’. However, different from the natural 
sciences, Schutz (1967) also posed the notion of first and second order constructs in 
research on “self-reflecting humans” (Flyvberg, 2001: 32). First-order constructs refer to the 
common-sense thinking of research participants: how they make sense of the world around 
them. Social scientists’ interpretations of this are thus second-order constructs (Blaikie, 
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2007). This means the researcher essentially “construct the constructs” (Schutz, 1967: 59) as 
a result of their own way of thinking about the world and in their orientation to their object 
of study. In interpreting the phenomenon of organ donation and ethnicity then, it is only 
through these first order constructs – entering the ‘world’ of those involved in organ 
donation – that would allow me to fully interpret the research problem (Aspers, 2009).  
It is through the experience of examining and interpreting such ‘worlds’ that the researcher 
must also acknowledge their own position and its influence on the study, in a reflexive 
research process, which I describe below. 
Reflexively researching organ donation and ethnicity  
Social research can never operate in a vacuum, and as researchers it is our position in the 
world which lends us our research stance (Moss and Dyck, 2002). In the context of a 
phenomenological approach, Emmanuel Levinas (1969) explicitly linked the philosophy to an 
ethics of being. This he articulated in terms of our relationship with the ‘other’ (Moran, 
2000). In research, the ‘other’ encompasses the research participants and settings, and the 
process involved in acknowledging somebody’s world on an individual level, rather than 
simply placing them into categories (Wild, 1969: 13-14) – as past research into organ 
donation and ethnicity has done by its focus upon ‘BME’ ‘communities’. It also includes 
being aware of how meaning is constructed between researcher and researched (Finlay, 
2006). In so doing, the researcher is able to achieve a type of objectivity, different to that of 
the disinterested observer (Schutz, 1944), in the research process.  
A form of objectivity can be gained in phenomenological research by recognising our place 
in the world. Donna Haraway (1991: 183) advocated such a research, which recognises the 
importance of “partial perspectives”. She argued that a form of embodied objectivity can be 
achieved if we are open about our position in the world. Similarly, for Max Van Manen, to 
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do phenomenological research it is vital to have a “strong orientation” (1997: 20) towards 
one’s topic. This effectively means that we live the research question by interrogating it 
within the context of our own existence (Van Manen, 1997: 43), and acknowledging how 
our own identity may impact upon the research process and its findings (Grewal and Ritchie, 
2006). This I map out below, by scrutinising how my personal position on organ donation, 
and my own ethnic identity had bearing upon the study.  
Prior to entering the research ‘world’ of organ donation and ethnicity, my own experience 
of donation and transplantation was limited to carrying a donor card, which I had done since 
I was a child; and knowing that a friend of my mother’s had died after two failed kidney 
transplants and years on dialysis. Upon beginning the study I was firmly prodonation: I saw 
no reason not to give my organs away after my death, since I had no specific belief in an 
afterlife. I had never given thought to the moral responsibility which backgrounded appeals 
for the public to donate their organs, which I described in chapter 1; or questioned the 
outcomes of transplant medicine for organ recipients as anything other than positive 
(despite the fact that transplantation had been far from successful for my mother’s friend). 
This stance meant that there was the potential for me to examine the research topic and 
analyse my data with the aim of ‘solving’ the shortage of ‘BME’ donor organs, thereby 
reproducing the blame discourse of current research and policy on the issue.  
However, upon beginning the study I became immersed in research literature which went 
beyond scrutinising the donation attitudes of minority ethnic groups, and into ethnographic 
accounts of the medical practices of donation and transplantation, and the experiences of 
donor families and transplant recipients. I began to learn that, far from being a ‘miracle’ 
cure, transplant patients continued – in many ways – to be sick: with daily medication 
regimes and the constant risk of graft failure (e.g. Crowley Matoka, 2005; Kierans, 2005). In 
addition, I learnt that, for donor families, the experience of donating a loved one’s organs 
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went far beyond their agreement to donate, and into the subsequent suffering engendered 
by the medical rules of anonymity, which largely kept donor families and recipients from 
forming relationships (Sharp, 2001; 2006). Whilst I remained convinced of my own desire to 
donate my organs after death, my views on transplant medicine began to shift as the study 
progressed, to eventually be characterised as one of ambivalence. I became acutely aware 
of the messiness involved in people’s decisions to donate, and how these cannot be reduced 
to questions of individual responsibility to donate organs for the sake of a wider ‘public’ 
good (see chapter 1). This stance is reflected in how I approached my analysis and 
presented the study findings, which draw attention to the ways in which donation decision-
making is the product of heterogeneous actors and practices, rather than a simple matter of 
an individual’s/community’s ‘cultural’ beliefs about organ donation. 
As my fieldwork progressed I experienced a similar process of awareness, in terms of how 
my relationship with the research topic and its subjects gradually developed. Initially 
adopting a hermeneutic phenomenological approach in my research involved me entering 
the (‘medical’) ‘world’ of organ donation, and the people who had experience of this 
‘world’. Like Schutz’s immigrant, this world was initially strange to me: I was hearing stories 
about death and dying on a near daily basis, and visiting what was, at first, the daunting 
setting of the ICU – where organ donation usually occurs, and professionals involved in 
donation work. Often waiting on these wards for a member of staff, I could not help but feel 
overwhelmed at the seemingly monstrous machinery which looked to be engulfing patients. 
I also found myself wondering that if I, as a researcher of this world felt intimidated by this 
environment, then how must families who experience the death of their relative here, feel?  
This world, however, gradually became more familiar. Over time I was able to understand 
the once foreign-sounding medical terms such as ‘coning’ and ‘perfusion’, and my shock at 
tales of death dissipated. In addition, at the time of my research, UK donation services were 
86 
 
undergoing huge organisational changes. One such change included the move of the 
donation nurses16 – who facilitate and manage the organ donation process – from their 
previous office bases into Intensive Care Units (ICU). Therefore, at the same time as I was 
learning the recipe knowledge used in the course of work around donation, donation nurses 
were also involved in their own process of learning the ‘thinking as usual’ of Intensive Care 
wards and their staff, to make workable new procedures around donation. In this way, the 
donation nurses were well placed as informants of these worlds (which I detail in part 3), 
since they were able to make explicit the ‘recipes’ they themselves were navigating.  
As my interviews developed with members of Intensive Care staff and donation nurses 
however, I found myself becoming increasingly involved in this ‘world’ of death and 
potential life. To some extent, the later lack of strangeness of the stories I was hearing and 
the practices I was observing indicated that I had begun to take the donation process and 
the workings of health professionals – specifically the donation nurses, whom gave me 
access to the research world, and to whom I was therefore largely reliant upon for 
progressing my insights – for granted. In the words of Schutz (1944), I was in danger of 
beginning to ‘think as usual’ about my research phenomena. Rather than maintaining my 
distance, I  was at risk of becoming too sympathetic towards the donation nurses, which had 
the potential to jeapordise my ability to critically analyse my data. 
Kaufman (2005: 14) documents a similar existential process in her research on death and 
dying in American hospitals, recounting how she gradually came to view death and its 
organisation as “routine”. In the middle of my fieldwork, however, I was suddenly shaken 
out of my blasé attitude towards this ‘world’ with an exposure to the process of a potential 
donor referral in ‘real’-time. This happened when I overheard a phone call discussing the 
referral of a young man, whilst waiting to interview one of the donation nurses in her 
                                                          
16
 I explain their role and these changes in detail in the next chapter. 
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regional office. Asking about the case, I was told that a man had been brought in after a 
motor vehicle accident, and that the Intensive Care staff were about to carry out brain stem 
death tests before speaking to his family. Upon hearing this I felt sick. I realised the actuality 
of a donor process was being played out in real time and I knew about a young man’s death 
before his family. Speaking about this to the donation nurse, she expressed her 
understanding, telling me how some cases “hit home” and make you realise the “strange” 
outlook on life which working in organ donation brings. Thus, I later came to understand my 
position in relation to my research subjects by gradually understanding their relation to this 
‘strange’ world of donation, and my own imperative to maintain the strangeness of this 
world in my analysis, rather than take it too much for granted17. 
In addition to outlining my stance on organ donation, it is also important to document how 
my own ethnic identity had bearing upon the research process. In initially approaching the 
topic of organ donation and ethnicity, in a reflection of the way in which the ‘problem’ has 
been commonly constructed, I felt uncomfortable with the idea that I would be doing 
research into minority ethnic ‘communities’. Looking back, I now realise that this was linked 
to my own mixed ethnic background. Positioning my identity in relation to this research is 
complex, since I see myself as a hybrid of backgrounds. On census forms I have always 
categorised myself as ‘Mixed: White and Asian’. My mother ticks ‘White British’ – her 
relatives being traceable to the North of England; my father, ‘Other’; and my sister ‘White 
British’ – her reasoning being that she looks ‘white’.  
My father arrived in Bristol in 1954, aged 2, on a ship from Rangoon in Burma, accompanied 
by his mother and five siblings (this number would later multiply to seven). My grandfather 
had arrived in the UK some time before to find work, after he and my grandmother decided 
                                                          
17
 I further reflect on how I considered my relationship to the donation nurses when analysing my data in the 
epilogue. 
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to remain British citizens and leave Burma after the dissolution of British rule in 1948. The 
reason for this, I am told, being that my grandfather, unlike my grandmother18, was not 
considered ‘Burmese’, being of Greek and German background. With the institution of a 
fledgling Burmese Government it became virtually impossible for him to find the work he 
was used to, as a ship’s captain. During childhood visits to my grandparents, I was always 
aware of a difference. This I later came to understand through my interpretation of the 
process of fitting-in which the family encountered as immigrants to the UK. This included 
them anglicising their family name; raising eight children in a three-bed council house; and 
my grandparents refusing to speak Burmese to their children once in England, for fear they 
would not otherwise integrate. My father was the only child who ended up at university, 
working his way through night school and day-release from a laboratory to eventually 
complete a PhD in Biochemistry and becoming a teacher. In contrast, my own upbringing in 
a suburban, largely ‘white’, town in an affluent area was what might be described as very 
middle class: with a teacher father and nurse (later lecturer) mother, a grammar school 
education, and straight into university to take up a Cultural Studies degree. As a result of my 
upbringing I have never felt part of a minority group as such, but my memories and sense of 
self will always be infused with my grandmother’s tales of Burma and my understanding of 
my father’s immigrant background. 
My familial straddling of the ‘white’ British and immigrant worlds means that my position in 
this research study is far from ‘objective’ and value free. It provides me with a particular 
vantage point on the world, which I need to be aware of, by documenting how this 
impacted the research process. For example, my sensitivity towards the impact of being 
categorised as somehow different (such as in how ‘BME’ transplant patients and potential 
donors have been) has obviously influenced how I approached the research topic: as a 
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 My Burmese grandmother was herself a hybrid: a product of British imperialism. Her grandfather was an 
English Lord who illegitimately fathered a child with her Burmese grandmother. 
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constructed, rather than a taken for granted ‘problem’. It also will have had consequences 
for the questions I asked of the topic (Gunaratnam, 2003), such as around how ethnicity is 
experienced and practiced in the donation process by health professionals, rather than 
solely focusing upon what people from ‘BME’ backgrounds think about organ donation. 
Moreover, my understanding of the complexity of ethnic identities –  beyond the simple 
classifications of ‘white’ ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ which get made in relation to donation 
and ethnicity – means that I came to largely label my research participants by using their 
own identity descriptions19. This ranged from the singular label of ‘Muslim’; to the more 
complex identity claims of Chris: a kidney transplant recipient with Ghanaian parents, whose 
father told him he was “made in England”, and how he questions his lack of ties to the 
‘black’ ‘community’, having mainly ‘white’ friends and a ‘white’ wife. In addition, my 
position on the topic will have also influenced how I interpreted the research data and 
presented the final findings, which argue that ethnicity is produced within the institutional 
contexts of organ donation, rather than necessarily that which offers an implicit problem for 
the donation process.  
In making these positions clear, I could be accused of bias towards the topic. However, as 
Howard Becker has argued (1967), all researchers inevitably choose their subject matter and 
take sides according to what values they believe in. Becker believes that accusations of bias 
can be diffused by making clear which side the research is on, to allow transparency in its 
critique. Thus, my approach to the ‘problem’ of donation and ethnicity could be seen as less 
of a pragmatic one and more of a political project. Rather than trying to ‘solve’ the issue as 
previous research has done, I have attempted to highlight the way in which this ‘problem’ 
has been produced in the first place, and how we might see it differently by looking outside 
of constructed notions of the ‘BME’ public.  
                                                          
19
 With a few exceptions, I would rarely ask participants to describe their ethnic identity. This is something I 
later regretted: wishing I had explicitly asked for a personal description of how they might classify themselves. 
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In addition to my identity affecting how I did the research, it may also have impacted upon 
how participants responded to me, the stories they told about their experiences, and the 
way in which these were told (Grewal and Ritchie, 2006). In relation to medical staff, my 
non-medical status (as a social scientist) instantly established my outsider position (Mullins, 
1999) to the world of organ donation, in that I was not versed in its clinical procedures. This 
status I saw as both a help and hindrance. Whilst some participants took care and time to 
explain the practices and medical terms of donation, others, I perceived, saw my lack of 
knowledge as evidence of my inability to do such a piece of research. In addition, queries 
about my own ethnic background rarely came up with health professionals. On the only 
occasion it did, with a donation nurse, I was told that she had “assumed” I was ‘white’. This 
may explain the sometimes borderline racist ways in which some health professionals (not 
just ‘white’) talked about minority ethnic families in front of me. With ‘community’ 
participants, I came to see my hybrid background as an advantage, even sometimes 
exploiting it to allow for a point of commonality. Many such participants were also at pains 
to convey their positivity towards organ donation, and their belief that more minority ethnic 
people needed to donate their organs. Power issues were implicit here (Gunaratnam, 2003), 
since these responses might have resulted from the assumption that my status as a 
university researcher meant  I was somehow trying to solve the ‘issue’ of low ‘BME’ donor 
rates, even though I would always tell participants that this was not my aim. 
My identity in relation to the world I was researching therefore meant I was able to adopt 
and adapt to different assigned and embodied identities. This not only allowed me to draw 
out my participants’ responses, but also meant I researched from a position of empathy; 
conscious to the feelings and positions of those who inhabited this – as one donation nurse 
put it – “strange world” of organ donation (Finlay, 2006). My involvement in this ‘world’, 
spanning Intensive Care wards, hospital offices, ‘community’ centres, homes and temples, 
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came about through the adoption of a multi-sited ethnographic methodology. This reflected 
the concerns of phenomenology, in that it allowed me to develop the research focus around 
what I was finding in the field, rather than remain faithful to a set way of approaching the 
phenomena. In the next section, I will briefly outline the principles and theory of using an 
ethnographic methodology, and how this is appropriate for the research problem. 
 
Part 2. Methodological approach: (multi-sited) ethnography 
The phenomenologist Max Van Manen (1997) points out that there are definite ways of 
doing a research project which lends itself to a phenomenological approach. He argues that 
what methodological choice is made, and thus what methods are employed, need to reflect 
the concerns of phenomenology, which “tries to ward off any tendency toward constructing 
a predetermined set of fixed procedures, techniques and concepts that would rule-govern 
the research project” (Van Manen, 1997: 37). Adopting an ethnographic methodology can 
reflect the phenomenological need for openness towards its research topic, in that it 
permits contingency in the research process. Rather than being able to say exactly what will 
be done at each stage, an ethnographic methodology responds to the research findings as 
they unfold (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). It also offers a way of researching which 
allows for insight into how the ‘problem’ of donation and ethnicity has been produced, by 
following the various social actors, such as ICU staff and donation nurses, involved in the 
‘problem’ on a daily basis.  
In general terms, ethnography can be conceptualised as an approach to its subject. It is a 
way of looking at the world, with ‘culture’ and context operating as its key concerns. The 
origins of ethnography came out of the practices of anthropology, where the term was 
originally used in reference to a descriptive text about a ‘community’, usually outside of the 
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Western world (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). In practice, ethnography usually involves 
employing a variety of (generally) qualitative methods to study people’s actions in their 
everyday worlds (the field). The use of triangulation, or ‘complementary’ methods (Barbour, 
2001), is typical of ethnography, which, according to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), 
usually obtains data from as wide a range of sources as possible. The most common method 
– and one which ethnography is most recognised for – is in the use of participant 
observation (Fox, 2004). This involves the researcher spending time with, and adopting an 
everyday role within the research ‘community’, and detailing these interactions in fieldnotes 
(a form of research diary). Ethnography also commonly involves the use of formal and 
informal interviews, and may include the use of quantitative approaches, such as 
questionnaires.  
Traditionally, ethnography was based upon a naturalistic research process. This involved the 
idea that the social world should be studied in its ‘natural’ state, left undisturbed by the 
researcher. This usually translated into the anthropologist entering a small ‘community’ and 
spending an extended period of time there, in order to answer some sort of ‘problem’ 
regarding that ‘community’ (e.g. see Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Mead, 1943). One of the 
characteristics of such an approach, however, was the tendency to objectify these 
‘communities’ in the description of their ‘culture’, as portrayed by the ‘objective’ 
ethnographer whose own values were rendered absent (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). 
This objective gaze of classical anthropology has been accused of complicity with 
imperialism, whereby reported ‘facts’ about non-Western ‘primitive’ societies – as seen 
through the eyes of the (usually) ‘white’, Western anthropologist – were taken as  
justification for the colonialist project (Said, 1989; Faubion, 2007). In this way, anthropology 
and its subjects were borne out of a reliance on, and subsequent representation of 
difference (Said, 1989). Parallels can be drawn between these traditions and the seemingly 
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objective stance which has been taken in the UK research on organ donation and ethnicity. 
By directing the focus upon community ‘culture’ as a barrier to donation, members of ‘BME’ 
populations are effectively ‘other-d’, with wider medical contexts left unquestioned. 
Today, such un-reflexive practice has been widely criticised in anthropology, and labelled as 
the “crisis of representation” (Marcus, 1998: 15). More recent forms of ethnography, as first 
proposed by Scholte (1969) in his call for a critical ethnography, have opened themselves 
out by adopting a more phenomenological orientation (e.g. Steedly, 1993; Tsing, 1994). This 
is done by blurring the boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’ – researcher and researched – 
in the writing of “positioned truths” (Abu Lughod, 1991: 142). Such an approach means 
showing that the ethnographer’s interpretations are the outcome of the research process: 
which produces the ‘world’ it describes, rather than taking this ‘world’ for granted 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). A phenomenological ethnography also interprets its 
phenomena by following the practices, settings, and sense making processes of those 
involved with the phenomena (e.g. Rosaldo, 1993).  In my study, this therefore includes not 
just individuals from ‘BME’ backgrounds involved in donation, but also the health 
professionals who make the process happen. 
In a similar vein, George Marcus (1998) has called for a re-thinking of anthropology’s 
traditionally holistic approach. He argues that the usual tactic of situating oneself within a 
bound ‘community’, which could be a village, or even a hospital ward, creates a “fiction” of 
a whole and “fully-probed micro-world”, rather than that which is constructed by the 
purposes of inquiry (much like the category of ‘BME’) (Marcus, 1998: 33). In pointing out the 
shortfalls of locally-focused ethnography, Marcus proposed a re-creation of the approach in 
the form of a multi-locale (or multi-sited) ethnography. This involves the ethnographer 
widening her lens across different places, people, and systems, so that neither side – such as 
transplant medicine (the macro) and ‘BME’ groups (the micro) – is polarised with the other. 
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Employing a phenomenological, multi-sited ethnographic methodology therefore involves 
looking at different places and parties to represent the multiplicity of phenomena. In 
relation to organ donation and ethnicity these places and parties encompass, among others: 
donation and transplant professionals, Intensive Care staff and Intensive Care wards, ‘BME’ 
transplant recipients and organ donors, potential donor families and religious leaders, and 
organ donation guidelines and consent forms. In Emily Martin’s (1994) ethnography on the 
role of immunity in American culture, the multiplicity of immunity was represented by 
conceptualising the immune system as a field, rather than a ‘community’. For Martin, the 
immune system could only be understood by looking at it from numerous angles, through 
differently related actors and settings. These included analysing public representations of 
the immune system in advertisements, volunteering as a ‘buddy’ at a centre for HIV 
sufferers, and conducting observation in an immunology research lab.  
In this study I have adopted a multi-sited ethnographic methodology to open up the 
phenomena of organ donation and ethnicity in a way that a qualitative interview study, or 
quantitative (questionnaire) approach (both of which have been used in previous research 
on the issue) would not allow. It broadens out an examination of the ‘problem’ from the 
perspective of different constituents, such as ‘BME’ families who have been requested to 
donate their relative’s organs, and the health professionals who navigate this ethically 
problematic field. As outlined in the research objective, the original focus for the study was 
to work outwards from the organ donation encounter. The meanings and practices of 
donation in relation to ethnicity were to be elucidated by starting with the donation 
encounter and allowing this to shape who I talked to, and where I went around this. In the 
next part, the methods, I detail the multi-sited field of organ donation and ethnicity, how I 
went about accessing this field, and the methods I drew on to do the research. 
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Part 3. Methods: accessing specialist domains and doing the research  
In this section I describe the process of how I went about actually researching the ‘problem’ 
of organ donation and ethnicity. I firstly detail the issues involved in accessing the specialist 
field of organ donation, the people I talked to, and the range of methods I used in the 
research. Secondly, I describe the process of analysing my data and producing the research 
findings, along with the ethical issues involved in doing the research.  
As highlighted in the previous section, an ethnographic approach uses different methods 
within numerous sites to build up a multi-faceted understanding of a study problem. My 
research therefore encompassed a variety of settings spanning: Intensive Care units (ICU), 
family interview rooms, seminar rooms, ICU offices, hospital chaplaincies, regional donor 
nurse team offices, hospital canteens, religious temples, ‘community’ centres, and 
participants’ homes; and different people including: ICU nurses and doctors, donation 
nurses, transplant recipients, ‘live’ organ donors, donor families, and religious leaders such 
as Imams. Below, I outline the process of gaining access to and researching these settings 
and people, in an account which aims to show the gradual shift in focus as my fieldwork 
progressed.  
Access: research sites, gatekeeping, and tricky recruitment 
Organ donation usually occurs within the specialised domain of the Intensive Care Unit20, 
and in the offices of regional donation nurse teams. These teams are responsible for 
facilitating and managing the donation process, and are contacted by Intensive Care staff 
with potential donor referrals. For the purposes of this study, I needed access to these 
settings to speak with health professionals involved in donation, as well as the minority 
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 The process also takes place less commonly in the Accident and Emergency Department, with the actual 
organ procurement occuring in operating theatres. 
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ethnic families these professionals encountered. Hospital ethnographies have evidenced the 
struggles experienced by researchers in accessing medical realms, and the bureaucratic 
ethical process this entails. This work has also highlighted the importance of developing 
relationships with key gatekeepers to facilitate access to these tricky research sites (e.g. 
Seymour, 2001; Wind, 2008). As a way in to my research ‘field’, a kidney transplant surgeon 
working in the North of England, with an interest in ethnicity, agreed to act as an informal 
supervisor to the study. Meeting with him facilitated a spontaneous introduction to the 
Specialist Nurses in Organ Donation (SN-OD) – whom I refer to throughout the study as 
donation nurses – working across the hall from his office. A subsequent meeting was 
arranged, and they, along with their allied regional team, agreed to be involved in the study. 
Their collaboration was vital not only in helping to recruit donor families and acting as 
participants to the study themselves, but also in acting as gatekeepers into the Intensive 
Care Units.  
Once initial agreement had been reached with the donation nurses, I began the tangled 
process of applying for NHS ethical approval from the Local Research Ethics Committee 
(LREC) in January 2009. This process of gaining approval took six months. It involved 
completing a mountain of forms to submit to both the LREC and each of the three Research 
and Development (R&D) departments within the hospital Trusts21 I had initially selected for 
the study, only one of which (I call ‘Lakeland’) I ended up researching22. The initial Trusts 
applied to were those in which the donation nurses were originally based. However, as a 
result of the organisational changes taking place at the time, following the Organ Donor 
Taskforce’s (ODT) recommendations (see chapters 1 and 3), soon after I gained approvals 
                                                          
21
 NHS hospital Trusts, which may be housed within one or a number of local hospitals, provide acute or 
secondary health care to a designated geographic area. 
22
 This was because, after further discussions with ICU staff in these Trusts, I realised that these sites did not 
provide enough opportunity for the research, due to their generally low numbers of organ donors and their 
lack of experience with requesting donation from ‘BME’ families.  
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the two donation nurse teams merged to become employees of NHS Blood and Transplant 
(NHSBT), and were re-located to a centralised office base (I refer to this merged team as 
team 1). This meant that I was also required to seek approval from NHSBT to ‘use’ their 
donation nurses in the research. This was gained alongside negotiating the participation of a 
further regional donation nurse team (which I refer to as team 2) in the North of England, 
who operated in an area with a large ‘BME’ population, thus offering further opportunities 
for me to find donor/non-donor families. This team also suggested that I apply for further 
R&D approval to access a large teaching hospital, ‘Hillview’, in which one of their donation 
nurses worked. Hillview was presented as an “interesting” opportunity for my research, 
since it hardly ever referred potential donors to the donation nurse team and had a large 
‘South Asian’ patient population.  
The main research sites therefore spanned the two hospital Trusts of Lakeland and Hillview, 
specifically their Intensive Care Units, and the regional offices of the two donation nurse 
teams. These teams were each made up of around 2023 members, including team leaders, 
donation nurses, and administrative staff. As a result of the ODT’s recommendations, whilst 
these teams were based within a centralised NHSBT office24 (usually also housing other 
departments, such as blood donation, and marketing staff), their work took place largely 
within the hospitals they had been newly assigned to as ‘embedded’ donation nurses. The 
term ‘embedded’ is used to refer to donation nurses physically based within one or two 
hospital Trusts on a day-to-day level. Their embedded ‘office’ was usually in an Intensive 
Care Unit and was either shared with other ICU staff, making it difficult for the donation 
nurses to carry out confidential work, or was a tiny, cupboard-like room, with little space for 
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 This number was much lower at the beginning of my research. As the ODT’s recommendations (2008) began 
to take effect, more donation nurses were employed, to be based within regional hospitals. 
24
 These offices were worked out of on an everyday basis by the donation nurse team leaders and the 
administrators. The embedded donation nurses only occasionally worked from these centres to catch up on 
paperwork and attend team meetings. 
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much beyond a computer and a few files. The ‘field’ for researching these teams therefore 
spanned their centralised base, along with their ICU offices, and the seminar rooms in which 
they carried out donation training for hospital staff.   
The embedded donation nurses at ‘Hillview’ and ‘Lakeland’ also acted as vital gatekeepers in 
helping me access ICU staff to interview at these sites. Emily, Hillview’s embedded donation 
nurse, along with being my gatekeeper to the hospital’s Clinical Organ Donor Champion25, 
also became my main informant. Emily had many years of experience in the donation nurse 
role, and was therefore able to offer me an historical perspective on the role, and how the 
ODT’s changes had affected her work as a result. Her experience also meant that she was 
well connected to a large network of other donation professionals. She therefore played a 
vital part in the study, not least because of her willingness to help, and the insight she 
offered into her experience at Hillview, but also because of the people she was able to put 
me in touch with, to help widen the scope of the study.  
At Lakeland – a University hospital serving a city with large ‘South Asian’ and ‘African 
Caribbean’ populations –  there were two embedded donation nurses, Jennie and Rachel. 
They covered donation within the large Trust, which spanned two hospitals and an adult 
and paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU). Different to my experience with Emily, their 
initially enthusiastic response to the study soon waned as – I interpreted – their workload 
widened. Nonetheless, they provided me with vital initial access to staff, organ donation 
committee meetings at the Trust, donation training days, and the Trust’s Clinical Donor 
Champion, Sarah. Following my numerous hampered attempts to gain access to Lakeland’s 
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 These posts are a new role generated by the ODT’s 2008 recommendations. They are generally Intensive 
Care consultants who give around 4-12 hours a week to work on organ donation. This may take the form of 
training staff, checking referrals, and working with the donation nurses in their general task of promoting 
donation to the Trust. At Hillview, the clinical lead, John, was a ‘white’, middle-aged male consultant 
Intensivist in the adult ICU. 
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adult ICU, Sarah, a Paediatric Intensive Care consultant, facilitated my eventual focus upon 
the PICU at Lakeland by helping me access the Unit’s staff.  
Once granted all necessary approvals for accessing these sites I began asking the donation 
nurses from both teams to send out recruitment packs26 to donor and non-donor families 
from ‘BME’ backgrounds. The inclusion criteria were based upon the aims of the study 
(deliberate sampling), rather than trying to gain a representative sample as such (as is more 
fitting to quantitative research (Barbour, 2001)). This was based upon prospective 
participants having been approached about donating their relative’s organs, and that they 
identified themselves (or had been identified) as being from a minority ethnic background.  
This stage of attempting to recruit donor and non-donor families was slow, frustrating, and, 
ultimately futile. At the start I had envisaged that the donation nurse teams would be able 
to quickly send out recruitment packs from lists of families. This reflected my naiveté about 
the way in which the teams worked – each nurse had their own caseload, rather than there 
being a centralised system – and the fact that the number of families who fitted the 
research criteria was extremely low. This meant I had to approach individual donation 
nurses about each potential family I heard about as a result of presenting my work and from 
subsequent pleading emails to the two teams. As I had initially planned to recruit ICU staff 
and donation nurses who had been involved with participating donor and non-donor 
families, staff recruitment was to be done after I had ‘found’ such families. After three 
months of trying to recruit families via donation nurses and outside promotion of the 
research27, I had no replies. I began to worry that the research would fail if I did not start 
                                                          
26
 These packs, see Appendix 3, included a letter of invitation to the family/individual, signed by myself and the 
appropriate donation nurse; an information sheet giving further details about the study and what would be 
involved in taking part; and a reply slip. 
27
 This included attending community meetings, Hindu and Sikh Temples, and Mosques to tell their members 
about the research, in the hope of spreading word and finding families who had experienced being asked for 
100 
 
some form of data collection. As such, I decided to widen my focus and begin recruiting 
hospital staff and donation nurses for interviews about their general experiences of 
donation with ‘BME’ families, whilst I continued to search for families28.  
This search carried on fruitlessly throughout, and beyond, the period of fieldwork 
(September 2009 - February 2011). Eventually, in contacting ‘community’ organisations, 
such as donation charities, who might help with my search, I stumbled across Arjun. After 
mentioning my research, he told me that his brother had recently died and they had been 
asked to donate his organs. He initially agreed to be interviewed for the study, but, after 
two broken dates I only managed a brief phone interview with him; during which it became 
obvious that he did not wish to discuss the experience at length, so I did not ask for further 
contact. As a compromise for this shortfall, I widened my focus to people of minority ethnic 
backgrounds who were connected to organ donation in some way. These included the ‘Sikh’ 
transplant recipient and his daughter (who donated her kidney to her father) whom I met 
whilst spending time in a Sikh temple. Overall 8 such participants who were connected with 
organ donation in some way were formally recruited to the study to be interviewed. These 
ranged from transplant recipients and their friends, to hospital Imams and the ‘British Asian’ 
founders of a donation campaign charity. 
My ‘failure’ to speak to ‘BME’ donor/non-donor families I understand as such: firstly, there 
were a limited number of minority ethnic donor families in the areas I was researching. This 
not only limited my chance of recruitment, but also offers interesting insight into the fact 
that so few ‘BME’ families had been approached about organ donation in the first place. 
Secondly, I had limited resources to pay for outside advertising for recruitment, and limited 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
organ donation. I also placed a number of adverts for the study in community newsletters, newspapers and on 
the walls of community centres across various locations (see appendix 2). 
28
 I gained a substantial ethics amendment for this shift in November 2009 (see Appendix 5). 
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support structures to help me access ‘community’ gatekeepers, (which have been evidenced 
as vital in research with minority ethnic groups (Sheik et al., 2009)). Thirdly, whilst health 
professional could be readily accessed within hospital domains, the idea of accessing people 
from minority ethnic groups with the uncommon experience of organ donation is 
problematic in itself. Researchers have pointed out difficulties with recruiting minority 
ethnic groups to research generally, arguing that research on ‘BME’ communities in the UK 
has often resulted from negative attention, such as in the aftermath of the 1980’s ‘riots’. As 
such, research may be perceived as stigmatising or unwelcome by minority ethnic groups 
(Johnson, 2006). In light of media coverage and advertising campaigns on the ‘BME’ donor 
issue (see chapter 1), my research may have therefore been perceived as an unwanted 
invitation to be further labelled and differentiated. Shriya, a ‘British Muslim’ woman 
working for a donation charity, summed it up in her description of being subjected to tick 
box exercises by policy makers, whom she understood as having little interest in properly 
representing ‘Muslim communities’.   
Beginning my recruitment with ICU staff and donation nurses meant that instead of asking 
them about specific cases, I would be focusing upon their general experiences of requesting 
organ donation from ‘BME’ families. Recruitment of health professionals snowballed from 
initial presentations about my research, given to PICU and ICU staff at Lakeland and Hillview, 
and the donation nurse teams. This was largely done using convenience sampling, in terms 
of who was willing to give me their time in the first place. These initial recruits also acted as 
gatekeepers to further members of staff. I soon realised however, in line with the statistics 
on low ‘BME’ donation rates, that staff experience of requesting from non-‘white’ families 
was few and far between. As such, I widened my criteria to also include staff who wished to 
talk about their experiences of donation generally. In line with the developing focus of an 
ethnographic study (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), this came after the topic of struggles 
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over withdrawal of care with ‘BME’ families was brought up during my first few interviews. 
As such, even if staff had no experience of donation with ‘BME’ families, all of them were 
able to discuss their experience of negotiations around death with minority ethnic families.  
The majority of health professionals interviewed for the study were white29. With the 
donation nurse teams, this was unavoidable, since – by their own admission – they were all 
of ‘white’ background. At Hillview, all the main consultants on the ICU were white and male, 
and only one (white) nurse on the unit came forward to participate, limiting my sample. I 
did eventually interview a ‘British Muslim’ liver consultant, who had been helping Emily with 
her local donation initiatives.  In Lakeland, the staff were visibly more diverse. However, 
despite my attempts to recruit staff from different ethnic backgrounds, all but one who 
came forward were ‘white’. The only non-white participant, a ‘British Hindu’ consultant was 
collared into participating by his colleague, who asked whether I needed any ‘ethnic’ 
doctors for the study! In total, within hospital settings, I conducted 13 interviews with 10 
specialist nurses in organ donation (5 from each of the 2 teams), 6 interviews with 5 
paediatric and adult Intensive Care consultants, 2 interviews with a transplant surgeon and 
liver consultant, and 5 interviews with PICU/ICU nurses (22 participants/26 interviews).  
Doing ethnography in the field: observation and narrative interviews 
In accordance with the traditions of ethnography (Fox, 2004), observation was used where 
appropriate in this study. In the context of the hospital settings, where roles are clearly 
defined (Wind, 2008), and with my lack of a healthcare background, I used non-participant 
observation for the study. Initially defining what to observe, however, was far from 
straightforward. Because of the nature of the topic, and the openness of a multi-sited 
                                                          
29
 Or, rather, I mostly assumed they were white. By ‘eyeballing’ (Ahmad, 1993) participants for their whiteness, 
rather than asking them to describe their ethnic identity, I was guilty of being a hypocrite of my own critiques 
about the homogenising effects of categorisation.  
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approach, I would have ideally positioned myself in the Intensive Care Units to observe the 
workings of donation on a daily basis, as Linda Hogle did in her research into the work 
around organ donors in the US and Germany (1995; 1996). However, I saw this approach as 
unrealistic. This was mainly because I was aware of the relative infrequency of organ 
donation at these sites, but also due to the ethical difficulties I foresaw with gaining 
permission for such observations, which would involve gaining the consent of immediately 
bereaved families. Observations were therefore done in settings and situations which 
allowed me insight into the daily ‘work’ of organ donation, without having to rely on direct 
observations of donation as it happened. These observations included: donation nurses’ 
training of hospital staff around organ donation, informal meetings with staff about my 
study, ICU staff and donation nurse team meetings, and organ donor committee meetings at 
Lakeland. As documented with my struggle to recruit ‘BME’ donor and non-donor families, 
observations with ‘community’ members eventually encompassed: spending time in a Sikh 
Gurdwara (Temple), where one of its members had had a kidney transplant, visits to 
Mosques, ‘community’ centres, and Hindu temples, and during interviews and informal 
discussions with interview participants.  
As most observations took place in public settings, permission to observe was gained from 
whoever was in charge, with anyone I spoke to also made aware of my role. For example, at 
Lakeland’s donation committee meeting, oral consent was given by the chair of the 
meeting. I also informed all attendees of my role, and made it clear that I would be taking 
observational notes at the start of each meeting. At the beginning of my fieldwork I would 
write extensive field notes30 about anything and everything that struck me as important.  As 
is usual to the ethnographer, however, I was able to hone my observations more readily as 
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 Sometimes field notes were taken at the time, when I felt it appropriate. This included at donation 
committee meetings, and organ donor training sessions, where I could excuse my scribbling with the need to 
get ‘information’ down. 
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they progressed (Fox, 2004; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) and as my findings about the 
‘problem’ of donation and ethnicity became more focused. Thus, in later stages my field 
notes acted as initial analyses for the study, and provided a continual reflective diary of my 
feelings about what I was finding. 
Alongside my observations, interviews – which eventually formed the bulk of my data – 
were conducted with participants about their donation experiences. As an interview 
methodology I adopted a narrative approach. This was in keeping with the 
phenomenological concern to explore people’s sense making processes and practices 
around organ donation and ethnicity (Van Manen, 1997). Narrative interviews use stories as 
a vehicle to explore how people construct meaning and make sense of their experiences. 
This provides a way of accessing individual experience, with reference to the wider world 
around them. Bruner (1986; 1990: 51) calls this the “dual landscape” aspect of narratives: 
where stories have both a moral and epistemic function. By engaging with peoples’ stories, 
the researcher is concerned with interpreting accounts by examining how events are made 
meaningful through their telling (Reissman, 1993). In this way, stories are not seen as 
unproblematic representations of a reality which we can directly access, but are viewed as a 
tool for exploring how people make sense of events, such as organ donation (Riessman, 
1993; Mishler, 1995; Spector-Mersel, 2010).  
In gathering participants’ stories, alongside observations of donation training sessions and 
committee meetings, I was able to not only trace the meanings of organ donation in relation 
to ethnicity, but also analyse how these relations were made sense of, performed, and 
subsequently (re)produced by the practices of health professionals31. Since narrative 
                                                          
31 See footnote 5 in the introduction for a definition of ‘practices. In this study practices included: the medical 
maintenance of potential organ donors by health professionals, so that their organs can be suitable for 
donation; the processes of filling out donor consent forms and performing brain stem death tests; 
communications between health professionals on courses of action around potential organ donors; 
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interviews emphasise the importance of participants’ accounts about the events in which 
they were involved (rather than simply gathering opinion on the ethnic donor ‘problem’), 
they can also function as a form of “extended ethnographic observation” (Mol, 2008: 11)32, 
thereby opening out insight into the relationship between meaning-making and practice in 
the context of the research ‘problem’.  
Working on the basis of a “tell me about...” approach, narrative interviews avoid asking 
sensitive questions by not pre-determining the direction of discussion. In this way 
respondents can talk about what is meaningful to them, in contrast to traditional question-
answer interview formats, which can suppress participants’ accounts (Mishler, 1986a). This 
approach is thus appropriate for the sensitive topic of organ donation, in which people are 
being asked to talk about their experiences of death and dying.  
In the traditions of doing a narrative interview (see e.g. Wengraf, 2001), interviews with 
participants were highly unstructured, with just one question asked to open out the 
discussion33. For example the health professionals’ question asked: 
Can you tell me the ‘story’ of your experiences of being involved in requesting 
organ donation from families of a minority ethnic background, as well as any 
other experiences you have of organ donation that you may wish to talk about.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
discussions of death and donation with patients’ families; and the process of withdrawing treatment on brain 
dead and dying patients, among others.  
32
 In her work on the logic of care Mol (2008) points out that, as her interviews with participants asked about 
the activities and events they were involved in, their accounts offered insight into situations that as 
researchers they had “no time or licence to go” (p.11). Whilst not specifically naming her interviews as 
narrative, her focus upon events is similar to the narrative concentration in my interviews upon obtaining 
stories of donation experiences. 
33
 See appendix 7 for interview schedules of the different questions asked of different participants. 
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For participants with no direct experience of the donation encounter, such as religious 
representatives and transplant recipients, the interviews would often ask a few ‘tell me 
about...’ questions. For example, with the two hospital Imams I interviewed, I asked them 
firstly for any general experiences related to organ donation, and specifically about their 
experiences of mediating between health professionals and families around decisions over 
withdrawal of care. For health professional interviewees, the initial question would 
sometimes lead to lengthy narrative, with little further prompting required. Many of the 
donation nurses, who spend a large chunk of their working time speaking to potential donor 
families, talked in great detail about their experiences. Interviews with Intensive Care staff, 
however, were slightly more stilted, with less ‘narrative’ and more opinion being put 
forward. In these situations, my initial inexperience with the narrative format meant I found 
myself interjecting with further questions, unable to stand the expectant look of staff, and 
their silence.  
My desire to fulfil the narrative requirement for stories led to me constantly asking “return 
to narrative questions” like: can you think of a case in which this occurred? (Wengraf, 2001: 
127). Further prompting questions such as: how do you ask families for donation?/what is it 
like to ask families?, were also sometimes used for participants who found it difficult to talk 
within the open narrative format. Towards the end of my fieldwork, I also began to ask 
more specific questions of my interviewees about themes which had been highlighted in 
previous interviews, such as withdrawal of care struggles.  
Different to a conventional narrative approach, which usually conducts multiple interviews 
with a small number of participants (Wengraf, 2001), I largely conducted just one interview 
with each participant. This was since I aimed to interview a wide range of constituents – in 
keeping with the multi-sited ethnographic approach (Marcus, 1998). In addition, I perceived 
that many interviewees, especially ICU staff who gave up their shift time to be interviewed, 
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might have felt burdened by a second interview. Some participants (n=4), however, did 
undergo a second interview upon my request. These were carried out with those whom had 
detailed a case which I wanted to find out more about, or when I felt that there were 
important aspects from the first interview which needed further probing. For the second 
interviews, after initial analyses of their transcript, participants’ words from their first 
interview were used as the basis for further questions. These would generally ask for more 
details about an event which they described (Wengraf, 2001). Overall I conducted 34 
interviews with 30 participants (26 interviews with 22 health professionals, and 8 interviews 
with 8 ‘community’ participants). 
At the start of every initial interview I went through the study information sheet with each 
participant, ensuring they understood the key points of anonymity and confidentiality. 
Written consent was taken once any questions had been answered, and talk was collected 
using a digital recorder. As soon as possible after an interview I wrote down my reflections 
in field notes, covering, among others: a description of where it took place, what point I 
thought the interviewee was making (Mishler, 1986b), their demeanour throughout, and my 
feelings about the interaction. I transcribed each interview verbatim, simultaneously 
anonymising the accounts as I went along. This process of transcription cannot be readily 
separated from the analytical process (Reissman, 1993). As such, transcription acted as an 
analytical way in to begin to interrogate what the accounts were telling me about the ‘issue’ 
of organ donation and ethnicity. This process of analysis I describe below. 
Analysis: understanding my data 
 
In ethnography the process of data collection and interpretation is iterative and ongoing. 
The ethnographic process means that analysis begins unsystematically and is gradually 
“funnelled” over time (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 206). Analysis was thus not a 
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wholly isolated period but was grounded within the research contexts (Bamberg, 1997; 
Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). The production of field notes was crucial to this process. 
By setting my interviews in context and documenting my research observations, field notes 
were used to plot emergent themes and continually re-assess the focus of my inquiry. The 
complementary material of my observations and narrative interviews adds to the eventual 
quality of interpretation (and, if we were being positivistic, the validity of the findings) – 
where one is contextualised by the other and vice versa (Atkinson and Delamont, 2006).  
Once the bulk of my fieldwork had come to an end I begin a period of focused, intense 
analysis. The initial problem I encountered during this period was how to do justice to both 
types of data (observations and interviews), without becoming overwhelmed with the sheer 
amount of material34 I had. In keeping with the study’s phenomenological approach I 
decided to employ a largely narrative analytical approach, which “privileges the subject’s 
ways of representing experience” (Reissman, 1991: 66). With this, I took the formal 
narrative interviews as the starting point for my analysis.  
Narrative analysis pays particular attention to structure, coherence, and temporality to 
highlight how events are given meaning by their teller (Mishler, 1986b; 1995 Reissman, 
2008). However, despite this common grounding there are a huge diversity of approaches 
around narrative analysis, which are often dependent upon the aims and philosophical 
approach of the study (Mishler, 1995).  Elliot Mishler (1995) has distinguished three models 
of narrative interpretation. These he outlines as: 1. representation and temporality; 2. 
structure and coherence; and 3. the cultural, social and psychological contexts of narrative. 
The first model has its basis in the work of the socio-linguist Labov (1972), who approached 
narrative analysis by isolating clauses within accounts, as if they corresponded with the 
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 This included over 30 hours worth of transcribed talk, and four notebooks of field notes. 
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“sequence of real events” (Mishler, 1995: 90). Labov asserted that a “fully formed story” 
consisted of 6 isolatable elements, these being:  
1. Abstract (the summary/point to the story);  
2. Orientation (time, place, who involved etc);  
3. Complicating action (the ‘plot’ – moving the story forward);  
4. Evaluation (where the teller comments on the meaning of events);  
5. Resolution (outcome of the experience);  
6. Coda (rounding off the story and bringing it back to the present context) (From Reissman, 
2008: 84). 
Although a practical model for doing analysis, critique of Labov’s approach has centred upon 
its positivistic stance, where stories are seen as a representation of external reality, rather 
than concentrating upon the meaning they convey (Mishler, 1995).  
The second form of analysis: coherence and structure, focuses upon “narrative strategies” 
(Mishler, 1995: 90). This approach looks at how language constructs the meaning of a 
narrative (e.g. Ricoeur, 1984). Accounts are therefore analysed for the way in which stories 
are used to create a sense of coherence and discursively frame events. The final model 
Mishler outlines concentrates upon the work and effect of stories: how they construct 
individual and collective identities and a moral evaluation of events. This form, Mishler 
argues, does not just relate to stories told by research participants, but also to stories 
produced in ethnographic accounts.  
As Mishler (1995) and Reissman (2008) have argued however, such analytical modes, and 
ways of actually doing analysis – which can include thematic and more structural 
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approaches, like Labov’s – are far from discrete. Instead, Mishler(1995) calls for recognition 
of the overlapping strategies of analysis, which amalgamate different perspectives and aims. 
In approaching my analysis from a phenomenological ethnographic perspective, I was 
concerned with looking at how narratives of donation experiences conveyed meanings 
about events, alongside how meaning was created in relation to the people and practices 
described. In this way, I would be able to move in and out of a focus upon particular 
experiences, and the wider processes and constituents involved in the donation and 
ethnicity ‘problem’ (see Saris, 1995; Menard-Warick, 2007; and Jacobs et al., 2011 for 
examples of narrative research which incorporate individual stories into understandings of 
wider socio-political contexts). For example, specific accounts about struggles around 
withdrawal of care between BME families and health professionals were eventually mapped 
to wider understandings of medical practices around death, and the way in which ‘BME’ 
families were described as problematic in relation to these practices. 
To allow for both insight into individual stories and the creation of a general account of the 
‘problem’ around donation and ethnicity, I therefore took an adapted narrative and 
thematic approach to interpreting my data. Reissman (2008) has advocated using thematic 
interpretation (what is said) alongside a structural, narrative analysis (how stories are 
constructed and meaning conveyed) for narrative material. This enables an overview of the 
data, whilst using select accounts to add a deeper layer to the findings. I decided to 
therefore begin my analysis by using a structural, narrative analysis on a sample of 
interviews. This would allow for working insights focused initially upon the stories around 
donation and its related processes. These insights would then be used to focus my thematic 
analysis. 
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I subsequently picked 8 interviews from 6 participants35, or just under 25% of my total 
interviews, for the narrative analysis. These were chosen because they featured the richest, 
most detailed narratives. This is what Ochs and Capps (2001) conceptualise as a story’s 
tellability, in that they convey the importance of occurrences for the speaker within the 
telling context. The detailed stories within these interviews thus offered rich insight into 
events and practices around donation, alongside how participants’ constructed their 
personal identity/moral message (Mishler, 1995) within these. To analyse this sample I 
adapted the structural approach of Labov (1972), to scrutinise how the teller conveys 
meaning through the organisation of their story (Reissman, 2008). However, not wishing to 
take such a positivistic stance as Labov, rather than separating each narrative into 6 
categories, I used just 2:  
 complicating actions (CA): how the story is produced by detailing the actions/events 
which took place over time;  
 evaluation (EV) of these actions: where the narrator imposes their moral judgements 
upon the events and their protagonists. 
This process involved taking an interview, and, after repeated reading to get a feel for its 
stories and what was being said (Mishler, 1986b; Reissman, 1993), isolating the main 
narratives (the most in-depth stories within the account) within each interview. These were 
subsequently separated into the 2 categories above, and placed within an Excel table. This 
meant the narrative could be read across the table: from complicating action to the 
interpretation of those actions (evaluation), and down (to the next point of action). I then 
mapped the remaining parts of the interview on to the sections of narrative that it seemed 
to be pointing to, under the category further interpretations. For example, this included 
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 Two participants from this sample had undergone 2 interviews. 
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smaller stories and opinions which seemed to make similar moral points to a main narrative, 
or section of that narrative. I then looked at each row, constituted by CA, EV, and further 
interpretation, and added a further column for my interpretation of these sections (see 
appendix 8). This involved thinking about how the narrative was arranged, and how each 
sequence of actions was given meaning in relation to the overall point of the story 
(Reissman, 2008). Later on, it also involved thinking about what these stories told me about 
the wider assemblages around, and institutional landscape (Foucault, 1980; Saris, 1995) of, 
organ donation and ethnicity.  
The analysis of this sample eventually led to the construction of preliminary working 
categories (or themes), such as consent complexities and conceptualising ethnicity, which 
best described what was going on in the stories. It also provided me with questions, relating 
to the initial findings, which I could ask of the rest of my data (see appendix 9). These 
categories and questions were then used as an analytical framework to interrogate my 
remaining interviews and fieldnotes, which I thematically analysed. For the thematic 
analysis, rather than taking a grounded-theory, line-by-line coding method (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1968), I used a broader story-by-story approach (or point-by-point, if there were 
few stories), which would allow me to develop general themes (Reissman, 2008). This also 
meant I could explore individual stories within the context of each interview; how the 
stories related to one another; and how themes intersected within the stories themselves.  
The process of developing my findings therefore involved an iterative to-ing and fro-ing 
between narrative and thematic analysis, with the narrative approach often informally 
employed to interrogate stories within the thematically-analysed interviews. Findings were 
also developed in lengthy discussions with my supervisors, from informal discussions with 
Emily, my main informant, and in presenting my data at PhD analysis sessions in my 
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department. These meetings acted as a key space by which to re-position myself in relation 
to the findings, as a result of others’ opinion about the data.  
It was during the initial period of analysis that I began to look at the work of science and 
technology studies (STS) (see part 4 of chapter 1), and subsequently actor-network theory 
(ANT), to help me understand my emerging insights. This came about by the fact that I 
began to notice how things – such as donation protocols, consent forms, and mechanical 
ventilators – featured prominently in many of my participant’s narratives, and in my 
observations of organ donor training and committee meetings. These things seemed to be 
intimately tied to, and wholly inseperable from, the practices around the organ donation 
encounter. As Casper and Berg (1995) have argued, paying attention to practice involves 
examining both the ‘social’ interactions and the materials which are involved in, and have 
relational effects upon practice. For example, donation protocols were often referred to in 
stories where they broke down in practice, such as when a coroner could not be contacted 
to ask permission for donation; and were embedded in the donation nurses’ delivery of 
donation training, such as in their demonstrations of how they worked through donation 
consent and patient assessment forms with families. In searching for a language which 
would help me open out my analysis to incorporate these materials, I came across science 
and technology accounts of how medical standards – such as policies and protocols – are 
put into practice (e.g. Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Singleton, 2005; Struhkamp et al., 
2009), and subsequently, the Actor Network approach (ANT) in research.  
In an ANT approach, phenomena (reality/categories/objects/subjects) – such as the 
category of ethnicity in organ donation – are understood as the effect of relations between 
diverse human and non-human entities (Latour, 2000; 2005; Law, 2008). In this way, 
materials feature as a way of thinking through phenomena as much as the experiences, 
interactions, and concerns of humans (Law, 2008). According to Bruno Latour (2005: 71-2), 
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these ‘things’, or ‘non-human actors’ – including consent and patient assessment forms, 
protocols, mechanical ventilators, laboratory testing technologies etc – function as “actors 
or more precisely participants” which “back-drop”, “authorise”, “suggest”, “influence” and 
“permit” human action. In this sense, they form an integral part of the relations which make 
up the phenomena of organ donation and ethnicity. So, for example, my analysis in chapter 
6 draws attention to the way in which donation consent forms mediate the encounter 
between donation nurses and potential donor families, and play an integral role in the 
interpretation of ‘BME’ families as problematic populations for organ donation.  
Whilst not at first an obvious (or necessarily comfortable) ‘fit’ with a phenomenological 
approach36, an ANT sensibility came about by following the sense-making processes of my 
participants, as advocated by a phenomenological and narrative approach, and as is fitting 
to an ethnographic methodology. Thus, by analysing what the research subjects were telling 
me, and by contemplating the way in which materials featured in their meaning-making, my 
phenomenological approach overlapped with the importance of ‘following the actor’ in ANT 
(Latour, 2005) – tracing the relations between different actors which/whom make up the 
‘problem’ of organ donation and ethnicity. Far from being imposed upon the data then, my 
later use of ANT and the incorporation of materials into my analysis37 developed from the 
constructions of those being researched.  
In keeping with the study’s ethnographic approach, analysis did not end with the resultant 
write-up, but was furthered through the process of writing, as an “analytical tool” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 163), and by the integration of related empirical and 
                                                          
36
 This is because, whilst phenomenology is focused upon how humans inhabit, experience, and make meaning 
of the world around them, with this world – to some extent – taken for granted, ANT is interested in how this 
world is formed, or made real; how it is done (performed); and how things occur as an effect of the relations 
between heterogenous (human and non-human) actors (Law, 2008). 
37
 Materials take a more explicit position in some of the results chapters than others. This I further discuss in 
the epilogue. 
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theoretical literature, such as research into the work of health professionals, and Foucault’s 
ideas around power and biopolitics. The data employed to present the results, in the main, 
come from the institutional research contexts. Since these are the settings which have been 
largely ignored by current literature into ethnicity and organ donation, I decided to focus 
upon the institutional material to tell the ‘story’ of my results. Fieldnotes and interview data 
from my time spent with ‘community’ participants were, however, drawn on throughout to 
inform my thinking. My results thus emplot the institutional landscape (Foucault, 1980; 
Saris, 1995) of organ donation and ethnicity. This I do by using individual cases/stories to 
illustrate the meaning of everyday experiences around the phenomenon, and how these 
experiences interact with wider issues, including medical authority, standardisation, the 
family, and the classification of individuals.   
In the final part of this chapter, I detail the ethical considerations involved in doing this 
study, and in writing and disseminating its potentially sensitive findings; which focus upon 
institutions and their practices, rather than solely ‘BME’ ‘communities’. 
Ethical considerations 
The domain of organ donation, as highlighted in the anthropological literature (Lock, 2002; 
Sharp, 2006, Scheper-Hughes, 2002) is a highly ethicised area, with its proliferation of 
debates about the body, inequalities, and the meaning of death, among others. My 
academic entry into this domain meant that the study’s particular focus, and my conduct 
within it, has always been entwined within the broader context of such concerns. This was 
not, however, what the NHS ethics committee I applied to, seemed interested in. The 
process of gaining NHS ethical approval to access hospital sites seemed more of a painful, 
bureaucratic form-filling exercise with a tick-box ethics, than one done for the good of 
participants. Whilst obviously important, ethical review processes have been criticised for 
their “formulaic” approach (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 227). I experienced this with 
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the NHS ethics forms for non-experimental studies (including qualitative research), which 
asked for details of the “total number of interventions” for each participant and how long 
each of these will likely last. Questions such as these left little room for an ethnographic 
study such as mine, which could not specify exactly what would happen or who would be 
talked to prior to the research beginning (Christians, 2005).  
Outside of such formalised criterion, ethics, for me, is embodied within the research 
process. As ethnography moulds its research focus around what is unfolding in the field, the 
ethics of such research can be linked to Levinas’s (1969) notion of the ‘other’, detailed 
previously. In my encounter as a researcher with ‘others’ (participants), my “moral 
obligations” to both the topic and those I came into contact with, was formed (Christians, 
2005: 150). In this way, ethics is not something which can simply be dropped on to a study 
from above – as the NHS review process seemed to require. Instead it is tied to the moral 
development of the researcher, in doing the work and critically engaging with participants.  
Despite the frustrations of the ethics process, it also gave me the time to formally consider 
the (ethical) implications of this study. Hammersley (1990) lists four considerations for 
ethical ethnographic research, these being: deception, privacy, damaging consequences for 
others (or harm), and consequences for future research. The notion of deception can also 
be placed under the umbrella of informed consent: where the researcher has a moral 
obligation to provide open information about the study to participants, and ensure their 
involvement is voluntary. All participants undertaking interviews in my research underwent 
a process of consent, involving the provision of information about the study, and the 
completion of a consent form (see appendix 3 and 4). This asked for, among others, their 
understanding of the study, and their permission to be directly quoted under an anonymous 
guise; covering their right to privacy and protection. Due to the sensitivity of accounts 
describing death and donation, participants were also offered a copy of their transcribed 
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interview to check they were happy with their talk being used. Of those (about half) who 
took this up, a few asked for further anonymisation, or even whole sections of their 
interview – which they felt were too sensitive – to be deleted. 
The notion of harm is complex in ethnography and can refer to the consequences for 
participants during the research and its aftermath (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Whilst 
I had little chance to ask families about their direct experiences of organ donation, many 
health professionals disclosed highly personal, sometimes overtly emotional accounts. In 
addition, I interviewed transplant recipients and one live kidney donor about their 
experiences, which had the potential to cause distress. The use of narrative interview was 
thus seen to be appropriate, since participants decided on the course and general focus of 
their interview. Building rapport is also a key part of an ethical ethnographic research, with 
the researcher’s ability to develop trust between themselves and their participants (Fox, 
2004). A number of participants, such as Emily, the embedded donation nurse at Hillview, 
acted as key gatekeepers and informants for my study. With her interest in the study and 
ready willingness to help me throughout and beyond my fieldwork, I strove to develop this 
relationship and involve her in the progress of the research and development of findings 
through regular email contact.  
Harm can also include the consequences of research findings becoming public, and the 
possibility that individuals may be recognised by a wider audience, or, indeed recognise 
themselves and others within the research account (Hammersley, 1990; Christians, 2005; 
Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). This would have devastating ramifications in a study such 
as mine, with the possibility for deceased donors to be identified, and in the context of the 
sensitivity of certain findings, such as the implicit ethnic stereotyping employed by some 
health professionals. To mitigate these effects pseudonyms are always used, and I have 
removed or altered identifying features relating to participants (e.g. ages, appearance, 
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accents, and particular job titles), research settings, and the people described in interview 
accounts. For example, particular details about donor’s deaths have been changed, to avoid 
them being traced back.   
In a similar way, harm (or offence) caused as the result of my research could have negative 
implications for future research. Since ethnography relies upon the help of gatekeepers and 
key informants, if offence is taken at the reported research findings, this can jeopardise the 
potential for further research (Hammersley, 1990). In presenting findings, one therefore has 
to tread a fine line between being representative and taking into account the feelings of 
those involved. ‘Community’ members involved will be fed back a written account of the 
findings. However, as pointed out above, the topic and eventual (institutional) focus of the 
research has the potential to cause controversy, especially for the health professionals who 
took part. For Becker though, a hostile reaction to research is reflective of a ‘good’ study 
which represents “the irreconcilable conflict between the interests of science and the 
interests of those studied” (1964: 276). I will eventually present my findings to the health 
professionals who took part. How I actually present these, and in what language will thus 
need be adapted for the various audiences. 
Conclusion and overview of the results chapters 
In the following chapters I present my findings, which resulted from following the various 
people (ICU staff professionals, donation nurses, transplant recipients, religious leaders etc), 
procedures (donation guidelines, standards, recommendations, and legislation), things 
(mechanical ventilators, monitoring machines, hospital beds etc), and settings (ICU wards, 
operating theatres, transplant centres, homes, hospital offices etc) connected to the organ 
donation and ethnicity ‘problem’. In so doing, rather than portraying a de-contextualised 
account of how the ‘cultural’ attitudes of ‘communities’ inhibit donation rates (and 
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therefore the ability to transplant ‘BME’ patients), I illustrate how the ‘problem’ can be 
traced to, among others: how organisational changes around organ donation are put to 
work in hospitals with high ‘BME’ patient populations; how struggles between ICU staff and 
‘BME’ families over decisions around death muddy the waters of what consent for organ 
donation actually means; and how donation nurses’ consent practices get done through 
their assumptions about ‘BME’ families. In this way, I demonstrate how the ‘BME’ donor 
‘issue’ is both constituted by, and reproduced within, institutional donation domains, and is 
not, therefore, something which can be reduced to persuading ‘communities’ to sign up to 
the organ donor register.  
To give life to the findings, I have mapped them on to the organ donation pathway, 
beginning, in chapter 3, with an overview of how this trajectory should look, according to 
donation policy and guidelines. This chapter aims to show the complexity of the organ 
donation process, and how reaching the stage of requesting organs from a donor family is 
dependent upon the practices and decisions of various actors, such as coroners, ICU 
consultants, and donation nurses. In so doing, I highlight how decisions around donation are 
not limited to the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to donation requests by ‘BME’ families. This chapter 
therefore offers a way in to the main research findings, which demonstrate how donation 
procedures are experienced, done, and made problematic in practice. In chapter 4, I 
examine the work done around organ donation, by looking at how the ODT’s (2008) 
recommendations for changes to donation services are put into practice by donation nurses, 
within local hospital settings. I demonstrate the problems encountered in attempts to 
increase (‘BME’) donation rates, and how donation nurses act as crucial agents for the 
production of practice norms around donation in Intensive Care Units. In this way, I argue 
that organ donors are ultimately produced as an outcome of practice, and not, necessarily 
the willingness of ‘BME’ individuals to donate their organs after death. 
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In chapter 5, I focus upon the issue of consent in organ donation with ‘BME’ families. 
Specifically, I problematise standardised constructions of donation consent in policy and 
donation promotions, which represent consent as the singular choice of an individual. In 
contrast, I show how these standardised presentations break down in practice: where 
consent to donate is predicated upon a family’s acceptance of the death of their relative; 
and how the final decision to donate is made by the potential donor’s family and not the 
potential donor. I highlight how these stages of consent are considered more complex with 
‘BME’ families, who are represented as problematic populations for donation by virtue of 
their failure to conform to the norms of practice around donation. In the final results 
chapter, 6, I look at the practice of obtaining formal consent for organ donation. Here, I 
demonstrate that achieving consent from families to donate their relative’s organs is 
contingent upon the interpretative, interactional work of the donation nurse, who adapts 
consent procedures according to their assessment of a family’s needs. It is these practices, 
however, which also construct and reify the ‘BME’ donor family as a problem for donation. 
In this way, I highlight how ethnicity is reproduced as a ‘problem’ within donation domains 
by health professionals, who act as agents for dealing with this ‘problem’ in practice.  
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Chapter 3. Donation Pathways: Standard (and 
Idealised) Processes 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the UK organ donation pathway as it is presented in 
procedural guidelines and standards, such as the Intensive Care Society’s (ICS) guidelines for 
Organ and Tissue Donation (2005) and the Human Tissue Authority’s Code of Practice: 
Donation of Solid Organs for Transplant (2009a). In so doing, it will highlight the complex 
process of organ donation: from how decisions get made to transfer a patient to the status 
of potential donor; to ensuring the requirements of consent and donor risk assessment are 
fulfilled; to gaining coroner consent for organ donation to take place; and facilitating theatre 
teams to remove the organs.  
The chapter is organised in two parts. I firstly contextualise these procedures by providing 
an historical insight into the development of donation guidelines in the UK. Secondly, I 
present the procedural stages involved in an organ donation process, and the different 
social actors responsible for making these stages happen – so that organs can be procured 
for transplant. In so doing, I show how decision-making and acts of formal and informal 
consent around donation are practiced across the entire process by differently involved 
actors. This is in contrast to how donation decisions have been presented in promotional 
campaigns and research on organ donation and ethnicity (see chapter 1) as a simple matter 
of a (‘BME’) family or individual saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question of donation.  
As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the organ donation process is a complicated trajectory, 
spanning different domains, actors, and forms of consent along the way. What became clear 
when researching this pathway, from both my fieldwork and the literature, was how 
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disparate the national information is regarding this process. Apart from the Human Tissue 
Act’s (2004) legislation around consent, there were no national standards for organ 
donation in place during my fieldwork38. Instead, there was a variety of procedural 
guidelines and legislation that practitioners drew on. Despite advice in 2008 by the Organ 
Donor Taskforce (ODT) for local donation policies - constructed around their 
recommendations - to be implemented within each hospital Trust, piecing together the full 
pathway involved searching not only across the ODTs report, but also (among others) the 
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges (AMRC) Code of Practice for the Diagnosis and 
Confirmation of Death (2008), the ICS’s Guidelines for Adult Organ and Tissue Donation 
(2005), UK Transplant’s (UKT) Hospital Policy for Organ and Tissue Donation (2003), the 
Human Tissue Authority’s (HTA) Codes of Practice for the Donation of Solid Organs for 
Transplant; and Consent (2009a; 2009b), as well as local Trust policies gathered from my 
fieldwork and open internet access. Further information on the recommended pathway was 
gathered from my observations of A&E and ICU nurses’ training in organ donation, delivered 
by the donation nurses.  
Figure 5 – which is adapted from, and integrates the ICS’s (2005) guideline diagram for the 
donation process with the ODT’s (2008) new recommendations for practice – illustrates the 
procedural donation process, in green. Alongside these procedures, I have highlighted the 
points of decision-making (not obvious in the standard pathway) which get made across this 
trajectory, in red.  
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 NICE guidelines for organ donation came out in December 2011. See footnote 40. 
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Figure 5. Donation pathways for donation after brain death (DBD) and donation after 
cardiac death (DCD), indicating key consent and decision-making points 
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Part 1. The development of organ donation guidelines in the UK 
The large variety of guidelines drawn on during the organ donation trajectory, as listed 
above, can be traced to shifts in the organisation of donation services in the UK over the 
past decade. As Griffith’s et al. (2009: 1459) tell us, before 2000 the UK, different to other 
European countries like Spain, had no national “unified” approach to improving organ 
donation rates. There was little in the way of donation guidelines and formalised education 
around donation for health professionals. In addition, there was a lack of formal 
management and reporting structures for donation nurses39, who, today, are responsible for 
managing and facilitating all aspects of the donation process, including obtaining legal 
consent for donation.  
Prior to 2000, donation nurses were employed by local hospital Trusts and worked within 
small teams, only attending other hospitals with a potential donor referral. Historically, 
Intensive Care Units (ICU) were responsible for identifying, referring and approaching 
families about organ donation. As such, the donation nurse usually only arrived on the scene 
once a family had agreed to donate. They therefore had little influence over donation 
practice at hospital level. In addition, most donation nurses – who largely came to the role 
from ICU and Accident and Emergency (A&E) backgrounds – had never received any formal 
training in consent and communicating to families about donation. This informal model of 
practice is understood to be one reason why the UK’s deceased organ donor rates remained 
below their potential, prior to changes implemented after 2000 (Griffiths et al., 2009). For 
example, the introduction of the Potential Donor Audit (PDA) in 2003 found that between 
2003 and 2004, 33% of potential brain stem dead patients were never formally tested for 
brain death (Griffiths et al., 2009), meaning their potential for donation was lost.  
                                                          
39
 Prior to 2010, donation nurses were referred to as ‘donor-transplant coordinators’, or DTCs. Their title then 
changed to ‘specialist nurse in organ donation’ (SN-OD). 
126 
 
The creation of UK Transplant (UKT) in 2000 was the start of a drastic change, which saw the 
previously informal approach to organ donation transformed into one underpinned by a 
vast range of procedures, guidelines, and legislation. Alongside operating as the professional 
body which managed donation nurses, UKT was also tasked with generally improving 
deceased organ donation rates. This it did firstly with the implementation of the PDA, to 
assess the potential for improving deceased donation rates and to function as a measure of 
its progress over time. In addition, in 2004, it introduced a new strategy which focused upon 
maximising donation rates by providing formal training for donation nurses (and some ICU 
consultants) around collaboratively communicating donation to families with ICU staff, and 
obtaining consent (Griffiths et al., 2009). This resulted in guidelines such as the Donor Family 
Care Policy (UKT, 2004a) and the ICS’s organ donation guidelines (2005). The increasing 
focus upon standardised procedures for organ donation have also been mirrored by updates 
of related guidelines and legislation around end of life decision making (GMC, 2010), 
diagnosing and confirming death (AMRC, 2008), and the Human Tissue Act (2004). 
Changes introduced by UKT were formalised in 2008 with the implementation of the ODT’s 
recommendations for organisational changes to donation services (outlined in chapter 1), 
and the superseding of UKT by the NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) service. The ODT’s 
recommendations were an attempt to make organ donation a “usual not unusual” event 
(ODT, 2008: 9) in end of life care, so as to dramatically improve donation rates. They 
included: appointing a clinical lead for organ donation within every acute hospital Trust, 
introducing minimum notification criteria for all potential organ donors to be referred to a 
donation nurse, and the creation of specialist surgical organ retrieval teams.  
The role of the organ donation nurse also changed with these recommendations. Small 
teams were merged to create large, regional teams covering wide geographical areas, and 
the donation nurse workforce dramatically increased. Instead of working out of a 
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centralised hospital base, donation nurses were newly embedded within one, or a few 
hospital Trusts, with responsibility to implement donation procedures, policy, and ultimately 
increase donation rates within ‘their’ hospital/s. The development of the donation nurses’ 
role has formalised their place in the donation trajectory. It can also be seen as symptomatic 
of the increasingly standardised nature of organ donation in the UK, which has culminated 
in recently (2011) introduced guidelines for organ donation from the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) 40. It is to this standardised pathway that I now turn, with two 
aims. These are to firstly outline the idealised, procedural stages of the organ donation 
process. This forms the background for the following chapter, which demonstrates how 
these procedures are put to work by ICU staff and donation nurses within local institutions. 
Secondly, I aim to highlight the fact that organ donation is premised upon different stages of 
decision-making and consent which occur all along the donation trajectory. This enables an 
initial problematisation of the policy and research focus on ‘BME’ populations, which 
represents them as the sole decision-makers in the task to increase organ donor rates from 
these groups.    
Part 2. The organ donation pathway 
There are currently two pathways to becoming an organ donor after death in the UK. The 
first, and most common, is donation after brain death (DBD), where death is diagnosed by 
neurological criteria (AMRC, 2008) and the patient remains breathing with the aid of a 
ventilator. This means that the heart and lungs41 can be used for transplant, since the 
                                                          
40
 These guidelines were implemented in December, 2011, after my fieldwork had ended. NICE is a 
government funded organisation responsible for setting national guidance and quality standards to improve 
health and prevent and treat diseases. NICE guidelines are taken as the UK’s ‘gold standard’ for achieving 
optimum outcomes from medical practice (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). 
41
 Other organs, such as the pancreas, which are not usually used in donation after cardiac death – the other 
form of donation – can also be used for transplant from brain death donors. 
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donor’s heart continues to beat (giving oxygen to the lungs) right up until its removal in the 
operating theatre. The decision to refer a patient for DBD is usually taken after a patient has 
suffered an unsurvivable head injury and where brain stem death (BSD) testing is deemed 
appropriate. This usually follows some kind of trauma to a person’s brain, which may result 
from internal ‘events’, such as a Subarachnoid Haemorrhage (bleeding over the surface of 
the brain) as the result of a stroke, or from external trauma, which can occur after a violent 
accident, like a car crash, or after a person has suffered from prolonged deprivation of 
oxygen, from drowning, for example (AMRC, 2008). Upon their arrival to hospital, the 
patient will be assessed in the A&E department, where they are usually admitted as an 
emergency trauma. Once in A&E, if a patient is suspected of being, or becoming, brain stem 
dead, they will usually be taken to the ICU to be managed and to facilitate brain stem death 
(BSD) testing. In the case of long-standing conditions or a neurological injury which has 
deteriorated over time, the patient may have been in ICU for a number of days or even 
weeks before suffering brain stem death.  
The second, and less common form of donation is known as donation after cardiac death 
(DCD)42. The conditions for referring a patient for DCD are similar to those of DBD, in that 
they are commonly referred after suffering a “catastrophic” brain injury (ICS/BTS, 2010). 
However, the difference comes with the fact that the patient is not suitable for brain stem 
death testing. This may be because they still have some brain stem function, or because 
they have too high a level of sedative or other drugs in their system to enable testing (which 
I cover later in the chapter). A patient is referred for DCD once a decision is made by the 
treating consultants to withdraw medical care – usually in the form of breathing support – 
on the grounds that the patient is going to die, and that further treatment would be futile43.  
                                                          
42
 Between 2010/11 there were 637 DBD donors, compared with 373 DCD donors (NHSBT, 2011). 
43
 This notion of futility is linked to a wide-ranging body of ethics literature, which tackles the contested 
understanding of what is considered to be in a patient’s ‘best interest’. For the purposes of my discussion on 
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This diagnosis is negotiated with the patient’s relatives, with donation requests occurring 
after the diagnosis has been accepted by the family (ICS, 2005). The decision to withdraw 
treatment may be made in A&E. However, because of the time and resources needed for 
donation, withdrawal of treatment usually occurs in the ICU. In this instance, the family 
generally has to agree to donation before the patient is moved, since this transfer is made 
to facilitate donation, rather than ‘treat’ the patient as such. Organ donation can then only 
take place if the patient dies (has an absence of a heartbeat and any electrical activity by the 
heart) within two hours of treatment being stopped, to maximise the potential for organs 
being suitable for transplant (ICS, 2005). Since a cardiac death donor’s heart stops beating 
prior to donation surgery, only kidneys and liver are usually suitable for transplant, since the 
heart, lungs, and other organs, like the pancreas, need to have a continual blood flow to 
survive. 
Despite making up about 35% of the UK’s deceased organ donations, DCD has yet to be 
implemented in around one-third of UK Intensive Care departments. In addition, in Trusts 
which do carry out the practice, referral and donation rates remain low, at 50% and 15%, 
respectively (ICS/BTS, 2010). In recent years, with the rates of DBD in continuous decline (a 
fall of 9% between 2001/02), DCD offers huge potential for increasing organ donor rates. 
The reasons for its uncommon practice are various, but are largely pointed to the tricky 
ethical and legal questions it raises. These include: the potential “conflicts of interest” 
between families and medical staff, with DCD only possible if the family consent to donation 
prior to the patient’s death, and the “lawfulness of interventions” involved, such as 
admitting a dying patient to ICU to facilitate donation and increasing medical therapies to 
stabilise organs for donation, prior to donation consent being provided (ICS/BTS, 2010: 12). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the donation pathway, I have not gone into such debates. For an understanding of such issues see Mohammed 
and Peter, 2009 and part 1 of chapter 5. 
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These introductory explanations of the different donation pathways highlight the various 
decisions which need to be made by health professionals in order for donation to actually 
occur. The first of these comes with the decision by the treating ICU or A&E consultant (or 
registrar) to refer a patient as a potential donor. According to the ODT (2008) this transfer of 
status is only made once a decision over diagnosis of death or withdrawal of treatment has 
been reached: 
 
A patient only becomes a potential organ donor when death is confirmed 
following clearly defined tests of the brain stem, in which case DBD may be 
possible; or when a decision has been taken – in the best interests of the patient 
– that further active treatment is no longer appropriate and should be 
withdrawn, in which case DCD may be possible. (ODT, 2008: 7-8) 
 
However, the separation of decisions around donation from decisions around death are 
contradicted within the same report by the ODT’s recommendation for a ‘minimum 
notification criteria’. Minimum notification criteria, sometimes referred to as ‘required’ or 
‘automatic referral’, means that ICU staff are supposed to notify a donation nurse “at the 
earliest opportunity” about the patient if there is a plan to diagnose death by neurological 
criteria (brain stem testing) and as soon as sedation and/or pain relief is stopped; or when 
the decision has been made to withdraw treatment on a patient deemed suitable for 
donation (Bleakley, 2010: 186). This is reflected in the ICS guidelines (2005), where the 
pathway diagram points to donation referral occuring prior to brain stem death testing. 
With both forms of donation, the decisions to diagnose death or withdraw care are asserted 
as being entirely separate from the decision to refer the patient as a potential donor (ODT, 
2008; AMRC, 2008). Yet, for an ICU or A&E doctor, the implementation of minimum 
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notification criteria suggests that their end-of-life diagnoses are intimately tied to decisions 
to refer a patient as a potential donor.  
In the following sections I describe each of the stages and the decisions involved in the 2 
organ donation pathways, from transferring a patient to the status of ‘potential donor’, to 
ultimately reaching the stage of organ procurement, so that organs may be used for 
transplant.  
The shift from ‘patient’ to ‘potential donor’ 
What is clear from the above, is that the decision-making process around donation begins at 
the point of diagnosis of an individual deemed to be near (or at) the end of life. The decision 
to place a patient into the category of ‘potential donor’ is formalised with the gatekeeping 
act of potential donor referral by ICU or A&E staff to the donation nurse.  
Referral at this point is recommended by the ODT under the concept of ‘minimum 
notification criteria’ (see above). The OTD asserts that:  
This notification should take place even if the attending clinical staff believe that 
donation might be contra-indicated or inappropriate. These proposals [....] 
should be implemented in all acute Trusts.” (ODT, 2008: 11) 
With this responsibility for clinical staff to refer potential donors, even when falling against 
their personal judgement, the decision over who is an initially suitable potential donor (prior 
to any clinical tests being carried out) becomes the responsibility of the donation nurse. The 
recommendation for a compulsory donor referral policy in hospitals has been seen to 
dramatically increase donation referral rates in Trusts where it has been implemented 
(Bleakley, 2010).  
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Once called about a possible donor, it is the donation nurse’s responsibility to initiate the 
process of assessing a patient’s suitability for donation44, usually before any conversations 
are had with their family (HTA, 2009a). This is done through a preliminary assessment of the 
patient’s medical notes (UKT, 2004a), in conversations with potential transplant centres, 
alongside checking whether the patient is on the organ donor register. If the patient is 
deemed initially suitable45, the on-call or embedded donation nurse, often accompanied by 
a colleague46, will go to the ICU or A&E department to discuss the family approach with the 
treating consultant. This is known as ‘collaborative requesting’: where breaking news of 
death to a family and the organ donation request are the outcome of a planned approach 
between the donation nurse and consultant. This is underpinned by the understanding that 
consent rates for donation are higher when there is involvement of a donation nurse, rather 
than solely the treating clinician (Griffiths et al., 2009; Bleakley, 2010).  
Breaking news of death: reaching consensus on medical decisions 
At this point the family will be informed by one of the ICU/A&E clinicians, sometimes 
accompanied by a donation nurse and/or a nurse caring for the patient, of the hopelessness 
of their relative’s situation. The family will be told that doctors either suspect brain stem 
death (DBD) and wish to carry out tests (and withdraw treatment if they are positive), or 
that they believe their relative’s situation to be hopeless and wish to remove active 
treatment so that they can die (DCD). This conversation has the function of breaking news 
                                                          
44
 This may be done on site, if the embedded donation nurse is already present, or at the regional offices of the 
donation nurse team. 
45
 Absolute contraindications for organ donation include known HIV infection, Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD), 
or other neurodegenerative diseases linked to infection. Patients are also unlikely to be suitable donors if they 
are over 90 years of age and if they have had active cancer within 3 years prior to their death. 
46
 The ODT (2008) recommended that up to three donation nurses may need to be involved in each donation 
process, each dealing with different aspects. This includes one nurse to communicate with and support the 
family, the other to obtain and keep a record of clinical information and liaise with transplant centres, and 
another to be present during the organ retrieval procedure and fulfil the last offices of the deceased. 
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of the medical prognosis of death, alongside reaching consensus with the patient’s family as 
to their acceptance and understanding of the situation. This stage is vital in the the organ 
donation trajectory, since the family have to be deemed to have understood the 
death/accepted the justification for withdrawal of treatment for the donation request to 
take place (ICS, 2005).  
The AMRC guidelines for diagnosing and confirming death impart the imperative of 
involving relatives and carers in discussions of death as decisions are made. The guidelines 
state that relatives “should be given appropriate explanation of the investigations being 
undertaken and of their interpretations throughout the process of the determination of 
death in a sympathetic, timely and appropriate fashion.” (AMRC, 2008: 9). Equally, recently 
published guidelines by the General Medical Council (GMC) on end of life care stipulate the 
importance of taking into account the “role and responsibilities of people close to the 
patient” (GMC, 2010: 20) in discussing care decisions. However, in the case of adults, the 
guidelines impress the authority of the clinical decision: 
Some members of the healthcare team, or people who are close to the patient, 
may find it more difficult to contemplate withdrawing a life-prolonging 
treatment than to decide not to start the treatment in the first place. This may 
be because of the emotional distress that can accompany a decision to withdraw 
treatment, or because they would feel responsible for the patient’s death. 
However, you should not allow these anxieties to override your clinical 
judgement and lead you [...] to continue treatment that is of no overall benefit. 
(GMC, 2010: 25) 
When it comes to children though (classified below the age of 16), the decision-making 
process is posed in terms of a partnered negotiation between the clinical team and the 
parents/legal guardians when “identifying options that are clinically appropriate and likely 
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to be in the child’s best interests” (GMC, 2010: 46). However, in the case of both adults and 
children, disagreements over the diagnosis/prognosis of death may lead to mediation by 
others, second opinions, or even obtaining the views of a court to reach a resolution. Such 
medical decisions about death, particularly concerning the withdrawal of treatment are 
justified in medical case law. One ruling drawn on by the GMC is linked to the medical 
imperative to act in the patient’s best interest, which is “interpreted as meaning that a 
patient should not be subjected to more treatment than is necessary to allow them to die 
peacefully and with dignity.” (GMC, 2010: 81). 
Breaking the news of death or impending death to a family thus also acts as a decision-
making process and key point of consent, whereby the family must accept this diagnosis for 
organ donation to be a possibility. In drawing on the guidelines, this process is understood 
as one which takes into account the family’s views (especially in the case of a child), but is 
ultimately configured as one where clinicians have authority: with the imperative to 
discontinue treatment if a patient’s situation is deemed futile.  
Confirming brain death 
In cases where brain stem death is suspected, once the family has been informed of this 
likelihood (and initially accepted this), two doctors – one of whom must be a consultant – 
will perform brain stem death tests to confirm their diagnosis. These tests are carried out at 
the patient’s bedside in the ICU, sometimes with the family present – especially where it is 
felt that they need further clarification to understand brain stem death as a final form of 
death. 
The AMRC (2008) reports that although there is still no statutory definition of death in the 
UK, the criteria for brain death has been incorporated into law in Northern Ireland and 
England. According to the guidelines, there are two conditions necessary for diagnosing 
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death. These being: “the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness”, coupled with 
the “irreversible loss of the capacity to breathe” (AMRC, 2008: 11). In the case of brain stem 
death, death is diagnosed while the patient is still breathing, with tests indicating the loss of 
ability to breathe with the removal of ventilator support. 
Before testing, the clinician must exclude any other possibilities causing the patient’s coma, 
such as large amounts of depressants – like narcotic drugs, tranquillisers or sedative drugs in 
the system; as well as hypothermia, all of which may induce coma-like symptoms which 
mimic brain stem death. To test for the absence of consciousness, doctors perform a 
number of seemingly simple tests to check for different reflexes, including the patient’s 
response to pain and changing light intensities. These tests include injecting ice-cold water 
over 60 seconds into each ear, and checking for eye movements  (ICS, 2005); inserting a 
spatula towards the back of the throat to check for a gag reflex; and applying pressure to 
the forehead to test for pain response. The apnoea test is the final check carried out and 
this looks for the absence of the patient’s ability to breathe on their own. This involves 
disconnecting the patient from the ventilator, usually by removing the tube, and observing 
them over a five minute period, to see whether they make any attempt to breathe unaided 
(ICS, 2005; AMRC, 2008). 
Once the first set of tests has been done, another set is carried out, often straight after, to 
eliminate error and re-assure the family (ICS, 2005) of the certainty of death. Although 
death is confirmed once the second set of tests have been done, the legal time of death is 
taken after the first tests are completed (AMRC, 2008). 
Requesting donation and taking consent for organs  
Once death has been confirmed or predicted, and seen to have been understood by the 
family, the request for organ donation can finally take place. If a best-practice, collaborative 
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approach has been taken the specialist nurse in organ donation will usually make the 
request, sometimes accompanied by the treating doctor and/or nurse. The request is 
expected to take place face-to-face in a private, quiet space (UKT, 2004b). This most often 
occurs in a separate room, away from the ward: often a ‘family interview room’, designed 
for sensitive conversations between families and treating health professionals. Requests 
occasionally also take place at the patient’s bedside, if deemed private enough.  
The approaching health professional also has to decide which individuals qualify as relevant 
next of kin (UKT, 2004b), and will sometimes speak to all family members wishing to be 
present, or may ask to only talk with immediate family. Who is able to legally provide 
consent for donation is configured in the UK’s Human Tissue Act’s (HTA) legislation of 2004. 
This was brought into force in 2006, replacing the 1961 Human Tissue Act, and outlines the 
legal framework relating to the process of consent for organ and tissue donation. The Act 
was brought about largely as a result of the public mistrust which arose from the organ 
retention scandal at Alder Hey Children’s Hospital and the Bristol Royal Infirmary during the 
1990s. A public inquiry into these events found that tissue and organs were often being 
taken, stored, and used without adequate consent after the post-mortems of deceased 
patients47 (Sheach Leath, 2007). The product of this public judgement resulted in a ruling 
that the existing laws around organ and tissue retention were insufficient and opaque, 
hence new legislation was brought about in 2004 (DH, 2004). 
In a bid to re-frame donation as a transparent act, the HTA outlines the process of consent 
at the heart of the principle “underpinning the lawful retention and use of body parts, 
organs and tissues from the living or the deceased” (DH, 2004: 3). In the context of the UK’s 
                                                          
47
 Consent is not actually required for a coroner’s post-mortem, but the retention of organs is only legal if it is 
for the specific purpose of finding out the cause of death. There are also hospital post-mortems, which 
clinicians or relatives can request after the death of an individual in hospital. Under the 1961 Human Tissue 
Act, hospital post-mortems only required a “lack of objection” from relatives for this process, rather than 
specific consent (Sheach Leath, 2007). 
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current opt-in organ donation system, the HTA’s code of practice on Donation of Solid 
Organs for Transplant (2009a) defines ‘valid’ consent for donation as that which is firstly 
sought from evidence of the deceased’s consent before death, such as their name on the 
donor register. If this is not available then a nominated representative or a ‘qualifying 
relative’ – usually a family member – can provide consent.    
In theory the Act makes it legal to remove someone’s organs simply on the basis that the 
individual has given their prior consent to donate. However, realising the ethical 
implications of such practice, the Act recognises the standard practice of asking for, and 
taking consent from family members, even if their relative’s wishes are already known (HTA, 
2009a; 2009b). Donation nurses, in collaboration with the treating ICU or A&E clinician, are 
responsible for approaching and taking donation consent from a potential donor family 
(NHSBT, 2010). In line with the ODT’s (2008) recommendations, all donation nurses now 
undergo specialist training in how to talk to families about organ donation, and how to 
structure the consent conversation. This involves taking the family through a step-by-step 
process: from the request, to explaining the donation process, to obtaining written consent 
and a medical and social history of the potential donor, right through to initiating any 
specific requests by the family for care of their relative after donation (UKT, 2004a; 2004b). 
Much of the donation nurses’ training is provided by an American company called Verble, 
Worth & Verble, who facilitate ‘master classes’ in consent and interviewing families about 
organ donation.   
This Verble and Worth training promotes the practice of requesting donation and taking 
informed consent through what is known as the ‘ladder of information of consent’. This 
firstly involves the donation nurse asking the family about their understanding of events 
around their relative’s diagnosis. After ensuring the family have understood and accepted 
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the clinician’s decision on death48, the donation nurse will continue the request process by 
introducing the family to their ‘options’ after death. These include those that are legally 
required, such as the registration of death, and potential coroner involvement, alongside 
asking the family whether they have considered the possibility of organ donation for their 
relative. If the patient is on the organ donor register this information may also be shared 
with the family, as a way of introducing the possibility of donation. At this point, the family 
will usually have a chance to ask any questions and/or may be left with some information 
and given time to think through the request (HTA, 2009b).  
If the family refuse donation, the donation nurse may discuss it further with them, to check 
their decision is final. If this is the case, treatment will be withdrawn from their relative (in 
both brain stem dead patients and those whose situation has been assessed as futile – 
potential DCD donors). If, however, the family express an interest in going ahead with 
donation, the donation nurse must then guide them through the formal process of consent. 
This is done by the completion of a standardised consent form, within which the designated 
family member must give general consent for donation, along with consent for each organ 
and any tissues they wish to be donated, i.e. kidneys, heart, corneas etc.  
As part of the process of informed consent, the donation nurse will also provide the family 
with certain details of: any likely coroner involvement, what the surgical procedure will 
involve and who carries it out, details of what exactly will be removed49, how the organs will 
be allocated, how long the process will take, the appearance of their relative’s body after 
the retrieval, and the possibility that some or all of the organs might be unsuitable for 
                                                          
48
 If the family are still judged as not understanding the situation, i.e. are refusing to accept that withdrawal of 
care is the right decision for their relative, then the donation conversation will usually not go ahead, or may be 
postponed so that the family can be given further explanation (by the consultant or donation nurse) about the 
death, to aid their understanding. 
49
 E.g. in the case of heart valve donation, the whole heart is removed. 
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transplantation after their removal (UKT, 2004a). The family are also made aware that they 
can withdraw their consent at any time; right until the first incision is made in the operating 
theatre (HTA, 2009a). Consent for donation is therefore only final once the donation 
operation has started. In the case of DCD, the family are informed that donation can only go 
ahead if their relative’s heart stops within a certain time (usually two hours) once treatment 
has been withdrawn, and that once they have been declared dead they will only have 
around five minutes to spend with their relative before they are taken to the operating 
theatre50 (ICS, 2005).  
The donation nurse also explains to the family that blood and tissue samples will need to be 
taken from their relative to test for certain diseases, like HIV and Hepatitis, to ensure that 
their organs are suitable to transplant. Along with the consent forms, the donation nurse 
must also complete a patient assessment form with the family, to obtain details of the 
donor’s social and medical history. This form is essentially used to find out the patient’s 
illness history and lifestyle, to assess the safety of the organs to be used for transplant51. It 
includes questions about the potential donor’s sexual history and their drug, alcohol, and 
tobacco use, alongside queries about their general health, such as whether they have ever 
been treated for cancer. Recognising the delicate nature of this part of the consent process, 
interview guidelines in UKT’s Donor Family Care Policy (2004a) advocate the importance of 
imparting the procedural nature of this process, stating that the donation nurse should 
explain “that some questions are of an intimate nature”, that they are required for all 
potential donors and that they “are not meant to cause offence” (UKT, 2004a: 10). 
                                                          
50
 This is to ensure that there is a limited amount of time that the organs are without oxygen, in order to 
maximise the chance of them being useable.  
51
 This would include assessing whether there is any chance that the donor could have recently contracted HIV 
– by asking about their sexual and substance use history - as the virus is usually only detected in blood tests 
two to six months after exposure. 
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Once these forms are complete, the donation nurse assesses whether the family has any 
special requests for the after care of their relative after donation. This includes asking about 
religious/ spiritual needs; whether they want any locks of hair, hand, and/or foot prints, 
photographs, and a body viewing. It also includes asking whether they would like follow up 
support after the donation, including information about the donation outcome and 
anonymised details of recipients. This makes it clear to the family that the donation nurses’s 
involvement does not simply end with the act of donation.  
Coroner consent 
Due to the sudden and unexpected nature of most donor deaths, the coroner is often 
involved in donation cases. Once a patient has died/treatment is to be withdrawn, the 
healthcare team are obliged to notify the local coroner if the cause of death is unknown, 
violent, considered ‘unnatural’, or if death occurs less than twenty-four hours after hospital 
admittance; in which case the coroner is legally bound to investigate. In the case of coroner 
involvement, donation can only go ahead with a coroner’s agreement, “who must be 
satisfied that such donation will not interfere with his/her duty to investigate the death” 
(DH, 2010). Coroner consent is therefore vital, since, even when a family have agreed for 
their relative’s organs to be donated, if the coroner feels the donation may disrupt their 
investigation, it cannot take place. Other forms of authoritative consent may also be needed 
from the police and pathologist (if a post-mortem is required). Here, the coroner must 
discuss the case with the senior police Investigating Officer and the pathologist responsible 
for the post-mortem if a potential donor’s death is implicated in criminal proceedings (DH, 
2010). Consent from the coroner is therefore mediated via these authorities. 
Coroner consent is sometimes sought by the treating clinician, prior to, or in parallel with 
the family approach This involves contacting the on-call coroner with details of the 
circumstances surrounding the death, any police involvement, the type of donation being 
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proposed and organs likely to be suitable for retrieval, along with whether the patient was 
on the organ donor register (ICS, 2005). Sometimes the coroner will be called by the 
donation nurse, which may be done before or after the family consent process. This form of 
approval is a key stage in the donation pathway, with the coroner understood to act as a key 
gatekeeper in the process. 
Backroom activities: testing, managing, and allocating organs  
Once both family and coroner consent have been secured, the donation nurse (who may be 
the same as the one approaching the family, or may be a colleague designated responsibility 
to deal with the largely administrative side of the process) will begin the testing process and 
continue to facilitate the management of the potential donor. Managing the donor involves 
monitoring their heart rate, blood pressure, blood sugar and fluid levels, and their 
respiratory rate. This is to ensure that any physical instability (like high blood sugar levels) in 
the donor is corrected, often with the administration of medication such as insulin (ICS, 
2005), to optimise the chances of successful donation. In the case of DCD, the notion of 
managing a patient – sustaining their organs in order to facilitate donation – has recently 
been clarified by the Department of Health, around a shift in understanding of what is 
considered the patient’s best interests: 
Maintenance of life-sustaining treatment may be considered to be in the best 
interests of someone who wanted to be a donor if it facilitates donation and 
does not cause them harm, or place them at significant risk of experiencing 
harm or distress. (DH, 2009: 10) 
In parallel, the donation nurse will also take blood from the potential donor and send these 
to the local hospital lab for virology, tissue, and blood group testing. The latter are used in 
decisions over how to allocate the organs; with virology testing done to rule out any chance 
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of HIV and hepatitis B or C transmission between donor and recipient. Other tests include 
liver function, along with x-rays if the heart or lungs are being removed. These results may 
take up to four hours to return, during which time the donation nurse will register the 
potential donor with UK Transplant and begin the organ offering process – usually done via 
the National Electronic Offering System. 
The allocation procedure can be lengthy, and involves offering organs according to organ-
specific allocation policies. For example, kidneys from DBD donors are electronically 
allocated by the placement of patients waiting for transplant on to a tiered hierarchy. This 
prioritises HLA matches (between donor and recipient) and distinguishes recipient need 
according to a points-based system, incorporating time waited for a transplant and age, 
amongst others, with paediatric patients given priority in all cases (Johnson et al., 2010). In 
contrast, with DCD donors, because of the decreased time in which kidneys can be outside 
of the body, they tend to be offered to transplant centres in order of location closest to the 
donor hospital. Here, transplant surgeons within each centre are given 45 minutes to accept 
or reject an organ, before the next centre is contacted. 
Alongside this, the donation nurse will also negotiate an operating theatre location and 
time, usually with the on-call anaesthetist and theatre co-ordinator. Due to scheduled 
surgery times, this will often be during the evening or night. The donation nurse will also 
contact the regional organ retrieval teams - specialist surgical teams employed by NHSBT to 
carry out organ procurements - to arrange for their arrival and details of the donation. 
The organ retrieval 
Once all virology tests have been returned (presuming they are negative), the organ 
allocation organised, the retrieval teams arrived, scrubbed and ready in theatre, and the 
family given chance to spend time with their relative and say goodbye, the procurement 
143 
 
process can begin. In the case of a DBD donor, this is a matter of transferring the donor to 
theatre, still attached to the ventilator, with an anaesthetist present to administer general 
anaesthetic52, before the initial surgical incision is made. With DCD however, this stage is 
more complex and involves withdrawing treatment on the donor according to usual 
protocol within the local ICU, waiting for the patient’s heart to stop beating, and declaring 
death prior to taking the patient to theatre. 
Withdrawal of treatment usually involves stopping ventilation and airway support to the 
patient, and administering sedatives (if not already done so) to elicit a pain-free death (ICS, 
2005). The family are then left with the patient, who will be observed by the donation nurse 
so that they can act immediately once the patient goes into asystole (meaning there is no 
cardiac output: the heart stops beating). If this happens within two hours53, a clinician will 
certify death after five minutes of the patient being in cardio-respiratory arrest (ICS, 2005). 
Although there is no standard criteria for diagnosing this form of death, it usually involves a 
doctor confirming the patient is no longer breathing (respiratory) and is without a pulse 
(cardiac), along with checking for the absence of brain activity by assessing pupil (shining a 
light into the eyes) and corneal reflexes (AMRC, 2008). Once death is confirmed, the donor 
will then be quickly taken to the operating theatre for the organ retrieval. 
Final (and continuing) acts of care 
Once the organs have been removed, the donor will be stitched and transferred back to the 
ICU for the performance of final acts of care. Depending on local policy, these may be 
carried out by both ICU nurses and the donation nurse, sometimes in conjunction with the 
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 This practice was explained in chapter 1. 
53
 Usually, if the patient has not died within two hours of withdrawal of treatment, then the donation cannot 
go ahead, and the family will be informed of this by the donation nurse. 
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family. This includes removing any remaining tubes and catheters54, washing and dressing 
the donor, and taking mementoes such as locks of hair and handprints for the family (ICS, 
2005; UKT, 2004a). If the family wish to spend further time with their relative, the donor will 
be transferred to the chapel of rest, and finally on to the mortuary.  
If the family have agreed to follow-up, the donation nurse will send them a letter, usually 
within a few weeks of the donation, thanking them and outlining the outcome of the 
retrieval, along with providing anonymised details of the organ recipients. The letter may 
also offer the family a follow-up visit by the donation nurse (UKT, 2004a), which is used to 
facilitate further support, such as bereavement counselling. It also provides information 
about contacting the transplant recipients, for which the donation nurse would act as 
mediator. The donation nurse also usually sends a card to each donor family on the 
anniversary of the donation. Contact with a donor family can therefore continue for years 
after the donation event. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of outlining the standardised donation pathway in this chapter has been to 
show what this process entails, alongside highlighting the complexity of procedures involved 
in facilitating a donation; the multiple stages of consent (such as decisions to refer, family 
acceptance of death, and coroner consent); and the huge variety of different actors 
(including families, ICU staff, donation nurses, coroners, mechanical ventilators, laboratory 
equipment, tools for conducting brain stem death tests, consent forms etc) involved in the 
process. In so doing, it becomes clear that the ‘issue’ of low ‘BME’ donation rates goes 
beyond questions about why certain population groups do or do not believe in organ 
donation, and into queries about whether patients are referred in the first place for 
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 These may be left in if a post mortem is required after the organ retrieval (ICS, 2005). 
145 
 
donation, and how death and donation requests are communicated to a family by health 
professionals.  
In addition, despite recommendations by the ODT (2008) to make donation a usual process 
in hospitals, and for staff to refer potential donors as a routine part of end of life care, these 
recommendations were to be implemented in locally-produced (within each Trust) donation 
guidelines and policy. This has implications for how recommendations to increase (‘BME’) 
organ donor rates are made to work at local, institutional levels, and indicates that we are 
not, therefore, dealing with uniform procedures (as outlined in this chapter) in everyday 
donation practice. In this way, donation decisions, and thus donation rates among certain 
population groups, can be understood by viewing organ donation as a multi-faceted 
process, contingent upon certain requirements being met along this pathway. It is 
important, therefore, to look at how this process is done and experienced in practice. This 
will provide us with a point of departure for understanding how ‘BME’ organ donors and 
their families are constituted as a result.  
In the following chapters I therefore take up different stages of the organ donation 
trajectory in everyday practice, to show how the ‘problem’ of organ donation and ethnicity 
can be traced in the organ donation encounter. Findings, in chapter 4, include the 
interaction of the ODT’s recommendations, such as required referral, with the practices of 
ICU staff – who may continue to make decisions on the suitability of a potential donor and 
approach a family about donation, despite this no longer being their responsibility.  In 
chapter 5, I show what happens when an ‘Asian’ family do not agree with the diagnosis of 
death of their relative – inhibiting the pathway towards donation request – and how they, 
and other ‘Asian’ families are constructed as a ‘problem’ for donation as a result. In 
addition, in chapter 6, I demonstrate how securing organs for donation is dependent upon 
the interpretative work of the donation nurse, and their ability to balance a family’s needs 
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with the requirements for legal consent. Moreover, I show how ‘BME’ families get 
reproduced as a ‘problem’ through the assumptions made by practitioners during these 
consent encounters. The following chapters therefore aim to provide insight into the various 
practices and experiences in everyday donation domains – and beyond – as a way of  
illustrating the complex ‘issue’ of organ donation and ethnicity.  
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Chapter 4. From Patient to Potential Donor: 
Standardised Recommendations, Localised Practices 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses upon the work of organ donation. Specifically, it will look at how the 
Organ Donor Taskforce’s (ODT) 2008 recommendations for organisational changes to 
donation processes get made to work at local (Trust) levels by the figure of the donation 
nurse. Drawing on work around standardisation and its enactments – how things, like policy, 
get done and conceived “on the ground” (e.g. Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Miller and 
Bowker, 2009: 152) – my way in to understanding donation and ethnicity takes experiences 
of implementing the ODT’s recommendations as its point of departure. In making the work 
involved in organ donation visible, I highlight the tension between guidelines and how these 
actually work in practice. With this, the question of low (‘BME’) donor rates becomes not 
just one relating to familial consent, but also gets embedded in an understanding of how the 
stage of requesting organs from families is actually reached in the first place. 
One of the hospital Trusts I researched, Hillview, and its embedded donation nurse, Emily, 
will be focused on in the first two sections of this chapter, as an exemplar to highlight 
general findings about how recommendations to increase donor rates are put into practice. 
The final, third, section contextualises these findings by looking at the emotional work 
involved in the donation process for health professionals. Emily, a donation nurse with 
many years experience, became my main informant in the study. I followed her progress 
during her first year at Hillview through interviews, observations of her training staff, 
informal meetings and regular communication through emails and phone calls. The first 
section of this chapter therefore examines how the ODT’s recommendations were put to 
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work by Emily in her implementation of a donation after cardiac death (DCD) programme at 
Hillview. With a responsibility to optimise donation rates within local Trusts, I show how 
donation nurses must carefully respond to the requirements of national recommendations 
according to the heterogeneous needs of local practice settings and their staff. In so doing, I 
illustrate the contingencies involved in making the ODT’s recommendations work in 
practice, and thus increasing organ donor rates.  
The second part of this chapter will look at decision-making around potential donor referral. 
As Latour (1987; 1988) has shown, things, such as the ODT’s recommendations, only 
become ‘real’ through the actors – human and non-human – who perform this reality. In 
this way, I show how, even when successful in implementing changes to donation procedure 
within Intensive Care Units (ICU), there is no guarantee for the donation nurse that staff will 
necessarily adhere to such changes. To get around such difficulties, donation nurses develop 
informal tactics to work through the contingencies involved in professional relationships 
around donation. In so doing, they are shown to be acutely aware of balancing the 
responsibility of increasing donor rates, with the needs of ICU staff.  
The final section backgrounds the above issues by demonstrating the overlap of public and 
medical sensitivity around organ donation, and how the work of donation nurses must 
encompass such concerns. I show how public worries around donation are also expressed 
by Intensive Care professionals, who worry about the implications of the ODT’s push to 
increase organ donors for their everyday work. At the same time, organ donation is 
experienced as an emotionally difficult experience for all staff involved in the process. In this 
way, the donation nurses’ job is far from a simple matter of implementing donation 
procedures in clinical contexts. To affect donation rates they must also work at making 
organ donation acceptable for medical practitioners and the ‘public’ alike. By showing how 
organ donation is made to work, practiced, and experienced at institutional levels, this 
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chapter makes visible wider difficulties around increasing donation rates, which have been 
largely ignored in conceptualisations of the ‘BME’ donor ‘problem’.  
Part 1. Making donation work in local settings 
I don’t know if I should say this or not but donation’s very much like a postcode 
lottery. You know, you go to a certain hospital you get cancer treatment, you go 
to another one you wouldn’t. Donation, and offering donation in my opinion is 
the same because, yes required referral is in a lot of places but I’ve talked about 
organ donation...organisational culture. If you end up in one hospital you’re less 
likely to get asked [to donate] than if you end up in another one. (Stephanie, 
donation nurse with team 1) 
Encountering Hillview 
On my way up the steep hills towards Hillview hospital for the first time, I was struck by the 
ethnic diversity of the city. Most of the shops I passed could be characterised as ‘Asian’: 
from Indian and Islamic clothes shops, to Islamic superstores, Indian takeaways, sweet 
shops and delicatessens, to the travel agents specialising in 'Hajj' packages. Upon arriving at 
Hillview, I was taken by the grand quality of the building. In contrast to the rabbit-warren 
corridors of many other hospitals I had visited, Hillview was filled with light. This gave a 
sense of space and calm, rather than the confusion I often felt upon entering other hospitals 
for the first time. Walking through the ICU, I realised how different it was to the Paediatric 
Intensive Care Unit (PICU) at Lakeland; where I had already spent some time. In sharp 
contrast to the modernity of Lakeland’s PICU – all shiny new machines and state-of-the-art 
equipment, with large gaps between each bed – Hillview’s ICU looked archaic. Beds were 
closely spaced along each wall, and everything seemed bunched together. The unit was full 
and claustrophobically warm. Faded green curtains were drawn around a few beds and 
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there was one central cubicle, where an elderly man of ‘Asian’ appearance was half-sitting, 
half lying in an easy chair. What sounded like Islamic chanting was playing out of his hi-fi, as 
he stared, glazed-eyed, into space. Most of the patients looked elderly: shrivelled, frail, and 
overwhelmed in their large beds with sheets draped over them, wires and tubes connected 
at all ends. In the middle of the ward was the nurses’ station-come-reception. Files were 
piled higgledy piggledy, and staff stood chattering about anything from having a fish and 
chip lunch to the need for more fire safety-belts. This Intensive Care ward was less daunting 
to me than Lakeland’s. Partly because the mess and out-of-date decor made it seem 
somehow more human, despite the mass of machinery. On the other hand, the closeness of 
the beds, the clutter and the generally cramped space made it feel chaotic and 
claustrophobic. The lack of privacy was reflected in the staff coffee room, which seemed to 
be the only place specifically for staff to go, unless they had the luxury of their own office, 
like John, Hillview’s Clinical Donor Champion and consultant Intensivist.  
DCD at Hillview: translating national recommendations in local contexts 
The ODT’s recommendations aimed to increase the UK’s deceased organ donation rates by 
50% by 2013 by making organ donation a “usual not unusual” (2008: 9) event in hospitals. 
To reach this target, these recommendations were to be implemented in hospital Trusts by 
embedded donation nurses and a Clinical Donor Champion: tasked with making these 
changes at local levels, with an eye on working “to a UK wide perspective” (ODT, 2008: 6). 
One way that this was to be achieved at Hillview was by introducing a donation after cardiac 
death (DCD) policy. As outlined in the previous chapter, DCD has yet to become 
commonplace in all UK hospitals, mainly because of the ethical and legal questions which 
persist around its practice. These include the fact that a patient may need to be given 
medications to preserve their organs for donation before their family have provided their 
consent for donation to take place (ICS/BTS, 2010).  
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Emily, the newly embedded donation nurse at Hillview had the initial job of implementing a 
DCD programme within the Trust, to begin the process of increasing its donor rates. The 
hospital not only had a reputation for rarely referring potential donors to the donation 
nurse team55, but also serves a large ‘South Asian’ (mainly of ‘Pakistani-Muslim’ heritage) 
patient population. It was thus pointed out as a key site for tackling the ‘issue’ of low ‘BME’ 
organ donation within the area the donation nurse team 2 covered; which encompassed a 
number of towns and cities with high minority ethnic populations. In implementing DCD at 
Hillview, Emily was also working towards ensuring that the ODT’s recommendations around 
making donation “a usual not unusual event” with “discussions about donation [...] part of 
all end of life care” (ODT, 2008: 36), happened, within the context of a Trust with poor rates 
of donation after brain death (DBD)56.  
Emily’s job to increase Hillview’s donation rates was variously difficult. This was not only 
because of the general ethical issues around DCD (described in the previous chapter), but 
also due to the presence of a large ‘Asian’ patient population – with her knowledge of their 
historically high refusal rates – and the ‘culture’ of donation on the ICU, which she 
acknowledged as being initially difficult to engage with. With the help of John, an ICU 
consultant and the Trust’s Clinical Donor Champion – responsible for collaborating with 
Emily to increase Hillview’s donor rates – Emily began work on creating a DCD programme 
at Hillview. This was seen as a way of tackling the hospital’s general donation problem, and 
specifically offering an opportunity to increase their even poorer rate of ‘Asian’ organ 
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 Prior to Emily’s arrival, Hillview had had only one organ donor in eighteen months. 
56
 One factor pointed to for the poor rate of DBD referrals at the Trust was that many patients with brain 
injuries, i.e. suspected to become brain stem dead, were often referred to the large neurological centre in a 
nearby city. This meant that the potential for DBD at Hillview was restricted, because the ICU had limited 
admittances of potentially brain dead patients.  
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donation57. In addition, kidneys from DCD donors are often locally allocated, since organs 
have a decreased time limit for being outside the body compared with those from a brain 
dead donor (NHSBT, 2010). Since a large percentage of Hillview’s kidney transplant list was 
made up of patients from ‘South Asian’ backgrounds, the DCD programme therefore also 
offered the potential to decrease its own transplant waiting lists. 
Emily was thus tasked with implementing an ethically challenging practice in the context of 
an ICU initially perceived as less than friendly towards donation, as she explained:  
Historically, the unit had always had, I think it’s fair to say, a very poor donation 
rate. And the fact that there’d been one donor...since 2008 I think speaks for 
itself. So a number of problems here: no DCD programme, a large percentage of 
the local population are from South Asian community, and er fairly high refusal 
rate from this community. It had been the last six years we’d been trying to get a 
DCD programme in here. Hit a brick wall all the time. Not me personally, sort of 
like with the team. Different individuals have tried and every time: brick wall, 
brick wall. Consultants were all concerned about the legal and ethical things 
around it [DCD]. They seemed to believe that if they made a decision about 
withdrawing treatment then went forward with organ donation they would have 
a criminal prosecution against them. So it’s been a long drawn-out thing, but as 
from a few months ago, we have finally got the DCD programme up and running. 
(Emily, donation nurse at Hillview) 
Emily’s work therefore involved balancing the general need to increase donor rates with 
producing a DCD policy that not only addressed national and ethical issues around DCD 
practice, but also the specific contingencies at Hillview. These consisted of: an ICU team 
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 Everyone I spoke to at Hillview was unable to recall ever having had an ‘Asian’ organ donor. I did not have 
access to records to confirm this. 
153 
 
little used to donation in the context of its previously poor donation rates; the 
understanding that donation was more difficult at ‘Hillview’ because of its large ‘Asian’ 
patient population; and the past experience of her colleagues failing to implement the 
policy because of the consultants’ fears over litigation. In this way, a crucial part of making 
this practice happen would be in the development of a DCD protocol, to provide practical 
certainty (Hogle, 2009) – what is to be done at each stage of DCD and by whom – to this 
somewhat controversial practice. Here, I understand protocols or procedures as: “a set of 
instructions (...) informing the user what to do in a specified situation” (Berg, 1998: 227). In 
other words, the DCD protocol would designate each task, and who is responsible for 
carrying these out, at each stage in the donation trajectory.  
In bringing about DCD, Emily was required to negotiate the requirements of different actors 
at different levels. I use the term ‘negotiate’ in this chapter to describe the process of 
making something work in practice, such as the DCD policy, by adjusting it around the needs 
of differently involved actors – such as ICU consultants and nurses, and the hospital itself 
(Hogle, 1995). As a local institution, Hillview stands in for both the concerns expressed 
around DCD at a macro-level (existing standards surrounding organ donation and the 
documented legal and ethical difficulties), and for the everyday, micro-level, concerns 
(Vaughan, 1999) around donation in practice, such as the fear that a decision to withdraw 
care and then refer a patient for organ donation may result in prosecution. In this way, to 
fulfil her role and effect any sort of change, Emily had to balance wider national, legal, and 
ethical concerns with an understanding of Hillview’s historic ‘culture’ around donation, and 
the fears of its staff. Drawing from Star and Lampland (2009: 14), implementing and locally 
standardising a DCD process can thus be conceived as a historical process, entwined to 
existing structures and events at Hillview.  
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With the collaboration of John – who spent much time persuading Hillview’s main ICU 
consultants to agree to the initial development of a DCD policy – Emily finally managed to 
launch the DCD programme in 2010, one year after being assigned to the hospital. Reaching 
this stage involved Emily and John facilitating lengthy discussions with ICU and A&E staff, 
hospital management, and operating theatre staff, to ensure that everyone was on board 
with the legal, ethical, and practical implications of implementing such a programme. As 
John explained, the ODTs recommendations came as the push to finally put DCD in place at 
the Trust: 
The DCD programme was [...] challenging in terms of the ethical and legal issues 
associated with it, and we’ve been reluctant here to embark upon this kind of 
programme, mainly for those sorts of reasons. So, since the new sort of 
taskforce recommendations had started to make the muddy waters a little bit 
clearer, people were more...cooperative in signing up to the programme. So 
initially it took right until the beginning of this year to convince the 6 main 
Intensive Care consultants to agree to set up this programme, and the feeling 
was we couldn’t really set it up without everybody’s agreement. So having got 
the agreement of the 6 main Intensivists, we then had to seek support from the 
rest of the team: all the nursing staff, both here and theatres, and the 
Emergency department, and the consultants in the Emergency department. And 
we’ve talked to an awful lot of people in the last six months, and we got to the 
point where we’d got a fairly good pathway defined and we’re having a 
debriefing about the first DCD patient later on this week and I guess well, part of 
that is to re-examine that pathway and make sure that we’re all happy in how its 
set out. (John, consultant intensivist and Clinical Donor Champion at Hillview)  
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The work to implement a DCD programme at Hillview and increase its almost non-existent 
organ donor rates, was therefore a drawn-out process. This began with the authority of the 
organ donor taskforce’s recommendations and was made ‘real’ by Emily and John bringing 
together the interests of diverse people (donation nurse teams, consultants, nurses, 
Hillview’s patient population); processes (withdrawal of care, diagnosing death etc); and 
‘worlds’ (management, surgery, intensive and emergency medicine), necessary to get the 
policy into place (Hogle, 2009; Miller and Bowker, 2009: 151). This process – drawing on the 
actor network approach58 (e.g. Latour, 1987; 2005: 108; Callon, 1986) – I interpret as one of 
translation. This refers to the alignment of people, places, processes, and things – brought 
together to make DCD happen. In this sense, the ODT’s recommendations are transformed 
at local levels by defining and entwining the roles of those, such as ICU nurses and 
consultants, who were to be involved in making new donation practices happen.  
Over one year after Emily started at Hillview, the DCD programme had begun; with a 
localised Trust policy document – detailing the stages of the DCD pathway – acting as a 
locally-specific procedure for the process. Emily was tasked with training the ICU and A&E 
nurses in DCD, with John taking the mantle for teaching the consultants. Training the ICU 
nurses involved Emily taking them through the donation procedures and highlighting their 
role along the way. The training sessions, one of which I observed, took place in Emily’s 
office, which doubled up as the ICU’s seminar room. At the session a few chairs were 
clustered around the table, with nurses dropping in, one-by-one, eventually making up a 
group of seven. Most are quiet, slumped in their chairs, as Emily takes them through the 
various stages of DCD and their involvement:  
Emily presents Hillview’s new DCD protocol on PowerPoint slides. She goes 
through the background as to why the new practice is important – in the context 
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 See chapter 1 and 2 for an explanation of this approach in research. 
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of decreasing rates of brain dead donors and the UK’s need to increase its 
overall donor numbers – before discussing each stage of the DCD procedure and 
who would be involved. Emily emphasises the ownership of Hillview’s new policy 
for her audience, discussing how decisions would be made as events unfolded. 
She asks the nurses whether they thought a dying patient should be maintained 
with therapy if a relative was taking too long to arrive at the hospital59. One 
nurse replies, ‘I wouldn’t’, to which Emily replies ‘You can only decide on the 
day’. She then brings up a slide with bold italic writing stating: Consent can be 
revoked at any time. She further explains: ‘that is until they go through the 
theatre door’ – referring to the fact that families can withdraw their consent for 
donation right up until the first incision has been made in the operating theatre. 
The nurses regularly interject with their concerns about what might happen in 
practice, with one piping up that she had images of family members chasing 
their relative down the hospital corridor as they were taken into theatre. In 
response, Emily reassures them: ‘I know what you’re thinking. That’s what I 
thought before I did it for the first time, but it’s not like that at all.’ A strange 
discussion then ensues about the logistics of getting someone who looks dead – 
who is dead – out of ICU and into the operating theatre without attracting too 
much attention from members of the public. Emily discusses the likely tactics: 
‘We’ll have someone waiting by the lift and to clear the corridors. We may even 
cover their face with an oxygen mask for sanity reasons, so that you don’t get 
people stopping you and asking what you’re doing with that patient.’ 
(Fieldnotes, October 2010) 
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 This relates to the fact that, to be suitable for DCD, a potential donor may need to be ‘treated’ with certain 
medical therapies in a certain time, to preserve the quality of their organs. This may be done before a family 
have consented to donate – leading to questions about the legal and ethical implications of such practice, as 
discussed in chapter 3. 
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This example shows the tensions for Emily in putting new donation processes into practice; 
unfamiliar to staff with little experience of donation generally. From a unit who previously 
had just one donor in eighteen months, to six in one year after Emily’s arrival, we see how 
the dramatic shift in donation rates through the “culture change” (Griffiths et al., 2009: 
1459) in practice, is difficult for staff to initially engage with. We witness Emily working 
through the possible contingencies of DCD with the nursing staff, whose personal worries 
about the practice overlap with wider ethical, legal, medical, and public concerns. These 
include how decisions about patients, and whether to clinically manage them as donors, will 
need to be made as events occur, such as when a family might not always be present to give 
timely consent for donation. They also encompass the constant potential of a family 
withdrawing consent, with the nurses relating this to their own ideas about the trauma for a 
family in their relative being taken to theatre so quickly after death (which usually happens 
within 10 minutes). Emily dissipates these worries by conveying her own practical 
experience of the process: “it’s not like that at all”, grounding the nurses projected concerns 
in the context of practice, where such fears have not been upheld.  She also manages 
perceptions of what she imagines of the public reaction to a dead body being taken into 
theatre. Here she mediates between public perceptions and professional concerns by 
proposing practicalities for resolving these, such as making a dead body appear alive by 
employing the symbolism of an oxygen mask (Hadders, 2007). In so doing, she pre-empts 
and neutralises any future problems, such as a member of the public delaying the donor 
transfer.  
By  working through the possible problems which might arise in the practice of DCD, Emily 
not only manages staff (and imagined public) concerns over the process but also offers  
nurses the tools to be able to work through these contingencies in practice, so that they can 
take ownership of the process. Emily thus uses this training session to transform, align, and 
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neutralise any tensions in the DCD policy by giving life to procedure: placing it in the context 
of the nurses’ everyday, practical concerns (Miller and Bowker, 2009). In so doing she 
creates a space of possibility (Singleton, 2005), where the procedures are hypothesised as 
working with, rather than being constrained by, everyday contingencies. In working through 
the various practices of DCD, Emily also normalises them. She makes them acceptable for 
medical practitioners, families, and the public, to fulfil her task of “realising every 
opportunity for donation” (ODT, 2008: 14). In this way, we see how the donation nurse acts 
as a vital agent for mobilising the interests of the ODT in practice. This they do by mediating 
between, and translating and aligning the ODT’s interests with the concerns of local 
institutions, their staff, and the public.  
When examined at institutional levels then, we see how the task to achieve more ‘BME’ 
organ donors is a hugely complex process. It goes far beyond promoting the message of 
donation to ‘BME’ ‘communities’ – a notion which underpins current research (e.g. Davis 
and Randhawa, 2004; Morgan et al., 2008). Insights into how the ODT’s recommendations 
to increase donor rates get interpreted at local, institutional levels cannot be seen as 
separate from the ‘BME’ organ donor ‘problem’, with the knowledge that a family’s access 
to organ donation in the first place depends upon the ability of the donation nurse (with the 
collaboration of the Clinical Donor Champions) to bring about change. The ODT’s 
recommendations for change thus shape practice, while always being embedded in the 
context of local peculiarities, organisational compositions, collective processes of 
negotiations between diversely involved constituents, and the political and historical 
environment surrounding organ donation (Timmermans and Berg, 1997, 2003; Hogle, 2009; 
Star and Lampland, 2009; Miller and Bowker, 2009). These complexities subsequently 
impact upon the success or otherwise of the changes, and thus the ability of ‘BME’ 
‘communities’ to donate more organs.  
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Part 2. Navigating professional relationships: making donation happen                                                
Even when new donation policies, like DCD, are formally implemented, there is no 
guarantee for the donation nurse that ICU staff will adhere to these procedures. As Miller 
and Bowker (2009) remind us – in their research on the construction of a standard 
computer package to enable data sharing between ecological scientists – standards “assume 
specific configurations, actors, tools and data” (2009: 152). In other words, they are 
constructed around assumptions of stable occurrences: people and technology coming 
together to produce a desirable outcome (Berg, 1998; Timmermans and Berg, 2003). When 
put into practice, however, the contingencies of complex donation situations means that 
experiences may look very different from their ideal. This ideal is encapsulated in the ODT’s 
recommendations and in procedural pathways, which intend to make donation practice, 
and thus donation outcomes, certain. Drawing from Latour (1987; 1988), “technical objects” 
such as guidelines, procedures etc, can only be seen as ‘real’ through the actors (human and 
non-human) who align themselves with its purpose (cited in Miller and Bowker, 2009: 151). 
Organ donation procedures are thus only as good as the staff who enact this material 
practice trajectory in moving from the potential for organ donation to the act of organ 
procurement itself. In the examples below this point will be highlighted by looking at 
Emily’s, and other donation nurses’, difficulties with getting staff to practice new procedures 
around donation. 
Donation practices and clinical hierarchies 
In the case of Hillview’s new DCD policy, one configuration upon which the whole process 
hinges is in the act of a potential donor being referred, by a member of the ICU staff60, to 
the on-call donation nurse once the decision has been made to withdraw treatment. The 
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 The policy does not specify who can refer. I came to learn that doctors and nurses were each as likely as the 
other to implement a potential donor referral. 
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DCD policy outlines the best practice process of referring all potential donors to the 
donation team. However, it also includes a clause which states that the ultimate decision on 
the appropriateness of referral lies with the treating ICU or A&E consultant. As detailed in 
the previous chapter, required referral, or minimum notification criteria, whilst not 
specifically named in Hillview’s DCD policy, was outlined by the OTD as one of the key 
recommendations to increasing donor rates. Where this policy has been formally brought 
into place in local Trusts, dramatic increases have been seen in both potential donor 
referrals and donation rates themselves (e.g. Bleakley, 2010). For Emily, the DCD policy at 
Hillview incorporated the requirements for the automatic referral of potential donors. 
Whilst no specific policy for DBD was yet in place, her ongoing donation training for the ICU 
staff addressed this need, in order to optimise both types of organ donors at the Trust.  
For Hillview’s ICU, Emily’s everyday presence on the ward represented a significant change 
for the conventional infrastructure of the department. In the past, ICU teams would 
generally only encounter donation nurses after inviting them into the department with a 
potential donor referral. With the recent move to their embedded roles, donation nurses 
can now be present from the time a patient arrives on the ward; with staff expected to 
make timely referrals of potential donors, and collaborate with the donation nurse in 
planning the donation request to the family. Whilst having noticeable impact on donor 
rates, this change also means that donation nurses have to carefully manage their relations 
with hospital staff, whose collaboration is vital in making these changes work.  
Over time, Emily made much progress in gaining the trust of Hillview’s ICU staff. Upon her 
initial entry into this seemingly unfriendly donation environment she had played the part of 
Schutz’s stranger (1944, see chapter 2): gradually learning and integrating to Hillview’s local 
(‘cultural’) ways of working – thus making these ways available for my analysis. Later on, she 
expressed her adaptation to this setting and the people within it, feeling embraced as an 
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‘insider’. Crucially, in their collaboration around the DCD policy, Emily and John had 
developed a good working relationship61 and had begun to take this outside of the 
immediate setting of the ICU, by working together on localised donation promotions: 
writing press releases, and appearing in local newspapers and on the regional television 
news. However, despite this progress, I also heard Emily’s concerns about the changes she 
was bringing about and how this affected her relationship with staff. She had worked hard 
at training staff in the re-organised donation procedures through formal training sessions 
(both for DCD and DBD) and in her informal interactions with them. This was to ensure the 
unit alerted her or her colleagues to any potential donors, and that the practice of 
collaborative requesting (see chapter 3) – whereby donation requests are planned in 
advance with clinical staff – became a usual way of working.  
Despite her insistence that most of the staff were on board with the new procedures, Emily 
recounted a frustrating experience with one of the consultants, forcing her to reflect on the 
relational implications of newly imposed donation practices. Arriving on the unit one 
morning, whilst walking through the ward to fetch her morning cup of coffee, Emily was 
made aware of a potentially brain dead patient by a staff nurse she was familiar with. To her 
surprise, however, the nurse prevents her from accessing the potential donor, conveying 
this through the message of the treating consultant, Peter: 
He [nurse] was like standing by the bed and he said: ‘Don’t you come near here.’ 
And, it was this gentleman who they were going to test that day [for brain stem 
death], and he said that Peter [the consultant] had said ‘I don’t want anybody 
talking to Emily about this patient until I’ve done the (amused voice) test’. And it 
was like really weird. (Emily, Hillview’s donation nurse) 
                                                          
61
 The ODT argues that the “collaboration between DTC’s [donation nurses] and Trust donation champions is 
key to the success” of its recommendations (2008: 45). 
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Emily expresses her surprise at the consultant’s actions, as he is both a regular doctor on the 
unit and someone she knows well. The staff nurse, unable to give her an explanation for the 
consultant’s blockade, later approaches her with an update, informing her that Peter had 
gone ahead with the donation request on his own: 
He [nurse] came up to me and said: ‘He’s [Peter] just made a pig’s ear of that 
interview [with the family about donation], and you nearly lost the whole thing.’ 
He said ‘I turned it round.’ Peter wouldn’t let me talk to them about donation, 
he brought it up himself, and I say, didn’t do it particularly well and admitted to 
me afterwards that he hadn’t done it particularly well as well. So it was the staff 
nurse who said: ‘hang on, I think we’ve got somebody here who can give you 
more information, who can sit down and talk you through it.’ And the staff nurse 
was brilliant ‘cause I had to come in. (Emily, donation nurse at Hillview) 
Emily perceives her ability to influence the consultant’s actions here as frustratingly limited: 
her only ally in this situation being the staff nurse, who, despite relaying the consultant’s 
authority, manages to claw back his supposedly disastrous donation request to allow Emily 
eventual access to the family. This contradicts what she had previously been discussing in 
her interview about feeling accepted on the unit. With this story she tells a different tale: 
relating the perception that she had her authority undermined by the consultant’s ability to 
navigate – find his own way through – the now-usual procedure of collaboratively working 
with a donation nurse once a patient is predicted to be brain stem dead.  
This example illustrates, to employ Star and Lampland’s term, the “slippage” between the 
ODT’s recommendations and their “realization in action” (2009: 15). In other words, by the 
consultant refusing to allow Emily’s involvement in a potential donor case, the procedure 
for collaborative working breaks down in practice. The work of organ donation, specifically 
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here the task of donor referral from consultant to donation nurse62, is thus a process of 
navigation – of constructing an individual course in the space of everyday ICU processes 
(Struhkamp et al., 2009). On the one hand, we can understand Emily’s experience of the 
consultant’s flouting of the ‘rules’ as his attempt to make the procedures of donation 
referral and request work for him, his patient, and their family (Timmermans and Berg, 
2003).  On the other side, we can pose the question of who has the authority to navigate 
donation procedures, and how this relates to wider issues of power relations in medical 
domains.  
In its recommendations, the ODT (2008: 42) conveys that there should be a “close and 
defined collaboration between DTC’s [donation nurses], clinical staff and Trust donor 
champions”. However, in practice, the donation nurses sometimes struggled to effect 
collaboration with ICU staff, especially consultants. In Emily’s example, we see how her 
attempts to bring about a way of working, which would see her being involved with a 
potential donor early on, are obstructed by the consultant, who, in Emily’s view, chooses to 
conduct the procedure in his own way. Here, the consultant’s actions also inhibit Emily’s 
ability to do her job properly. Her narrative conveys the tension involved in trying to enforce 
the very procedures she has helped to implement, with the consultant’s ability to act as 
authoritative gatekeeper to a potential donor.  
Megan Hall, one of the newer donation nurses in Emily’s regional donation nurse team, 
conveyed a related experience in her training of ICU consultants in potential donor referral. 
For Megan, a key point of her training is in the emphasis that decisions of potential donor 
suitability, especially in the case of donation after cardiac death, are not for the doctors to 
make: 
                                                          
62
 This process can also be understood as the act of staff handing over ownership of a patient to a donation 
nurse; shifting their ontological status from patient to potential donor as they do so (e.g. see Hadders, 2007 for 
a similar understanding of the switch from dead patient to corpse through post-mortem practices). 
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When I maybe do some sessions with consultants and give examples of patients 
that they haven’t asked for retrieval, we try and highlight that they are missing 
potential donors from the cardiac death. Because they [consultants] don’t miss 
them from the brain death really, it’s from the cardiac death. And we say to the 
consultants that we don’t want them to assess a patient’s suitability for 
donation, that should be the transplant surgeon’s decision. And some struggle to 
give that up to the transplant surgeons. But what we try and do is highlight to 
them, you know, in May for example, you didn’t refer Mrs Smith. And say: ‘You 
can’t absolutely say whether they definitely would have been a donor or not, 
but you can say it was likely that she would have been’. And the consultants will 
maybe respond with: ‘Well I didn’t because of kidney failure.’ And you say ‘that 
doesn’t absolutely exclude them’. And I’ve had a consultant say to me: ‘I’ll refer 
people like that over my dead body.’ So what can you say to that?! [laughs] ‘I’ll 
refer patients like that over my dead body.’ [...] Who he thinks wouldn’t be 
medically suitable. Erm...[little laugh] and the only way you can change that is by 
making it a policy that is a required element of their job to refer. And that will 
come, but it just takes time to get that in. (Megan, donation nurse with team 2) 
In this example, Megan gives examples from practice – relating to missed donation 
opportunities by virtue of the non-referral of potential DCD donors by consultants – to show 
how consultants’ decisions have the potential to affect organ donor rates. She negotiates 
their concerns around handing over responsibility for decisions on donor suitability to the 
transplant surgeon by highlighting real-life incidents, where their decisions to not refer a 
patient were clinically incorrect. In so doing, she attempts to bring their practice into line 
with recommended procedure around donation referral.  
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I draw upon Foucault’s (2003) conception of biopolitics to understand Megan’s interaction 
with the consultants here. Biopolitics refers to how governments have power (which 
Foucault refers to as ‘biopower’) to intervene in people’s lives at the level of populations. 
This is done through “rational” management using, for example the “instruments” of 
demography (Macey, 2009: 189) and public health to control birth rates, disease processes, 
and thus mortality rates in the general population. In this way, I argue that the ODT’s 
intervention to increase organ donor rates is a biopolitical one, in that the 
recommendations operate with the intention of affecting transplant rates, and thus the lives 
(and mortality rates) of patients waiting for transplant. As discussed above, for this 
biopolitical intervention to take effect, the donation nurses (with the help of Clinical Donor 
Champions) are responsible for implementing new donation procedures to ensure “that 
appropriate policies [are] in place, that any local obstacles [are] identified and resolved and 
that all necessary steps [are] in place to realise every opportunity for donation” (ODT, 2008: 
14). To do this, donation nurses mobilise these policies into action. As we saw with Megan, 
this was done by imparting the importance of procedure to consultants, by showing how 
their decisions have the potential to affect donor rates and thus the bodies of potential 
donors and transplant recipients. In this way, the donation nurses act as regulators of staff 
actions, and the agents of (biopolitical) governance around donation. In highlighting the 
importance of donation practices, such as required referral, to the consultants, and the 
implications of not carrying them out, Megan makes them accountable for their own 
actions. In so doing, she also creates the possibility for staff to self-regulate their practices 
around the new norms of procedure; which she, herself, produces (Foucault, 1977).  
In this example, however, Megan also conveys how her attempts to change consultants’ 
practice around DCD referral are undermined with the rebuttal of one consultant – “I’ll refer 
people like that over my dead body” – to her assertion that certain conditions, such as 
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kidney disease, do not necessarily rule out donation. Megan expresses how her only options 
for enforcing such procedures, in light of the consultant’s remark, is to bring in a referral 
policy. This she could utilise as a “strategic resource” (Castel, 2009): giving formalised 
authority to her training, and weight to her status as the main actor responsible for 
delivering the ODT’s recommendations. Here then, as with Emily, we also see how the 
governing role of the donation nurse gets undermined in practice, with hospital staff 
refusing to fulfil their newly designated responsibilities around donation.  
Donation nurses’ frustrations with the ability of ICU staff, particularly consultants, to get 
round the new organisation of donation practice were not limited to potential donor 
referral. Their stories consistently drew upon the problem of staff not fulfilling their 
responsibilities properly. These included refusals to call the coroner, asking families at the 
“wrong time”, or not asking them at all, and making decisions about the unsuitability of a 
patient for organ donation without first consulting a donation nurse. Donation nurses 
therefore remain limited in being able to enforce the very standards they have worked at 
implementing, especially since the ODT’s recommendations were not brought in as uniform, 
national guidelines.  
As Timmermans and Berg (1997) argue, although allowing for legitimacy in the actions of 
professionals, protocols – or, in our case, recommendations for practice – do not 
fundamentally change the world they act on because they “feed off existing infrastructures 
and power relationships” (1997: 295). In donation contexts, this means that despite the 
donation nurses having responsibility to effect change, in practice they do not always have 
the authority to make this happen. This was evidenced by the way in which the Clinical 
Donor Champions for organ donation, usually ICU/A&E consultants, were seen as key figures 
for bringing authority to the ODT’s recommendations. As discussed above, at Hillview, John 
was the one who had brought about the possibility of DCD by his ability to get the necessary 
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hospital authorities – managers and ICU consultants – to agree to the policy. However, it 
was the donation nurses who often did most of the work to bring these changes into being. 
For example, during the donation committee meetings at Lakeland it became increasingly 
obvious that nearly all of the tasks – such as implementing a required referral policy and 
creating staff manuals for the organ donation pathway –  for changing donation practice at 
the Trust were delegated to the two embedded donation nurses, Rachel and Jennie. Despite 
other committee members, including Sarah, Lakeland’s Clinical Donor Champion, 
acknowledging the enormity of their task, Jennie and Rachel were offered little practical 
support, beyond administrative help, to achieve the Trust’s goals.  
Drawing from Timmermans and Berg’s argument above, I approach these disparities 
between the responsibility designated to donation nurses and their struggle to implement 
change in practice, with insights into how power is understood to work. Power is a tricky 
concept, which, in the context of clinical decision-making, is traditionally posed as top-
down: conventionally discussed around the assumption that doctors wield formal power 
while nurses posses little (Laschinger and Havens, 1997; Coombs, 2007). This is manifested 
in conceptualisations of nursing as ‘invisible work’ and ‘women’s work’ (Timmermans et al., 
1998; Bolton, 2005): a set-up which essentialises and reifies notions of gender, and the 
patriarchal organisation of society (Turner, 1995; Wall, 2010). Such understandings, 
however, simplify the concept of power – as something which exists within an immoveable 
hierarchy (Di Palma, 2004), rather than that which can be traced in everyday interactions. 
For Foucault, power should be analysed at micro-levels, tracing its macro forms to 
institutions63, relations, and their strategic operations and effects (1980). Rather than simply 
conceive of the traditionally gendered boundaries between doctors and nurses, and the 
                                                          
63
 Foucault understands ‘institutions’ as “applied to every kind of more or less constrained, learned behaviour” 
(1980: 187). 
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imposed domination of the former – which is one way in which we could read Emily and 
Megan’s narratives – Foucault offers a conception of power as that which offers potential. 
Instead of just inhibiting action, constraint also conversely creates opportunity (Foucault, 
1978; 1980; De Certeau, 1984). Therefore, for the consultant in Emily’s story, the newly 
taught relations around donation referral provoke the possibility of other forms of practice, 
evidenced in his subversion of these relations by refusing Emily access to a potential donor.  
In this way, the donation nurses’ localised construction of donation policy and guidelines, 
whilst “strategically organising” “a set of relations” (Law, 1991: 172) around donation, have 
differential power effects in practice. Despite the “legitimising function” (Shore and Wright, 
2005: 9) of the ODT’s recommendations, everyday interactions around their implementation 
evidence the fact that policies function as contested sites of negotiation (Shore and Wright, 
2005: 15). Here, hierarchies in the organisation of medical work, whilst not taken for 
granted, obviously background Emily and Megan’s frustration with their inability to affect 
the actions of ICU consultants, and, ultimately affect organ donation rates. For the 
consultants, their power lies in the potential for them to make decisions about the fate of a 
dead or dying patient, with their responsibility to refer potential donors to the donation 
nurse team.  This, as we see, can be given or withheld (Law, 1991: 178) in their position as a 
patient’s gatekeeper. Moreover, this has bearing upon the ability of the donation nurse to 
fulfil the task laid down by the ODT. In this way, Law (1991) argues that Foucault’s 
conception of power fails to conceive of its differential distribution and consequences for 
diverse constituents. Thus, the institution of organisational changes to affect donor rates 
has different effects for ICU doctors, and donation nurses, along with (‘BME’) ‘potential 
donors’ and their families – whose status as such is dependent upon the negotiated work of 
the donation nurse, and the gatekeeping practices of ICU staff.  
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However, this remains a still limited view of the relations of power in organ donation. As 
Emily’s story above tells us, and grapples back power as it does so, the consultant who 
restricted her access to a potential donor, did not do the donation request “particularly 
well”, and it was the staff nurse who was left to clean up the mess64. Coombs’ (2007) study 
on decision-making in Intensive Care evidences how, because of the difficulties for nurses in 
influencing clinical decision-making, they develop subversive strategies to affect decisions 
and develop their own professional agenda, with one participant stating:  
You need to play games with the managers and the doctors [...]. You don’t do 
anything different, just differently. You need to be more proactive and think 
how to respond to the different personalities. (Coombs 2007: 132) 
This ability to “play games” became essential for the donation nurses in their attempts to 
influence donation practice, and ultimately increase donation rates, as I go on to show 
below. 
Re-appropriating power in donation practice  
Returning to Emily’s story of the consultant, Peter, who blocked her way to a potential 
donor, Emily subsequently reflected on his actions as symptomatic of his general concerns 
over the workability of collaborative practice:  
You’ve probably heard some of my colleagues talk about Verble and Worth65. 
They’re these two American women who talk about this long contact model for 
donation, which involves us getting involved with families before their relative 
has died. And like Peter, he’s been on a Verble and Worth workshop, and he has 
                                                          
64
 This I metaphorically relate to the notion of nursing as ‘dirty work’: nurses mop up the detritus of medicine 
both metaphorically and in practice (Bolton, 2005). 
65
 See chapter 3. Verble and Worth are the American company who train all donation nurses in the practice of 
gaining consent for organ donation, and how to collaboratively work with hospital staff to achieve this. 
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some concerns I think about this long contact. And he’s not the only person 
cause I, personally, have concerns as well about it, in the fact that long contact 
starts, you know, a good 48, 72 hours before somebody becomes brain stem 
dead. And then you’re making the family [said in disbelieving tone] tea and all 
this lot and like sitting and talking to them, and he [Peter] said: ‘And at what 
point do you reveal who you really are?’ So I said, ‘Well yeah, there is that.’ And 
I, you know, I am uncomfortable with it, Jessie. People say it does work, but 
Peter’s not convinced that collaborative requesting works. And he said: ‘John’s 
always telling us that we need to get you lot [donation nurses] involved, but the 
research doesn’t back up that collaborative requesting makes any difference’. So 
I said: ‘Fair comment’, I said, ‘but what [it] does show is that if you have a 
planned approach with you and me, and we sit down and say what we’re going 
to say and how we’re going to say it [to the family], then that does work’. But I 
think unfortunately there’s been a couple of cases recently where our team have 
been called too early, and I think that’s where Peter has sort of like had his 
fingers burned a little bit, so he was very much: right, you know, I want this very 
black and white. I want brain stem death, there, done. Then you can go and talk 
to the family. (Emily, donation nurse at Hillview) 
Emily here refers back to the story of how Peter prevented her initial involvement in a 
potential donor case, relating his actions to his general concerns with collaborative 
requesting/long contact. This approach – not part of the ODT’s recommendations, yet which 
has been brought into practice as a result of the donation nurses’ Verble and Worth training 
– involves the donation nurse being introduced to a family prior to brain stem death testing, 
or upon the decision of withdrawal of care, with the family not necessarily aware of their 
role until the donation request. In reflecting on Peter’s unease with this approach, Emily 
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also takes the opportunity to divulge her own concerns about it. In so doing, she qualifies 
the consultant’s right to his actions, which blocked her initial involvement in a donor case.  
Emily relates how she managed this situation by conveying the collaborative approach to 
Peter in everyday terms: sitting down and having a conversation about how to approach a 
family at the time. In this way, she attempts to involve Peter as an active, influential, 
participant in the donation process by creating a relationship between his work, the training 
around collaborative requesting, and her role (Callon, 1986). Emily’s attempt to work 
through the situation in this way also highlights her sensitivity to the implications of changes 
around donation practice on the autonomy of ICU practitioners. The experience 
demonstrates, for Emily, the limitations of new donation procedures in the context of 
specific people and situations. She adapts to the situation with Peter by drawing on her 
existing knowledge, experience, and resources (Dodier, 1998; Struhkamp et al., 2009) to 
manage the traditionally-tricky relationship between ICU staff and donation nurses. Here, 
underlying clashes of interest, such as shifting from the imperative to treat to the 
imperative to manage a body for donation, have the potential to bubble over (Sharp, 2006).  
In developing their new role as integrated within – rather than outside of – a healthcare 
team, donation nurses were acutely aware of the implications of such changes and the 
discomfort this caused for ICU staff. As Emily emphasises, integration is a slow process 
which requires careful navigation to accommodate new ways of working into existing ones: 
I’ve said to the new guys that have started doing the job at the other hospitals: 
‘you’ve got to give a period of time for a certain amount of trust to develop as 
well’. And I think, I said to my boss, ‘I could have come in here [Hillview] like a 
bull in a china shop and said: Right, well we’re gonna do this and we’re gonna do 
that, and you are gonna have this DCD programme whether you like it or not.’ 
But I knew that we wouldn’t get anywhere with that because people would, you 
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know, some of my previous colleagues had tried to do that and got nowhere. So 
it’s tiny tiny little steps, and just do things really slowly. (Emily, donation nurse at 
Hillview)   
In order to negotiate the shift in conventions (Star, 1991; Star and Lampland, 2009) around 
donation, donation nurses required an awareness of the importance of subtly implementing 
change. In practice, this sometimes involved defying existing authorities, such as hospital 
managers and ICU consultants, to fulfil the requirements of their role. In the case of 
attaining donor referrals, donation nurses adopted a range of subversive tactics (De 
Certeau, 1984) to implement formalised or informal required referral practice within ICUs. 
This included: by-passing consultants (as gatekeepers to potential donors) altogether, by 
befriending others with access to patient information, such as ward clerks; ensuring 
clinicians were accountable for their decisions to not refer a potential donor by bringing in 
required referral forms to be completed for all deaths in ICU; and conveying to ICU and A&E 
nurses during donation training sessions that they are able to refer a potential donor, even 
when the treating consultant has refused to do so. 
Ellie Harris, an outspoken donation nurse with a number of years experience, described how 
she countered the difficulties of implementing donation changes in her embedded Trust, by 
– as she goes on to describe – her “slightly devious” strategy for getting a minimum 
notification criteria (required referral) policy in place: 
 I’ve sat with a consultant in one of the hospitals I used to deal with, and...it’s a 
case possibly of being...erm, slightly devious [laughs] in that you’re letting them 
have their say. Some people will just say ‘I am not having the policy called that.’ 
So simply: ‘That’s fine’. What you have to do is make sure what we [my 
emphasis] call minimum notification criteria is in that policy. After that they 
[consultants] can call it whatever they want. They can call it Mickey mouse, I 
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don’t care. Some of them don’t like it called required referral, some of them will 
call it automatic referral, some of them it’s just the organ donation policy. I don’t 
really care. So if you let them think that they’ve won, god love them, then you’re 
more likely to [get the policy in]. If you try and sort of enforce that you’ll just 
never get anywhere. [....] The two Trusts that went ‘No, no, no. We’re not having 
it’, I sat down and wrote the policy with them. [...] I just sort of had to say [...] ‘If 
you speak to us early at this point then I can give you an idea about suitability, 
and if you ring me at this point there’s less delays for you and it’s better for you 
to have this information before you talk to them’. ‘Oh yeah, so it is’. In it goes! 
(Ellie, donation nurse for team 1)  
In this example, Ellie understands the hospitals’ turn-around to the idea of required referral 
through her practice of ensuring that managers and consultants see the policy as a direct 
result of their own decision making. This she does by agreeing with their disagreement with 
the policy in its standardised form (from the ODT’s recommendations); making suggestions 
to rectify the situation; ensuring they play an active role in the localised policy construction; 
and impressing the benefits for staff if they were to adopt the new procedure. In this way 
she formulates the process of decision-making around a new policy as belonging to the 
hospital. Using a process of tactical consensus building, which positions the policy around 
the interests of the necessary Trust constituents, Ellie re-creates their interests to mirror her 
own (Latour, 1987). For Ellie, the knowledge that the eventual message is essentially the 
same as the official recommendation for required referral provides a sense of satisfaction. 
She has been able to implement policy without visibly undermining existing power 
structures. Here she employs ‘face-work’ (Goffman, 1955; 1967) to maintain an impression 
of cooperation and conformity to “patterns of action and representation” (Star, 1991: 28). 
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This enables her to overcome seemingly impenetrable hierarchies of decision-making in 
medical institutions.  
In their work on medical protocols and the use of standards in local practice, Timmermans 
and Berg (1997) use examples of nurses negotiating authority, such as one hinting to a 
junior doctor about the treatment he might want to give an arresting drug-addict, to show 
that nurses’ influence only largely extends to what they label as “repairwork” (p. 295). This 
continues, rather than deviates from, the hierarchical picture. For the donation nurses, 
however, their knowledge of hierarchies and the importance of maintaining these to get 
their job done are actively drawn on and exploited through subtle negotiations. Reflecting 
this, Hughes’ early ethnography (1988) on nurse-doctor interactions in a casualty 
department showed how casualty nurses regularly led patient information gathering, with 
their assessments on pre-diagnosis paving the way for the doctors’ treatment decisions. 
Despite this, many nurses distanced themselves from personal culpability for their 
assessments. This left medical dominance intact, whilst the nurses were able to skilfully 
influence and aid the doctors to make the ‘right’ decision and to get things done.  
Conversely then, the conventions and constraints of medical hierarchies simultaneously 
provide openings for donation nurses to influence practice (Foucault, 1980). Despite being 
caught up in power relations, the donation nurses were able to manipulate clinical 
hierarchies to effect new norms around donation practice, whilst not directly effacing the 
authority of gatekeepers, like ICU consultants. This I also relate to Foucault’s (1980) 
conception of how the relations of power – such as the existing hierarchies between doctors 
and (donation) nurses – are internalised, in the donation nurses’ use of face-work to get 
round the tricky process of implementing change. In so doing, donation nurses employ self 
governance which keeps intact the “systems of relations” (Foucault, 1980: 194) traditionally 
established between nurses, doctors, ICU wards etc, as discussed above. Their ability to 
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make change without disrupting existing relations shows that they are acutely aware of the 
importance of these relations for their ultimate aim of increasing donor rates.  
In looking at how new donation policies are brought into practice, the micro-politics of 
clinical life are made visible in relation to the biopolitics (macro-politics) of organ 
procurement. Medicine is seen here as a mass or multiple of parts (e.g. Mol, 2002), rather 
than simply unified around the cause of increasing (‘BME’) organ donation. Rather than the 
new roles and responsibilities around donation being something which naturally happen as 
an outcome of policy designations, these must be actively negotiated within local settings. 
In other words, policy both determines and is an outcome of practice (Timmermans and 
Berg, 2003). However, despite being invested with the responsibility to improve local (and 
thus national) donation rates, donation nurses did not necessarily have the immediate 
authority to do so. As such, they employed tactical work, which manipulated and even 
exploited existing roles and hierarchies, to achieve the biopolitical aims of the ODT. 
Increasing the chances of reaching the stage of donation consent is therefore dependent 
upon these negotiations – within which (‘BME’) potential donors, their families, and 
potential transplant recipients are thus also caught up.  
In addition to their manipulations, donation nurses also illustrated times when they 
blatantly effaced authority. This was often recounted around cases which they were made 
aware of, yet were explicitly advised by ICU staff to not request donation from the patient’s 
family. This was usually when the family were perceived as too upset or angry about the 
death of their relative, with the assumption that a donation request would exacerbate the 
situation. Rachel, the embedded donation nurse at Lakeland, recounted a time when ICU 
staff told her not to approach the family of a potential donor, which they justified by the 
family’s anger at their relative’s treatment being withdrawn. Despite this order Rachel went 
ahead and asked the family, eventually obtaining consent for donation from them. She 
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justified her actions by the fact that the patient was on the donor register, and that, in her 
words, the family “calmed down” once she had requested donation from them.  
For the donation nurses, their belief in the benefit of donation for a family, coupled with the 
fact that, as one put it: it is their job to approach every potential donor family, means that 
they sometimes went directly against the concerns of healthcare staff. Stories such as 
Rachel’s were often constructed as tales conveying the moral imperative of asking families 
for organ donation. This imperative, which I discussed in chapter 1, is publically presented in 
NHSBT’s (2009) ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ Prove It donation campaigns, with the plea for 
‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ people to register as a donor for the sake of the ‘community’ with 
which they are supposed to identify. Here, I argue that this imperative for the public to 
donate can also be traced to the imperative for health professionals to ask for donation, as 
underpinned by the ODT’s assertion of making donation a “usual” practice in end of life care 
(ODT, 2008: 9). As I demonstrated above, it is the donation nurses who are tasked with 
monitoring and enforcing this imperative. As I show in part 3, however, this has implications 
for the everyday work of Intensive Care staff, in how they balance this imperative with their 
own emotional struggles with the donation process.  
  
Part 3. Donation and its discontents: medical and public concerns 
Moving our lens wider, it is important to view the problems encountered by the donation 
nurse in implementing new donation procedures by looking at the discomfort caused by the 
upheaval in donation services, alongside the personal struggles of ICU staff with donation. 
The focus of the ODTs recommendations to optimise donation rates has led to concern for 
those involved in treating patients, since this aim is underpinned by the presumption that 
donation requests will become a norm at the end of a patient’s life, as I show below.  
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The personal becomes public: donation concerns 
The very nature of the donation nurses’ work means they occupy a marginalised position in 
medicine. Solely working with dead or dying patients and their families means they are 
neither a member of the healthcare team; actively treating patients, nor an outsider to the 
medical institutions in which they are based. This marginality can also be understood as a 
product of the precarious place organ donation occupies in the public, and how these 
concerns get carried through to the medical domain. These sensitivities encompass not 
simply bio-ethical concerns around donation practice, as in the case of DCD, but also  public 
fears that donation equates with a lack of treatment, as found in the research with ‘BME’ 
groups, outlined in chapter 1 (Davis and Randhawa, 2004; Alkhawari et al., 2005; Morgan et 
al., 2008). I was made aware of the existence of such concerns when helping out on the 
organ donation stall at Hillview’s Open Day. One question asked repeatedly by members of 
the public concerned their desire to become an organ donor after their death, but their fear 
that signing up to the donor register meant that doctors would do less to save their life. 
These myths, however, do have a basis in historical experience: from Victorian grave-
robbers (Richardson, 2000; 2006), to the UK organ retention scandal in the 1990s, and the 
‘Body Snatchers of New York’ case, where tissue and bone was removed from the bodies of 
the dead in funeral homes, without the knowledge of relatives, by a bio-bank company in 
the US (Scheper-Hughes, 2006). Concerns over donation also perfused the narratives of ICU 
staff. This reflects research which acknowledges the process of requesting donation from 
recently bereaved families to be an enormously burdensome experience (Stoeckle, 1990; 
Featherstone, 1994).  
With the increasing push to maximise donation rates, some ICU staff expressed their 
concern over how this would affect their everyday work, and their discomfort with the 
perceived pressure this might place on families. The struggles of the donation nurse to 
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enforce new donation procedures needs to seen from this wider perspective, which 
concerns the ethically sensitive and emotional dimension of organ donation. As John, 
Hillview’s Clinical Donor Champion, explained when questioned about his role: “... [w]ell 
obviously I believe passionately in what we’re doing is right...but at the same time [I’m] 
wary of being too keen and creating the wrong impression”. I relayed my understanding of 
this to him as meaning he must balance the imperative of care with organ donation. His 
reply revealed his sensitivity to the ethical issues associated with donation: 
You don’t want to be construed as body snatchers, and I guess that’s the 
potential problems historically that’s sort of been associated with initiatives in 
the past. So there’s a complete separation between the clinical care and the 
organ donation side of things, in that the conflict of interest has been one of the 
priorities to solve and to reassure people that what we’re doing is entirely 
appropriate. (John, ICU consultant and clinical donor champion at Hillview) 
John here expresses his awareness of potential (mis)understandings around his involvement 
in organ donation. Rather than being viewed as working towards saving a life, he could be 
seen as taking a life away, for his own interests. Since these positions could be construed as 
conflicting, this leads him to carefully demonstrate the separation between them. In 
expressing his concerns with “creating the wrong impression”, he also reveals his 
ambivalence about his position as both ICU consultant and Donor Champion. He takes 
responsibility for being both a doctor who both saves lives and champions the practice of 
organ donation by viewing this position from the perspectives of others, such as families 
and the public. In acknowledging this tension, John also suggests its management in practice 
(Goffman, 1969): he must do enough to affect donor rates on his unit, yet not go so far as to 
undermine his position as a doctor who treats acutely ill patients. 
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During my observation of Emily’s training of Hillview’s ICU nurses around the new DCD 
pathway, an incident occurred, which further highlights such tensions, and how these are 
managed by the donation nurse: 
As the training draws to a close, with Emily asking for questions and feedback, 
one nurse becomes quite opinionated, expressing her worries about the 
implications of a family member giving consent for donation if they are not 
aware of their relative’s wishes. Emily reassures her, saying firmly that she 
wouldn’t allow it, and would advise against a family member going ahead if they 
weren’t comfortable with the idea. The same nurse, now sitting straight-backed, 
with a fairly aggressive stance, asserts that she ‘just doesn’t agree with it’ [DCD]: 
‘It sounds like you’re pushing it on a family. I’ve got a donor card but you get 
some families who are so distressed and everything and then to have a team 
approaching them. I just think it’s wrong.’ Emily, in response, tries to play, as she 
puts it, devil’s advocate: ‘well what about if that family also had a relative 
waiting for an organ?’ The nurse thinks, but her body language remains 
unconvinced. Emily, smiling and maintaining her cool, tells her that everybody is 
entitled to their opinions, which is why it is important to talk about issues like 
this. (Fieldnotes, October 2010) 
In this example, the nurse expresses her concerns about the ethics of asking a family to 
donate organs when they are unaware of their relative’s position on donation. The nurse is 
worried that a family may feel put under pressure to say yes, as a result of being asked 
about donation in the first place. In response, Emily poses the scenario that the family might 
themselves have a relative waiting for transplant. This subtly implies that if they were not 
asked to donate by staff, then the potential for saving a life may be inhibited. Rather than 
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addressing the valid concern of the nurse, Emily re-imposes the moral order, by framing the 
importance of asking in terms of the (biopolitical) imperative to save more lives.   
As we also see in this example, the concerned nurse initially positions her opinions as if they 
were distanced from her own identity around donation. She uses the disclaimer of her 
possession of a donor card to displace her concerns; aligning them with the interests of 
families, rather than her own. That ICU staff struggled with their own feelings about aspects 
of the donation process, yet often presented these feelings as if in the interests of families 
and the public, is telling. In light of the moral discourse around the imperative to donate 
organs after death, the worries of staff about organ donation must be carefully managed – 
presented as public – so that they are not seen to inhibit attempts to increase organ 
donation, and thus save lives. In this way, adopting a public face to express their worries 
about donation might be one of the few resources they have at their disposal to voice their 
concerns, whilst ensuring they are not accused of blocking the potential for increasing 
access to transplantation.  
The emotional work of organ donation 
These ambivalences also came out in the narratives of ICU staff and donation nurses, who 
conveyed the deeply emotional effect of being involved in donation. In the same way that 
staff managed the presentation of their concerns, even when claiming to be able to 
professionally distance themselves from the emotive practice of donation, stories recounted 
often revealed a different picture. 
This was especially the case with David, a consultant on the Paediatric Intensive Care Unit 
(PICU) at Lakeland, where it was still common practice for staff to make the donation 
request. Throughout most of his interview, David conveyed a certain blasé breeziness about 
his donation experiences. Whilst acknowledging that some of his colleagues tend to 
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become, as he put it, “emotionally taxed by the whole issue”, he told me that he did not 
find approaching families about donation “too taxing”. However, when I asked him whether 
there were any donation experiences which stuck in his mind, the story he told impressed a 
very different image of the professional distancing he initially conveyed: 
D: I remember once being accused by a family of keeping their child alive just for 
organ donation. Which, erm...was quite an unpleasant experience. Erm, because 
it’s not what we do. 
J: Can you tell me about that? 
D: So that would be, I think a child who had a catastrophic head injury and was 
admitted late one evening from another hospital. [coughs] And was assessed by 
the neurosurgeons and had scans which showed a catastrophic head injury that 
was non-survivable. And by this time it was around midnight or so. I was on call 
and my plan was to keep the child steady until the morning to do some brain-
stem tests. Which we did, and the child was brain-stem dead, and I said that [to 
the family], you know, things were futile. We should stop [treatment] and 
consider organ donation if that was something that they wished. Erm, and they 
[family] said, ‘well, why weren’t we having this discussion last night?’ And as I 
said, basically they accused me of keeping their child alive just so that we could 
take the organs off them, which wasn’t really the case. (David, PICU consultant 
at Lakeland) 
David’s story here conveys his deep unease with how his medical decisions were challenged 
by the patient’s family66, with their implication that by delaying certain processes overnight 
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 In the background to this is also the constant threat for doctors of being legally challenged for malpractice 
by families, especially in cases where patients have died (see GMC, 2010). 
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he had acted in his own, rather than their child’s, best interests. In his initial disclaimer of 
the unpleasantness of the experience, David conveys the lasting impact of the situation. His 
story reveals the facade behind his comments of not finding donation requests “too taxing”, 
and highlights the distressing nature that donation work can pose for those involved. 
However, that he told this story after positioning himself as distanced from such emotions 
also illustrates the self-surveillance of practitioners involved in intensive care medicine and 
organ donation. Here, one’s own emotional concerns must be deferred to the responsibility 
to care for patients/donors and their families (Hochschild, 1983; Gray, 2009)67. 
Dealing with child and adolescent donors was also highlighted as one of the more difficult 
aspects of the job, especially for those who had children themselves. One nurse, Elizabeth, 
who had worked for many years on Lakeland’s PICU was alarmingly honest about her own 
struggles to stop herself from becoming emotionally distressed in front of grieving families. 
She recounted her embodied – here referring to how the world of donation is experienced 
and expressed through the body – tactic of how she digs her nails into the palm of her hand 
to preventing herself from crying in front of families. One story, however, illustrated her 
struggle with always being able to separate her private feelings from her work: 
I do find it quite hard because I think once you’ve had your own children and 
you work here [PICU] it does very subtly just shift your perspective on things. 
And you do, rather selfishly I suppose, you do compare what happens here with: 
Oh my God that could be my child. What would I do? You can’t help it. And 
especially when I see little boys and girls the same age as my kids. There was a 
lad not long ago went for donation who had the same name as my son, he was 
the same age and lying there in the bed with the same colour hair, and I was just 
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 This point references the notion of ‘emotional labour’, developed by Hochschild (1983). This refers to the 
process of withholding one’s personal feelings; so as to continue with an external impression to ensure that 
others remain (feeling) cared for. 
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like: No [Little laugh]. No. I can’t do this one. [...] I couldn’t. I mean it was nearly 
the end of my shift and we’d done all the sort of acute interventions to see what 
we could salvage, to see if we could make anything any better. And it became 
quite apparent that we couldn’t [save his life]. So the family went off with the 
consultant for ‘The talk’ [to be told about the diagnosis] and I was handing over 
to the staff on the next shift and then I just said: ‘That’s it now, I have to walk 
away before this family come back after that discussion.’ And so I said ‘I want 
the day staff to handle it because they’re gonna be here for the next 12 hours 
and I’m not.’ So I sort of...handed everything over, wrote everything up, and 
didn’t, didn’t get involved with him. [Be]cause that was too hard. (Elizabeth, 
PICU nurse at Lakeland) 
Elizabeth’s story tells of the distress at the failure to save this little boy with the team’s 
medical interventions (e.g. Delvecchio Good et al., 2004), and her subsequent realisation 
that the case was too close to home for her to continue with. Reflecting on her awareness 
of her own emotional limits, she recounts consciously pulling away from the situation by 
deliberately leaving before the family came back from being told of their son’s death. Since 
Elizabeth struggled to distance herself from the pain of bereaved families, she had 
developed tactics to self-manage and mask her emotions in the public domains of the PICU 
bedside and family interview room (Goffman, 1969). This involved suppressing her own 
feelings for the sake of families, pushing to the fore her professional membership as a nurse 
(Star, 1991).  
The fact that organ donation requires dead patients, and necessarily involves families 
recently traumatised by the news of their relative’s death makes it far from an easy practice. 
As one donation nurse speculated, for Intensive Care staff, whose usual role is to treat 
acutely ill patients, the presence of an organ donor implies a failure in their practice: they 
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have been unable to save a life. For the donation nurses, as demonstrated in Emily’s 
training, they manage these emotions by re-asserting the importance (moral imperative) of 
asking families, in terms which impart the ultimate aim of organ donation: to save lives. In 
so doing, they make problematic the everyday concerns which staff have about donation 
and the recent organisational changes, ensuring, simultaneously, that the biopolitical 
project of increasing donor rates remains on course.  
Moreover, as I showed in chapter 1, the ‘BME’ organ donor shortage is generally presented 
as a problem of families’ and ‘communities’’ failure to accept donation as a ‘culturally’ 
acceptable act. In contrast, the stories here attest to the fact that donation is not only 
difficult for families (the ‘public’) but also for staff who facilitate the donation process. In 
tracing the personal struggles of health professionals involved in donation we see the 
precariousness of its practice, especially in light of evidence which demonstrates the 
importance of health professional conduct in families’ donation decisions (Siminoff et al., 
2001; Simpkin et al., 2009). In this way, if donation is experienced as a difficult practical and 
conceptual process for staff who regularly encounter death and dying, we must ask the 
question of why it is that minority ethnic communities have become, and continue to be, 
maligned for their perceived failure to participate in this process.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have highlighted the complexities involved in increasing ‘BME’ donor rates, 
by examining the institutional work involved in implementing the ODT’s national 
recommendations to optimise deceased donation. As I have shown, increasing ‘BME’ organ 
donation goes beyond the issue of solely securing a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ from a ‘BME’ family for 
donation and into the fact that ‘BME’ ‘communities’ only get to donate by virtue of the 
medical practices around donation.  
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As demonstrated, the figure of the donation nurse is pivotal to the success of the ODT’s 
project. They bridge the diverse practical, ethical, and legal issues around donation, created 
at the interface of medicine and its publics. This they do by negotiating the contingencies of 
the hospital Trusts in which they are embedded; and transforming de-contextualised 
recommendations into everyday forms. It is within these contexts that we also see the 
donation nurse as an agent of governance: mobilising the interests of differently involved 
actors, such as ICU consultants and nurses, hospital managers, and theatre staff, to bring 
about change and produce new norms of practice around donation. Moreover, increasing 
donation also involves the donation nurse neutralising the concerns of staff about new 
procedures, by imparting the moral imperative of requesting donation from a family. 
The process of making these new procedures happen in practice is therefore conditional 
upon the adjustment of roles and relationships within local settings – often involving a 
challenge to the structure of clinical hierarchies of decision-making. Here we see how a 
patient’s transformation to the status of ‘potential donor’ is dependent upon the negotiated 
interactions of ICU staff and donation nurses – who attempt to impose self-governance and 
the norms of when, where, and who does the asking for organ donation. In addition, since 
donation nurses are specially trained in the process of donation request, that they were not 
always able to access families and be the ones to ask has implications for how (‘BME’) 
families are asked about donation, and whether donation is consented for, or refused, as a 
result.  
In making visible the work involved in organ donation, prior to reaching the stage of 
donation request, I have demonstrated the difficulties involved in generating more organs 
for transplant. Since organ donation is only possible as an outcome of the negotiated 
practices of health professionals, decisions about organ donation come to be understood as 
not just the concern of ‘BME’ potential donor families and ‘communities’, but can be traced 
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to the uncertainties involved in satisfying the requirements for reaching the stage of 
donation request. These include: what gets practiced or not practiced in different hospital 
Trusts; the decisions of ICU staff to refer or not refer a patient for donation; and the ability 
of the donation nurses to re-align practice with its procedural forms, thereby increasing the 
chances of gaining consent for organ donation. In the next chapter, I focus upon experiences 
with ‘BME’ families at particular stages of the organ donation pathway, to question the 
notion of what consent for donation actually means in practice, and thus further an 
understanding of ethnicity in organ donation.  
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Chapter 5. Consent Complexities: Death and the 
‘BME’ Family 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I showed how the implementation of the ODT’s recommendations 
for changes to donation practice illustrated the complexity involved in increasing organ 
donor rates at local levels. In facilitating these changes, donation nurses worked at 
increasing the likelihood of patients being referred as potential donors. With the 
responsibility of health professionals to refer dead or dying patients for organ donation to 
the donation nurse, consent for organ donation therefore encompasses not just the 
decisions of families in response to the donation request, but also the decisions of health 
professionals, in their referral, or non-referral, of a patient for donation. In this chapter I 
take up this issue of consent for donation, to illustrate the protracted nature of this process 
for families. 
In the three parts to this chapter I will show how standardised constructions of consent for 
organ donation – manifested in NHSBT’s Can We Count on You? (2007) and Prove It (2009) 
donation campaigns, and formalised in the 2004 Human Tissue Act – become problematic in 
the donation encounter with ‘BME’ families. In its standardised form, consent is configured 
as an outcome of a singular choice: to donate or not to donate, and as a product of 
individual decision-making – either by a person placing their name on the organ donor 
register, or by an appropriate “representative” (HTA, 2009a; 2009b) providing agreement to 
donate a person’s organs after their death. In contrast, I argue that consent in everyday 
donation encounters is far more complex. Rather than the individual donor providing 
consent, in practice, the decision to donate falls to the donor’s family. In addition, consent 
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from the family begins prior to them being asked about donation, and involves their 
acceptance of the diagnosis of the death of their relative. Consent is therefore a hugely 
protracted and complex process, which, as I demonstrate, is experienced as particularly so 
in the case of minority ethnic families.   
In the first section, I show how refusals for organ donation from minority ethnic families 
were often understood by health professionals in terms of ‘BME’ families’ refusals to accept 
the diagnosis of the death of their relative. This led ICU staff to “broker” their decisions 
around death with families (Timmermans, 2005: 993), through a process of negotiation to 
legitimate their medical diagnoses. This work of legitimation, I argue, also acts as a process 
of smoothing the pathway towards donation request, by getting families to informally agree 
(consent) to the death of their relative. 
In the second part, I illustrate how the ‘BME’ family get specifically problematised in relation 
to formalised notions of donation consent. This I relate to the Human Tissue Authority’s 
(HTA) guidelines for consent (2009b), which lay out a hierarchy for who can make donation 
decisions: from the donor themselves to a person considered the highest qualifying relation 
to the donor. In practice however, with minority ethnic families, this hierarchy did not work, 
since decisions around donation were seen as a product of negotiation between a number 
of differently involved actors. Negotiating donation decisions with ‘BME’ families was 
therefore perceived as a complex process, and, as a consequence, health professionals 
sometimes called into question the legitimacy of families’ decisions around donation.  
Finally, in the third section, I show how ‘BME’ families are produced as a problematic 
category for organ donation by virtue of the way in which they were perceived as difficult to 
manage in relation to the norms of Intensive Care medicine. In this way, I argue that medical 
standards and bureaucracies create normative notions of what a family is, and what 
behaviour is appropriate within ICU domains. In turn, ‘BME’ families are constructed as a 
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problem for donation in the context of the standards upon which donation is premised, such 
as family acceptance of medical decisions around death. It is to this issue of death in 
donation which I now turn, in the first section below. 
 
Part 1. Donation refusal and death discussions  
You’ve got to get a family to accept the death first absolutely, and then the lack 
of hope. And if you go in there with those [donation] conversations before they 
accept death and they accept that there’s no hope, they’ll be upset and angry. 
(Joanne Hill, PICU consultant at Lakeland) 
As detailed in chapter 3, once a decision has been made by the treating Intensive Care 
doctors that a patient is not going to survive, the next stage in the donation pathway is to 
break the news of potential brain death, or the hopelessness of a patient’s condition – 
meaning their death is inevitable – to the family. The decision on death is usually made by 
the clinical team once initial brain stem death tests have been carried out on a patient, or 
when all suitable medical interventions have failed in the attempt to save a patient’s life. 
The patient’s family will then be called into a meeting – which one nurse referred to as “the 
talk” – with the treating doctor/s and nurses, to discuss their findings with the family. Here, 
the doctor will, as one put it, “summarise where we are up to with that patient”, before 
conveying to the family what happens next. Sometimes families may be encouraged to 
watch brain stem death tests as part of this discussion, to help them understand the finality 
of the diagnosis. The doctor will then convey to the family their decision to stop – what is 
medically termed ‘withdraw’ – life prolonging medical treatment (GMC, 2010) on the 
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patient, so that they can die68. This action is considered to be in the patient’s best interests, 
with the understanding that further, often aggressive, treatment will cause more harm than 
good, since the patient’s death is inevitable (GMC, 2010).This stage of discussing death with 
a family is understood as vital in progressing towards organ donation since, according to 
guidelines, only when a family are seen to have accepted that their relative’s condition is 
irreversible should the donation request take place (UKT, 2004a; ICS, 2005).  
The task of breaking and negotiating the news of a patient’s death to relatives usually takes 
place in designated private rooms, set away from the treatment ward. These are used for 
discussions of death, meetings between staff and families on a patient’s progress, or even as 
a space for family members to have privacy, away from the public setting of the ward. I 
conducted a number of my interviews with staff in the “family interview rooms” – as they 
were labelled on the door – of Lakeland’s PICU. These consisted of three, tiny, box-like 
rooms, positioned alongside each other in the main corridor, directly outside of the 
treatment ward. Inside these rooms the walls were painted white and the lighting was 
harsh. Two good-sized peach coloured couches were squeezed into the space. A coffee 
table was placed in the middle of the room, with a box of tissues stood on top: seemingly 
waiting for the outpouring of emotions involved in bad news discussions with families. 
There were no windows in these rooms, which, along with their small size, gave them an 
oppressive, claustrophobic atmosphere. The rooms felt like small, private cells: where 
families live out both good and terrible news about their relative.  
Conflicting decisions on death  
The process of breaking news of death to families was emphasised by the donation nurses – 
as well as is imparted by guidelines (ICS, 2005; AMRC, 2008) – as that which should remain 
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 In the case of brain stem dead patients, who are already legally certified as dead, it means that they will stop 
breathing. 
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separate from the request for organ donation. This means that families should be given 
news of death, and have shown their understanding and acceptance of this diagnosis, prior 
to any discussions about organ donation beginning. This was largely due to the fear that 
families might interpret the decision to withdraw care from their relative as being in the 
interests of donation, rather than of the patient. Such practice was seen as especially 
important in the case of DCD, where, because death has not yet happened – yet is 
diagnosed as inevitable – potential conflicts of interest were highlighted (ICS/BTS, 2010. See 
previous chapter). Despite this theoretical separation between death and donation69, many 
ICU staff gave prominent position to the stage of discussing death with a family in their 
donation stories. In other words, this separation did not happen in practice, since the stage 
of imparting the diagnosis of death to a family was described as integral to the donation 
process. This was especially the case when conflicts arose between families and staff over 
these decisions. Such struggles happened with families of all ethnicities, yet were described 
as an especially common occurrence with minority ethnic, particularly ‘Muslim’, families.  
These conflicts ranged from families refusing to accept the diagnosis of death and asking 
staff to continue with treatment on their relative – in the belief that not enough had been 
done to save their life; to families being unable to understand that their still-breathing 
(brain dead) relative could really be dead. As I show therefore, differences of opinion 
between families and health professionals around death were understood to be pre-
emptive of donation refusals. In other words, families’ lack of acceptance of death was 
linked to their lack of acceptance – refusal – of organ donation.  
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 This separation is formalised by the AMRC’s (2008) Code of Practice for the Diagnosis and Confirmation of 
Death, where it states: “The Working Party decided that it was important to separate completely the diagnosis 
and confirmation of death from anything to do with the issues surrounding organ donation and 
transplantation” (p. 9). Within this document, issues of organ donation in relation to death diagnoses are 
referred to the ICS’s (2005) donation guidelines and the HTA’s (2009b) code of practice for consent.  
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Sophie, a highly experienced donation nurse, recalled a case from when she was still 
working as an Intensive Care nurse of, as she described, a “lady” from an “Indian island” 
who died of a brain haemorrhage during child birth, whilst the baby survived. Despite this 
woman being flagged up as a potential donor, Sophie narrated the negative donation 
outcome as ultimately down to the disjuncture between the medical diagnosis of death and 
the family’s interpretation of the situation: 
I looked after her for four days. And my enduring memory about her was 
actually...organ donation could never have come into it because [the] family, 
wouldn’t accept brain stem death as a definition of death. A lot of her religion 
seemed to be a fusion of Hinduism and Christianity and she had Christian and 
Hindu symbols on the pillow all the time. We had to make sure [they] were 
placed in a certain order. And even though the doctors had done the brain-stem 
death tests and said she is brain-stem dead, and we did briefly discuss donation, 
they [family] just put an end to that, they said: ‘we don’t accept that she won’t 
get better.’ And, ‘you’re not going to take her off the ventilator.’ So you can’t 
facilitate organ donation from someone like that and in the end the hospital 
lawyers had to, because erm...to take her off, you know, when they say you’re 
not taking her off the ventilator, if they’d [doctors] have done that [taken her off 
the ventilator] they could have been open to, you know, perhaps [legal action by 
the family], even though she was legally certified dead. So she stayed on the unit 
another two days and I cared for her for another two days. And her 
husband...he’d come in and spend 5 minutes, and he wouldn’t engage. We tried 
to engage in conversation; he wouldn’t engage [....] When you’re brain-stem 
dead, the rest of your organs try to follow. So no matter how much you support 
this patient, every brain-stem dead patient that’s been ventilated, their heart 
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has stopped within 2 to 4 days. Then about 2 days later she just [cardiac] 
arrested. So, donation wasn’t an option with her in the sense that they [family] 
wouldn’t never ever gonna even accept that she could be taken off the 
ventilator; that there wasn’t hope for her to survive. (Sophie, donation nurse 
with team 2) 
This example illustrates how discussions of death with the family are linked to, rather than 
separated from, the donation request. In this case, the family are asked about donation 
despite the fact that they do not agree with their relative’s diagnosis of death. Sophie 
describes their refusal for organ donation as an outcome of their refusal to accept the brain 
death diagnosis, and thus the decision of staff to withdraw treatment from their relative. 
Moreover, she juxtaposes her description of the family’s lack of acceptance of the death of 
their relative with insight into their religious status, by detailing the religious artefacts 
placed around the patient. Here, she conveys subtle markers of difference between her own 
view of death and the family’s (religious) understanding of the situation. The implication 
being that the family’s conflicting views of death, and their subsequent lack of engagement 
with the donation request are an outcome of their religious beliefs around death.  
Sophie describes how the conflict played out in this situation: the family continue to 
demand that their relative can be saved and insist that she not be taken off the ventilator, 
whilst Sophie and the medical team have diagnosed her as already (brain) dead. This 
decision is eventually vindicated when the woman dies two days later, despite being 
allowed to remain on the ventilator. With Sophie’s evaluation: "you can't facilitate organ 
donation from someone like that" – drawn from her experiences as both an ICU and 
donation nurse, we gain insight into the contingent arrangements around donation. These 
being that donation consent, and thus refusal, are understood to be predicated upon a 
family’s agreement, or lack of agreement, with medical decisions around death. However, as 
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we also see here, and as I later develop in parts 2 and 3, understandings of donation refusal 
from minority ethnic families are linked to specific constructions of the difficulties these 
families present for healthcare staff. This includes perceptions of religious needs around 
death, and how these clash with the medical practice of withdrawing care.  
Positive donation outcomes are therefore understood as dependent upon the capacity of all 
involved constituents – family, ICU doctors and nurses – to come to a shared, or co-
constructed, definition of the situation around death (Thomas, 1931). Discussions of death 
between health professionals and ‘BME’ families thus organise donation outcomes, and in 
turn, highlight how death is a socially determined process, integral to decisions around 
donation. A family’s acceptance of death thereby acts as an informal stage of consent in the 
organ donation process. Without this acceptance, stories often described an outcome of 
donation refusal, or the donation request not happening. This is in contrast to the HTA’s 
code of practice on consent (2009b), which makes no reference to discussions of death with 
a family in its outline of the process and stages of gaining consent for donation.  
David Sudnow’s (1967) study on dying in American hospitals highlights the importance of 
situating families’ understandings of death within the context of how death is organised in 
hospitals. Sudnow was the first to “locate ‘death’ and ‘dying’ as an organisationally relevant 
event” (1967: 3), by looking at the practices done around death by health professionals. He 
made a distinction between biological death (when the body has ceased to function), clinical 
death (“the appearance of death signs upon physical examination”) and social death, where 
the patient is treated as essentially dead by staff and family alike, since they have ceased to 
have any “socially relevant attributes” (1967: 74). In relation to this, stories like Sophie’s 
highlight how, even when a patient is declared clinically dead, families may not always 
accept this, since they perceive their relative to be still socially alive (Sudnow, 1967; 
Seymour, 2000). In other words, they still see them as a person, rather than a dead body. 
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This indicates that there is a gap between the medical definition of death and families’ 
understanding of death. This was especially so in the case of brain death: where the dead 
are still breathing – appear alive – with the aid of a ventilator. In Sophie’s example, since the 
potential donor’s clinical and biological death status was not entirely obvious, the family 
argued for her to be kept on the ventilator in their understanding that she would get better. 
In these struggles the ontology of the dead or dying patient is thus brought into question 
(Hadders, 2007; 2009a; 2009b) by families. As discussed in chapter 1, studies with donor 
and non-donor families found that many families struggled to come to terms with the 
concept of their relative being brain dead. In turn, families who donated demonstrated a 
greater understanding of the finality involved in brain death than those who refused 
donation (e.g. Sque and Payne, 1996; Franz et al., 1997; De Jong et al., 1998; Bellali and 
Papadatou, 2007; Sque et al., 2007). Margaret Lock (2002) highlights similar ambivalences 
over brain death in Japan, where the brain dead person is only legally recognised when a 
patient has previously given written consent for donation, and their families agree to this 
upon their death. In this way, similar to Sudnow, brain death is understood as a “socially 
determined” form of death (Lock, 2002: 183), brought about by the negotiation of different 
constituents. Without this consensus, potential donors may enter, what Kaufman (2005: 
152) refers to as the “zone of indistinction”. This occurs when a patient is neither 
responding to treatment, nor are they “dying quickly enough” (Kaufman, 2005: 152). They 
enter a sort of no-place: neither (biologically) dead nor (socially) alive. In Sophie’s story, the 
brain dead patient remaining on the ventilator therefore – from Turner (1974) – occupies a 
position of liminality for the family: pausing in the passage between the socially stable 
identities of life and death, thereby reducing the chance of them becoming an organ donor.  
Decisions around death therefore frame the outcome of family decisions on organ donation. 
In NHSBT’s recent general and ‘BME’ targeted Prove It campaign (2009. See figs. 1, 2 and 4 
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in chapter 1), which encourages the public to donate their organs after death, individuals 
are asked to “prove” their belief in donation by putting their name on the organ donor 
register. Specifically the ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ campaigns state: “if more people 
registered as donors, more lives would be saved”. Here, the act of organ donation – and 
reduction in inequality of access to transplantation for ‘BME’ populations – is equated with 
a singular decision by a member of the public to register as an organ donor70. In contrast, 
stories describing the struggles between health professionals and ‘BME’ families around 
decisions on death reveal the simplicity of constructing donation decision-making in this 
way. I therefore add a further dimension to understandings of low ‘BME’ donor rates, 
beyond the assumptions that donation refusals are an outcome of the ‘cultural’ reluctance 
of ‘BME’ groups to donate organs. Here, ‘BME’ donation refusal is seen as an outcome of 
the break-down of discussions around death, and not simply the result of a refusal to the 
direct request for organs.    
Negotiating death diagnoses 
There is a further dimension to the view that conflicts over death inhibit the likelihood of 
gaining donation consent, which we glimpsed in Sophie’s brief description of the 
involvement of hospital solicitors in the case above. This being that discussions around 
death also involve the active negotiation of death diagnoses with families, in attempts to 
gain their acceptance of the situation. As I will argue, this also acts as a process of 
smoothing the path towards donation request and consent. Health professionals described 
the various ways in which this was done, including: demonstrating brain death tests in front 
of a family; attempting to impart the biological hopelessness of their relative’s condition by 
                                                          
70
 See Singleton, 2005, for a similar argument relating to public participation in CPR. Singleton argues that 
leaflets about a ‘community’ CPR training initiative construct the act of an individual’s financial contribution to 
the scheme as a way of directly helping to save lives (2005: 778). 
197 
 
listing the clinical reasons for the death; and drawing on other authorities, such as solicitors 
and religious leaders, to mediate their decisions with families. 
At Hillview, John, an ICU consultant and the hospital’s Clinical Donor Champion, told of the 
difficulty of one particular case where a ‘South Asian’ family refused to recognise the dying 
status of their relative and agree to the usual process of withdrawal of care. Legal action 
from the hospital was only averted after the medical team managed to reach a compromise 
with the family: 
There was one family, and I guess they were erm...part of the South Asian 
community in the city, and it was all a very difficult experience even before we 
got to the topic of organ donation. And it was very difficult to... persuade [the 
family] that continuing treatment wasn’t in their mother’s best interests; who 
was a woman who developed multiple organ failure and was failing to respond 
to all the supportive treatments. And we took several days to convince the 
family to limit the care that we were giving. They completely refused to have the 
care withdrawn, and I guess rather than go through the courts we negotiated a 
limitation of treatment. And in her particular case she did become brain stem 
dead...but...[sighs] we had a very difficult time convincing them that that meant 
she was dead in terms of medical and legal authorities. So subsequent 
discussions after the brain stem death testing were pretty short and eventually 
she actually died on the ventilator, which I guess we went along with in the end. 
But clearly we had reservations about whether we were acting in that lady’s best 
interests. It was a very large family, very articulate family, and...[I] guess we tried 
to come to what we thought was a win-win for both sides. But it’s the writing 
was on the wall at the beginning that she was unlikely to go on and donate any 
organs. (John, ICU consultant and Clinical Donor Champion at Hillview) 
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John’s experience conveys the struggle to legitimate the unit’s medical decision on the 
woman’s dying status with her family. In contrast to the view of staff, John describes how 
the family perceived further treatment to be the best option for their relative. He justifies 
the medical diagnosis by listing the hopelessness of the patient’s situation: multiple organ 
failure, unresponsive to treatment, and her subsequent deterioration into brain stem death. 
John therefore legitimates his decision through the narration of biomedical markers 
indicating the imminence of the patient’s death (Johnson et al., 2000; Aldridge and Barton, 
2007; Hadders, 2011). The family’s refusal to allow withdrawal of treatment meant he was 
forced to negotiate a compromise of limited – rather than halted – care. He describes how it 
took a period of days to persuade them that the continuation of care was not in the best 
interests of their mother. This means that, rather than having a positive effect, such as 
saving or making the patient more comfortable, treatment is viewed as causing more harm 
– pain or distress – to a patient who will inevitably die. This persuasion involved imparting 
the medical and legal reasons for the patient’s death to the family, and thus the (legal) 
justification for removing active treatment. 
Here we see how conflicts between families and medical staff over decisions around death 
are negotiated by staff, in attempts to reach a consensus on the situation. This is reflected in 
John’s statement: “we tried to come to what we thought was a win-win for both sides”. It is 
only in reaching an agreement that organ donation is understood as possible. As such, the 
work to aid this agreement, I argue, is also done so as to make donation a possibility.  
Timmermans (2005) has coined the notion of “death brokering” to describe such processes 
of negotiation, where medical professionals “render individual deaths culturally meaningful” 
(2005: 993) to families. Following from Foucault (1976), an individual’s death, originally kept 
at bay by medical attempts to save a life, is subsequently conveyed to families as a natural 
outcome of illness. As John describes above, this brokering took the form of relaying the 
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hopelessness of continuing treatment, and later persuading the family of their relative’s 
legal death status. Studies into medical communication with families around death and 
dying have highlighted how such negotiations have a vital function in the process of moving 
patients from the phase of dying into death (Curtis and Patrick, 2001; Kaufman, 2005). As 
Johnson et al. (2000), in their study with American doctors found, this often involves the 
gradual incorporation of the possibility of death in discussions with families. This eventually 
ensures that any hope of the patient’s recovery is dispelled, and they are understood to be 
(socially) dying (see also, Sudnow, 1967: 93-96). Similarly, Aldridge and Barton (2007) found 
that where doctors were consistent in their summaries of the hopelessness of a patient’s 
condition, families would more readily agree to the decision to withdraw care, than in cases 
where doctors had referenced a chance of survival. In this way, when these strategies for 
breaking bad news are compromised, as in the case of sudden death – of which many organ 
donors make up – families may struggle to engage with medical diagnoses of death (Russ 
and Kaufman, 2005: 117).   
John describes the various attempts to legitimate the death to the family: spending time 
“convincing them”, so as to align their understanding of the situation with that of the 
medical team (Hadders, 2011). In so doing, attempts are made to re-stabilise the disrupted 
donation trajectory; where a family’s consent for death allows for a successful donation 
request. However, in John’s case, consensus on withdrawal of care never came about. 
Instead, an agreement was made – between staff and the family – to a limitation, rather 
than complete withdrawal of care. This meant that any chance of organ donation was 
impossible71.  
                                                          
71
 This is due to the fact that a potential donor must be actively managed and their organs quickly procured 
once brain death has occurred/death is understood imminent (in the case of DCD) to ensure their viability for 
transplant. In the case of brain dead or dying patients remaining on a ventilator, their condition is likely to 
become unstable, meaning their organs become increasingly damaged and therefore unsuitable for donation. 
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Even when attempts to legitimate medical decisions of death to a family resulted in the 
family subsequently accepting the diagnosis, this did not necessarily result in donation 
consent. Sandra, an ICU nurse at Hillview narrated a case involving a ‘Muslim’ family, where 
their initial scepticism over the diagnosis of brain stem death of their father – “they weren’t 
believing what we were telling them about the death” – was turned around after they 
witnessed the brain stem death tests. Once the family had demonstrated their 
understanding of death they were asked about organ donation. However, Sandra described 
how this request resulted in an angry response, and was interpreted as the reason for their 
father’s diagnosis. In other words, the family saw the decision of the death of their father as 
being made for the purposes of organ donation, rather than his death being inevitable.  
In this case, the process of successful death brokering with the family meant that organ 
donation was seen as a possibility. However, as both John and Sandra’s examples 
demonstrate, even with such negotiations, consensus on death and donation are not always 
reached. That these conflicts were described as particularly prevalent with ‘BME’, especially 
‘Muslim’, families calls into question how discussions of death are actually done by health 
professional with minority ethnic families. In this way, I argue that refusal to donate organs 
is not simply about the failure of families to accept – what Foucault (1976) describes as – 
medical authority on death, but may also be about the failure of health professionals to 
successfully communicate their decisions on death to families (e.g. Russ and Kaufman, 
2005). In addition, as I will take up in part 3, it leads us to ponder the way in which ‘BME’ 
families are potentially constructed by health professionals as a ‘problem’ for organ 
donation, through particular interpretations of the difficulties they present around death. 
Mediating death 
Health professionals’ stories also described how, in some cases, conflicts over death 
between families and ICU practitioners were further mediated by figures outside of the 
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treating medical team. Sometimes the donation nurses themselves acted as mediators 
between families and ICU teams. They described how one of their first actions when 
speaking to a family – prior to any mention of donation being made – is to ask for their 
understanding of the situation. If the family indicate a lack of acceptance of their relative’s 
death the donation nurse will then guide them through a further explanation of the 
diagnosis. In other cases, not always linked to potential donors, hospital solicitors were 
consulted to provide legal advice for staff who wanted to withdraw treatment, yet did not 
have the consent of families to do so. At other times, religious figures, such as hospital 
chaplains, were called on – sometimes by a family, sometimes the ICU staff – to act as a 
mediator in the situation. 
At Hillview, where there were regular disputes between ‘Muslim’ families and staff over 
death diagnoses, the hospital’s resident Imam, Aatif, was regularly called on to arbitrate 
between the two sides. Whilst he had never been involved in a potential donor case, his 
commonplace involvement in death discussions tells us much about the difficulty ICU staff 
had with neutralising such situations with ‘Muslim’ families.  A “typical scenario”, as Aatif 
described, usually involved a ‘Muslim’ patient who had been attached to a ventilator in 
Intensive Care for a number of days. With continual deterioration and lack of improvement 
in their condition after treatment, a decision is made by the treating team that any further 
intervention is futile. The family are then told about this decision in terms which frame it 
around the interests of the patient: treatment should be withdrawn so as not to prolong 
their relative’s suffering (Johnson et al., 2000). Aatif described the common disputes that 
subsequently arise at this point – when a family disagree with the situation being presented 
to them – and his ensuing involvement as mediator between the interests of a family and 
the interests of the medical team, with the dying patient at the centre: 
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The family turn round and say: ‘no, he’s still breathing.’ Okay [doctors respond 
with] ‘he’s still breathing, but it’s not him that’s breathing, he’s been assisted by 
this aid. He is unable to do that himself.’ The family will then come back with: 
‘oh no, but he might improve’ and that kind of thing. So, somebody needs 
to...come and bridge the gap between...their [family] expectations and their 
[staff] expectations. So who comes along? Call the chaplain: I come in fully 
armoured! (Aatif, Hillview’s Imam Chaplain) 
Aatif explained how, upon his arrival at such scenes, his first actions are to ask questions of 
the medical team about the patient’s situation: what treatment they have and haven’t 
explored, and what the patient’s prognosis is – so as to give him a medical understanding of 
the situation. He then approaches the family, who, in his words: “will throw it on to your 
shoulders and say ‘Imam, whatever you think. We are happy with the outcome of whatever 
God has to say.’” As Aatif goes on to describe, his position as intermediary is therefore far 
from easy: 
And it’s like: am I being asked here to make a decision on behalf of your loved 
one? And that is where this thing is very very difficult for me. Because in the 
hereafter I would not like to be questioned by God that a decision was in your 
hands, and you took somebody’s life away when they could have lived for 
another six months, a year, whatever it is. So Islamically I seek a second opinion 
from another Islamic Scholar, just like your medical clinical staff would. [....] 
There are times when I haven’t agreed with our staff, and I didn’t even need a 
second opinion. Where I’ve actually gone up to the consultants, asked leading 
questions and thought: no wait a minute, there’s still some mileage in this. And I 
have actually turned around and said ‘No, I don’t think you can be supported on 
this [decision to withdraw care].’ [Be]cause first thing is medical staff winning 
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your approval. Then it’s about medical staff saying ‘Okay, now that you’re with 
us, go and sort them lot [family] out.’ (laughs) When all fails, they know that I 
can pull it together for ‘em. And as I say, in one particular incident, I wasn’t 
convinced. So I said to the consultant: ‘I don’t think so. I’m not convinced [with 
the decision to withdraw care].’ Er and basically, he [consultant] said ‘Okay.’ I 
said ‘I think if you give us another weekend or so and let’s see what happens’. I 
think it was Thursday or Friday then, and this patient was sat up on Monday 
morning. (Aatif, Hillview’s Imam Chaplain) 
Widening the scope of his official role to provide religious guidance for patients around their 
health needs, Aatif’s place at Hillview, as both hospital employee and, as he described, “one 
of them” (‘Muslim’), also involves “bridging the gap” between the largely white ICU 
consultant body and ‘Muslim’ families. Aatif positions himself as a vital resource for medical 
staff struggling to convince families of the dying or dead status of their relative. He is 
therefore both a key ally for staff and someone with authority, over that of families, to 
challenge medical decision-making – as we saw in the example of the patient who survived 
after his intervention. With this he highlights a different perspective to medical decisions of 
death (Luce and White, 2007) and the multiple moments of diagnosis in medical practice 
(Byrne and Stengel, 2010). In Aatif’s regular role as mediator a form of parliament of death 
(Latour, 1993) is played out. Here, medical decisions on death are verified or refuted via his 
position of religious authority, and in his use of similar techniques to medicine by calling on 
a further (religious) expert.  
In his description of his role as decision-maker between the two sides, Aatif also conveys the 
responsibility involved: he is mediator not only between families and health professionals, 
but also between life and death, and God and medicine. I draw on Haraway’s (1997) 
transmuted interpretation of Schaper and Schaffin’s notion of the modest witness to think 
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about his positioning here. Haraway draws out the modest witness from its original 
inception as an impartial (white, male) figure, able to objectively mediate between the 
domains of science and the public, to her reconfiguration of a partial, self-aware, and 
accountable figure. For Haraway, the modest witness, like Aatif, is one who makes science 
transparent: bringing it into question in terms of “possible liveable worlds” (1997: 39). In 
questioning his role as mediator, Aatif acknowledges the burden of such responsibility, 
calling attention to his partiality in the process: “this thing is very very difficult for me”.  
My time spent with Aatif helped me understand a further layer to the work done by ICU 
staff to legitimate their decisions around death (and ultimately move the donation process 
forward) – by calling on mediating figures such as Aatif. These legitimating processes are not 
simply confined to the function of facilitating donation, however. Instead, they need to also 
be understood in the wider context of the moral and emotional struggles of ICU staff with 
continuing treatment on dying patients, as I show below. 
Continuing treatment on dying patients: moral struggles 
In the examples above we witness how tensions around decisions of death lead to 
difficulties in gaining consent for donation. In addition, we also glimpse how the interests of 
families and health professionals may differ in relation to bioethical notions of futility. 
Futility refers to the use of “inappropriate treatments that will not improve disease 
prognosis, alleviate physiological symptoms, or prolong survival” (Mohammed and Peter, 
2009: 292). Stopping intensive treatment on a patient whose situation is deemed beyond 
hope, or where death has already occurred (in the case of brain stem death), is linked to the 
bioethical imperatives of beneficence and non-malfeasance (Luce and White, 2007). This 
means that medical practice should do no harm to a patient, and should only be carried out 
in consideration of the patient’s ‘best interest’. In this way, when ICU staff are impelled by a 
family to continue to ventilate and treat a dead or dying patient, this is understood to 
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compromise the best interests of a patient. This is because such care is considered 
superfluous and the cause of further pain or distress in a patient (Luce and White, 2007; 
Mohammed and Peter, 2009). However, as Mohammed and Peter (2009) argue, and as we 
saw in John and Sophie’s examples, negotiations with families resulting in the continuation – 
rather than withdrawal – of a patient’s ventilation can be understood as “moral practices” 
which benefit the family (p.292); in that they allow them a dying stage, to come to terms 
with their relative’s death (Timmermans, 2005).  
Such practice is contrasted with the General Medical Council’s (GMC) recommendation that 
family “anxieties” over withdrawing care should not “override [...] clinical judgement and 
lead you [...] to continue treatment that is of no overall benefit” (GMC, 2010: 25). The 
guidance to have “clinical” decisions take precedent over the feelings of a family are 
enacted very differently in the cases Sophie and John described. Their experience of such 
situations (and fear of legal action by families) contrasts with the GMC’S recommendation 
to follow through with ‘medical’ decisions. Some nurses and consultants I interviewed, 
especially those working in Lakeland’s Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU), confessed to 
their moral and emotional wrestling with continuing treatment on dying patients at the 
behest of families, and their personal feelings about the situation.  
For Ketu, a PICU consultant at Lakeland, the ability of medical technologies to keep a dying 
child alive presented him with routine quandaries between his own, moral concerns, and 
the pressure he feels from families, colleagues, and society to keep a patient alive: 
The difficulty is, and there’s one example already on the unit, where the family 
are not where you are despite lots of you as Intensivists, and other specialities 
saying the same thing [that the patient is dying]. And those are the really 
difficult ones. What do you do in those circumstances? Some of those you can 
actually get the family eventually to come on board, but it takes them a lot 
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longer. [....] And a case on the unit at the moment, I’ve actually said to Dad, this 
is far higher pressure than I would use on you, and your child is only twelve 
months old. So to put it into context, into something they could understand, so 
that, with time you actually end up making the family understand that 
continuing treatment is a futile exercise. [....] Erm [coughs] and I always think, is 
it right what I’m doing? Is it in the best interests of the child? And I always ask 
myself that question. But it’s still difficult. [....] A lot of the decisions we make 
now I think are driven by pressures beyond that of my own working 
environment. Society’s expectations, families’ expectations, fellow physicians’ 
expectations, nursing expectations. All of these drive you to...to treatment 
options that you don’t necessarily believe in. But it’s coming to a compromise 
between what sits comfortably with your conscience and what you can do or 
have to do as a physician. (Ketu, PICU consultant at Lakeland) 
Negotiations around end of life decisions, and their impact upon donation decision-making, 
thus extend into the general emotional and moral difficulty for staff in continuing, as one 
nurse described, “aggressive” treatment on patients deemed beyond saving. Ketu’s example 
reveals the everyday struggles of Intensive Care professionals who navigate moral 
uncertainties in the care of dying patients. In the case he describes, the increase in 
treatment on a young baby to a level beyond that usually used on adults is conveyed to the 
family in these terms, to emphasise how it is at the limit of what the medical team can 
feasibly do. Ketu conveys how such actions are done alongside attempts to persuade the 
family of the legitimacy of the medical decision to remove care, allowing them time to come 
to terms with the fact that their child will die (Mohammed and Peter, 2009).  
Here, decisions to treat, or not, have ramifications for the production of a ‘good’ (equated 
as natural), or ‘bad’ (linked to aggressive treatment) death (Delvecchio Good et al., 2004; 
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Mohammed and Peter, 2009). Ketu describes the process of struggling with his own 
conscience in the context of the needs and interests not only of families, but also his 
colleagues, and society; referencing the continual expectations on medicine to stave off 
death (Kaufman, 2005; Chapple, 2010). With Ketu’s narrative we glean insight into the 
difficult emotional process for health professionals in imparting and acting out their 
decisions on death to families. In practice, this encompasses a moral responsibility towards 
the welfare of families, which, in turn, leads to health professionals struggling with their 
decisions to treat (for the sake of families) or not treat (for the sake of patients). Far from 
the authority of medical decisions taking precedent – manifested in the GMC’s (2010) 
recommendations – dying, and thus the pathway towards donation, is witnessed here as “a 
nuanced social process that involves a negotiation of moral responsibilities, identities, 
positions, and viewpoints” (Mohammed and Peter, 2009: 301).  
In the examples presented in this section I have shown how discussions around death with 
potential (‘BME’) donor families act as a vital stage in the organ donation trajectory. When 
medical decisions of death are not accepted by a family this is understood to jeopardise, 
and even lead to the failure of, subsequent requests for donation. In this way, I firstly 
argued that for families to agree to organ donation, they are required to provide their 
informal consent for the death of their relative to occur. Secondly, when such disagreement 
happens, Intensive Care staff actively attempt to legitimate their diagnoses to families by a 
process of negotiating the death to render it acceptable. In the case of potential donors, this 
process also prepares the family for donation request. In addition, other figures, such as 
hospital Imams and solicitors, are sometimes called on to further mediate general disputes 
between families desperate for their relative to survive, and health professionals who do 
not wish to continue with futile care on a dying patient. Lastly, similar to how donation was 
described as an emotional process for health professionals in chapter 4, in the wider 
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background to such struggles we also witness the emotional work involved for staff in 
continuing aggressive treatment on patients they deem beyond hope.  
In this way, I argue that to understand the problem of consent for organ donation from 
‘BME’ families we need to conceive of the stage in which death is discussed with families as 
a form of, and integral to, donation consent. That these communications were described as 
especially difficult with ‘BME’ families indicates that this is not simply about families’ lack of 
acceptance of death, but also the ability of health professionals to communicate death and 
make it understandable – and thus acceptable – for a family. The next section will continue 
with the problem of consent along the donation pathway: showing how the Human Tissue 
Authority’s guidelines around consent fail to capture experiences of working with non-
‘white’ families, when it comes to assessing a potential donor’s next of kin. 
 
Part 2. Multiple consent constituents: the ‘‘BME’ family’ 
As highlighted above, consent for organ donation has been publically constructed by 
donation campaigns as a discrete act of rejection or acceptance, in the act of an individual 
registering their willingness to become an organ donor. In addition, as I argued in chapter 1, 
NHSBT’s targeted ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ Prove It (2009) and Can we Count on You? (2007) 
campaigns utilise the polarised statistics of the increased likelihood of ‘black’ and ‘South 
Asian’ people needing a transplant and the small (1%) percentage of ‘black’ and ‘South 
Asian’ people on the organ donor register. In this way, the private act of organ donation is 
re-constituted around the responsibility to act on behalf of a collective (‘black’ or ‘South 
Asian’) to which individuals have been ascribed (Hacking, 2006; Hayden, 2007; Kierans and 
Cooper, 2011). However, despite the linking of individuals to notions of ‘community’, 
NHSBT’s Prove It campaign slogan states on all its posters: “if you believe in organ donation, 
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prove it”. With this, the individual is represented as ultimately responsible for the decision 
to donate, and thus save lives.     
In contrast, the 2004 Human Tissue Act (HTA) configures one of the main stages in consent 
as involving an understanding of who is able to provide permission for organ donation. The 
main Act (2004) describes how ‘appropriate consent’72 can be provided by the donor if they 
have left evidence of their wishes prior to death, such as by joining the organ donor register. 
The Human Tissue Act therefore enshrines the legal ability to carry out organ donation if the 
deceased’s wishes are known. However, in practice, rather than donation happening as a 
result of an individual’s decision to join the donor register, it is their family who usually give 
the say so for donation to go ahead (May, Auliso and Devita, 2000). The HTA takes this into 
account in its Code of Practice for Consent (HTA, 2009b), where it acknowledges the usual 
process of gaining agreement for donation from a “qualifying” relation (para. 29). Who can 
be included within this notion of a ‘qualifying relationship’ to the deceased, and thus who 
can provide consent for donation, is provided by the HTA’s hierarchy for consent (2009b). 
This hierarchy places spouse or partner at the top, moving through to parent or child, then 
brother or sister, aunt or uncle, through to friend of longstanding at the bottom. This means 
that the relative of the donor who is highest up the hierarchy should theoretically be the 
one to make the decision on donation, and provide their consent for it to go ahead. In 
configuring consent in this way, the HTA also constructs a normative notion of the family, in 
terms of who is most closely related to whom, which I take up later in this section. 
Despite the HTA’s acknowledgement of family involvement in donation consent, the formal 
act of consent falls to just one, ‘qualifying’ relation. Similar to the donation campaign 
                                                          
72
 In bioethical terms, consent has traditionally been legislated around the notion of the individual’s right to 
voluntary participation in, for example, organ donation or medical trials. This was originally enshrined in the 
Neuremberg Code of 1947, and was later developed in the World Medical Association’s Helsinki Declaration 
(1964), which broadened out consent to also encompass “proxy” consent by relatives, to “supplement” 
consent in the case of children or those with learning disabilities (Hoeyer, 2009: 273).   
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discourse of an individual giver, the HTA positions responsibility for decision-making upon 
just one individual. This is reflected in the donation consent forms, which provide a single 
space for a relative to formally register their consent. On the first page of the consent form 
(see fig. 6), underneath a section for the “patient’s details”, the box titled: “consent for 
organs and tissue” has a space for the patient’s name, and below this, just one box for the 
name of the relation giving consent for donation, alongside details of the nature of their 
relationship to the patient. This is presented as such: “I, (name) the (e.g. mother, husband) 
of (patient’s name) give consent to the donation of the following organs/tissue for 
transplantation”. Here, the decision-maker for the donation of a dead patient’s organs is 
configured as a singular relation.  
In this section, I argue that such standardised notions of consent – as an outcome of an 
individual, hierarchical process of decision-making – fails to account for the complexity of 
how donation decisions are made by ‘BME’ families, and, in turn, also serves to make these 
decisions problematic.  
Donation decision-making: the complexity of family  
When first approaching a family about organ donation, donation nurses must decide on who 
can act as the “qualifying” relative – or, as the donation nurses usually referred to, next of 
kin – to provide consent for organ donation. Some donation nurses emphasised the difficult 
nature of this stage of the consent process with minority ethnic families. They described 
large numbers of family members – sometimes up to 15 or 20 – present during the donation 
request, and their struggle to ensure that the appropriate family member/s make/s the final 
decision on donation; along with trying to sufficiently explain the process to others present. 
In this way, ‘BME’ families were understood to pose a problem for negotiations around 
donation, since their decisions were viewed as the outcome of a complex process of 
deliberation between various individuals. These included immediate and extended family - 
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Figure 6. The first page of NHSBT’s consent form for organ donation. 
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aunts, uncles, cousins etc, ‘community’ members, and religious figures, such as Imams. This 
was in contrast to the commonly described small ‘white’ family units: parents and siblings, 
or partner and children.  
In this way, standardised notions of the family, and who should be involved in donation 
decision-making, sometimes broke down in encounters with ‘BME’ families. One ICU 
Consultant at Hillview, Matthew, had even developed tactics for getting past this ‘difficulty’ 
by only allowing 3 people in the room during donation requests and in discussions with 
families about the death of their relative. As he put it, when discussing his withdrawal of 
care conversations with ‘Asian’ families: “if they [‘Asian’ families] had their way there would 
be about thirty of them in the room, and the person you really want to speak to is the wife”. 
Disparaging comments such as these also illustrated the way in which ‘BME’ families were 
perceived to be an issue for donation negotiations, by virtue of how they were implicitly 
contrasted with standardised notions of the (‘white’) family. Rather than 30 people in the 
room, 3 people are considered to be an appropriate, more manageable number by Matthew 
here. In conceptualising ‘Asian’ families in this way, Matthew also produces them as a 
homogenous category. ‘Asian families’ are automatically classified as an unruly and difficult 
to manage group for the consultant’s routine work of communicating death and donation to 
families. This problematic construction of the ‘BME’ family in relation to norms of donation 
practice I further deal with in section 3. 
One story highlighting the complexity of ‘family’ in donation consent came from Emily’s 
experience of requesting donation from a ‘Muslim’ family at Hillview. Emily’s narrative 
began with an ideal donation scenario: a woman had suffered a spontaneous subarachnoid 
haemorrhage and was transferred to Intensive Care. Emily described it as: 
Absolutely text book stuff regarding, you know, identification of brain stem 
death, the [brain stem] testing had all been done by John [the Clinical Donor 
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Champion] and one of the other consultants. I was on call, and came along after 
the patient was referred. [It was a] planned approach: the consultant did the 
brain stem death talk [with the family] and I then spoke to them about donation. 
(Emily, donation nurse at Hillview) 
Emily reflects on the initial stages of this encounter as exactly in line with donation 
procedure (covered in chapter 3): she is called early and adopts a collaborative approach, 
which involves her being present from the time the consultant delivers the news of death to 
the potential donor family. As her story opens out, however, this ideal scenario becomes 
more complex, when, after agreeing to speak with her about donation, the family do not fit 
the usual notion of next of kin. She describes how, rather than the husband of the potential 
donor including his children in the donation conversation, he requests that his nephew and 
niece accompany him. As Emily recounts, this was seen as “odd” by other members of staff. 
However, in recognition of her long experience as a donation nurse, Emily describes how 
she responded with: “Well if that’s what he [husband] wants, you know, we’ll just do what 
he wants.” 
Emily then asks the family whether they would consider organ donation, describing how she 
fully expected them to say ‘no’ to the request. This reveals her entrenched presumptions 
about ‘Asian’ families in donation situations: that donation requests to such families will 
automatically result in donation refusal. However, her expectations are confounded when 
the husband expresses an interest in donating his wife’s organs. This he pivots around the 
chance of his sick nephew, who was on the transplant list, receiving part of her liver. Emily 
describes her excitement at the possibility of Hillview having its first ‘Asian’ donation that 
she can recall. However, as her story unfolds, this chance of consent never materialises:  
We went through the whole spiel of, you know, all the options available [to the 
family], one of them being organ donation. And I’d carried on talking and was 
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waiting for him [husband] to say ‘No’. But, you know, he continued to listen. I 
stopped and asked whether he had any questions’: [husband:] ‘No, this is 
something I want to think about.’ The family then started talking in Punjabi and I 
could hear ‘liver’, ‘heart’, ‘kidneys’. And I’m thinking they are actually going to 
go ahead with this [donation]. Then the husband asked his niece to explain to 
me another part of it, which was the fact that the nephew who was sitting in 
front of me was waiting for a liver transplant. So obviously the question was 
then: can he receive the liver? So I said, you know, ‘We’ll see.’ So made the 
enquiries and all the enquiries we came out that yes: it looked like the transplant 
centre would let this lady’s liver be used for her nephew. So I went back to the 
family and the husband asked if he could just have five minutes by himself. And 
when I came back again the next thing that he [husband] said, was that he’d 
spoken to his Mullah73, and he was extremely sorry, but the Mullah had said that 
he couldn’t consent to donation. He said that he could not consent for his wife 
because it was Allah’s way that his wife had died. It was Allah’s decision. And he 
[husband] said you know, ‘donation is not allowed within our religion.’ So I said 
‘Well actually that’s not correct. It is all about interpretation of the Quran, and 
did you tell your Mullah that your nephew was waiting for a liver transplant as 
well?’; ‘Yes I did.’ And I said: ‘your Mullah still said no?’; ‘Yes.’ And that’s when 
he [husband] said that ‘My Mullah had said that if we had discussed donation 
during her lifetime, or she had been on the [donor] register then she would have 
been allowed to donate.’ (Emily, donation nurse at Hillview) 
Emily’s example here illustrates the complexity of the process involved in the husband’s 
eventual refusal to donate his wife’s organs. His decision is understood as an outcome of 
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 A Mullah is a Muslim man educated in Islamic theology and law, and often refers to any type of Muslim 
clergy. 
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negotiations between differently involved individuals. To begin with, the husband’s initial 
interest in donation is described through his hope that his nephew might directly benefit 
from the donation. In this way, Emily implicitly conveys the husband’s personal 
responsibility to donate his wife’s organs for the sake of his nephew, who constitutes a vital 
part of the decision. Emily describes her process of negotiation with the transplant team, to 
confirm that the nephew could take part of the liver. She constructs this part of the process 
as manageable and positive: the motivation to donate can be met and the key relative – the 
husband – seems keen. However, upon her returning to the group, a further decision-maker 
has been brought into the picture: the Mullah, and, with this, the rule of Allah (God). 
Religion and its representative thus become active participants in the husband’s final 
decision to refuse donation, with his explanation that, without knowledge of his wife’s 
wishes, he is unable to provide consent on her behalf. 
This drawn-out process of decision-making, involving immediate and wider family, along 
with a religious authority, highlights the perceived difficulty of negotiating donation 
decisions with ‘BME’ families. Moreover, with the involvement of the potential donor’s 
nephew and niece, rather than her children, the standardised notion – laid out in the HTA’s 
consent guidelines (2009a) – of who constitutes a qualifying relative is shown to break down 
in practice. Here, rather than simply the highest qualifying relative – the husband – being 
the one who decides, the decision is meted out to various individuals, including nephews 
and nieces, the mullah and God, alongside the potential donor herself – who never 
registered her wishes around donation. For Emily, this decision is initially difficult to 
understand. This is shown in her challenge to the husband over his choice, using her 
understanding of Islam’s official positive stance on donation. This frustration Emily also links 
to the fact that not only did the nephew lose out on a liver transplant, but she also later 
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discovered that a young baby of compatible blood group to the potential donor was on the 
super-urgent waiting list for a liver74.  
The disgruntlement over the husband’s decision was not confined to Emily. She recounts 
how it caused continued consternation amongst Hillview’s Intensive Care staff: 
But, so [louder] since then that has caused, as I say...discussion: a lot of 
discussion amongst the staff and not necessarily, you know, nice discussion 
should we say. Because you can imagine sort of like what people are saying. 
(Emily, donation nurse at Hillview)  
The negative discussion over the outcome of this case can be mapped to the way in which 
‘BME’ groups have been handed responsibility by policy, research, and public campaigns to 
solve ‘BME’ transplant inequalities by donating more organs, as described in chapter 1. In 
this example, staff frustration at the ‘Asian’ family’s eventual refusal to donate is traced to 
their obligation to donate for the sake of various parties. These include not only the donor’s 
nephew and the baby in need of an urgent liver transplant, but also the potential for 
Hillview to generate more ‘Asian’ organ donors – which we witness with Emily’s excitement 
at the husband’s interest in donation. In contrast, the husband’s perceived responsibility 
towards Islam, and his bringing of the Mullah into the process, seemingly undermines these 
constructed responsibilities.  
This frustration over the husband’s eventual decision I also understand through the HTA’s 
standardised package (Fujimura, 1992) of who makes up a qualifying relation in organ 
donation, described earlier. The often described extended family involvement in ‘BME’ 
donation decisions contrasts with the neat notion of family, delineated in the HTA’s consent 
hierarchy. The way in which ‘BME’ families were constructed by health professionals as a 
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 The super-urgent list is made up of patients who will die within a few days without a transplant. 
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difficult group for donation negotiations can therefore be connected to normative notions 
of what constitutes a family – and thus a donation decision-maker.  
In the traditional Anglo-European context the family takes the form of biological, bilateral 
relations (Strathern, 1992; Featherstone et al., 2006; Gibbon, 2011). Here the notion of 
family is constituted by blood relations on both the mother’s and father’s side, with 
relatedness assigned by degree from this central point, i.e. sibling, aunt etc. That ‘BME’ 
families’ decision-making around donation involved various individuals – not necessarily 
understood to be family members (in the traditional sense) of the deceased – problematises 
the standardised notion of what makes up a family, and thus who can act as key donation 
decision-makers. In a similar way, Shih et al’s. (2001) study of donor families in Taiwan 
showed how the collective process of donation decision-making by Taiwanese extended 
families was not represented by consent procedures and forms; which only recognised the 
legal next of kin – the spouse – as the sole consent provider, and thus decision-maker, for 
donation.  
In stories of the complex negotiations by differently involved decision-makers in ‘BME’ 
donation scenarios, we see the problem of viewing consent as a product of individual 
decision-making. Firstly, the notion of family is understood as fundamental to the donation 
process, in that donation nurses and other health professionals must involve various family 
members in their negotiations around donation. However, secondly, this concept of the 
family was often made problematic in encounters with ‘BME’ families. These families were 
often described as differing from the normative family unit: in their drawing on different 
resources – beyond family and into ‘community’ and religion – to make donation decisions. 
This was thirdly perceived to have an impact upon health professionals’ ability to facilitate 
decision-making.  
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As Bowker and Star remind us in their work on classification and its consequences, 
categories, such as the ‘‘BME’ family’ act as boundary objects. These “are able to both travel 
across borders and maintain some kind of constant identity” (1999:15-16). In organ 
donation, the notion of family gets differently constituted in the interaction of variously 
involved individuals (family in practice) with the classificatory norms of the HTA (family in 
theory). In this way, the ‘‘BME’ family’ was differentiated from the normative notion of what 
a family should be in organ donation. This differentiation meant that they were perceived to 
present particular problems for donation request, and were seen as an innate barrier for 
successful donation negotiations and thus in need of careful management. In addition, as I 
go on to describe below, a small number of stories conveyed how standardised notions of 
the family may lead to queries over the legitimacy of ‘BME’ families’ responses to donation 
requests.    
Questioning the legitimacy of donation decisions  
I was directed to interview Megan, one of the more inexperienced donation nurses with 
team 2, after her team leader told me that she had an interesting case for my study. During 
her interview, Megan recounted how she was called to an Intensive Care ward to request 
the donation of a young ‘African-Caribbean’75 man who had experienced, as she explained, a 
“lifetime of illness”. The man’s family had been informed of his death and checks revealed 
he had registered as a donor, as part of his driving licence application, a few years earlier. 
The family had been told Megan would be coming to talk to them about donation, however, 
upon her arrival she was informed that they were not yet ready to speak with her. Megan 
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 Going through this man’s case notes after our interview, Megan later realised that this man was actually 
from Africa. She had categorised him as ‘African-Caribbean’ without knowing his heritage, showing the 
contingencies of how individuals get assigned to ethnic identity categories by health professionals (Ahmad, 
1993). 
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then waited a number of hours to talk with the potential donor family, during which time 
she started her own investigations of the situation: 
The sister in charge of the unit that day, she approached me and said that there 
was a letter for me that she was quite confused about. Erm...now the nurse at 
the bedside, [who] had been involved with the family, she had said that when 
the patient’s wife was on her own at his bedside, that they’d talked quite freely 
about a lot of things: about her husband and his illness. But whenever the rest of 
the family were there she didn’t seem to have a voice, she was very quiet. As I 
say, this letter was presented to me from just the family in general, and it said 
that they understood their relative was on the organ donor register. However, 
they felt that it [donation] was against their cultural beliefs, and that he should 
remain whole and shouldn’t donate any organs. (Megan, donation nurse for 
team 2) 
Megan here questions the position of the potential donor’s wife by her understanding that 
she – deduced from the description given by the patient’s nurse – occupies a passive 
position within the family. She then describes the letter, written by the family and handed 
to her by the Sister on the unit. In this, the family outline their, as she describes “cultural” 
reasons for refusing donation: wanting their relative to remain intact, alongside their, as she 
later describes, understanding that their relative had changed his mind about being on the 
donor register. For Megan, this was a tricky position to be put in, since, according to her 
records, the patient had registered his wish to donate. Megan goes on to describe this case 
as a problem to be solved: did the potential donor really change his mind on donation? And 
did the family have the right to refuse donation on his behalf? Her questioning of the 
validity of the family’s decision continues with her description – gathered again from the 
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treating nurse – of how the patient’s wife was unaware that her husband was even on the 
donor register: 
And she [wife to the nurse] actually said ‘we’ve never talked about organ 
donation.’ And yet in the letter it said that the conversations they’d had had 
been with her. So...being someone of relatively new experience I’d never 
encountered anything like that before. But [...] I didn’t feel like I just wanted to 
walk away. Because I did feel that his wishes were that he wanted to donate his 
organs. (Megan, donation nurse for team 2) 
This conviction that the patient would have wanted to donate his organs, Megan goes on to 
reference around her belief that his ongoing illness and routine hospital admissions meant 
he would have known what he was doing when he joined the donor register. She explains: 
“he knew about hospitals, he knew what illness was about”. With this understanding, along 
with the knowledge that the wife was not even aware of his being on the register, she finds 
herself disbelieving of the family’s claim that the patient had since changed his mind on 
donation. Megan here makes a value judgement on this family, implicitly categorising their 
decision, and, in turn, the family themselves, as troublesome for her practice. Determined 
to try and find out more about the situation, Megan asks the treating nurse to tell the family 
that she wanted to speak with them. As she then describes, her encounter with the 
potential donor’s brother and wife leaves her further convinced that the family’s decision 
did not fully represent the wishes of the donor:   
So I was approached by the brother and the patient’s wife. And the brother 
immediately said, ‘I don’t know why you want to talk to us. We’ve already said 
we don’t want to do this.’ So I just said to him ‘I understand, I’ve read your 
letter. Thank you for thinking about it.’ And I just said that ‘I have to also make 
sure that you understand that from my point of view that was his last recorded 
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wishes [to donate], and that we have to try and fulfil that. But if you know of 
otherwise.’ Then he [brother] said to the patient’s wife: ‘He spoke to you and 
said he didn’t want to do it didn’t he?’ And she nodded. But she had already told 
the nurse at the bedside that they’d never spoke about organ donation. So, I 
couldn’t say any more. If I said any more it would have looked like I was 
harassing them. (Megan, donation nurse for team 2)  
In this case we see how the formalised (HTA) hierarchies concerning who can legally provide 
consent for donation have weight, when a family seemingly makes a decision which does 
not conform to these standards. Megan explains how she described her responsibility to 
fulfil the last recorded wishes of the patient to his family. Since the patient was on the 
donor register, Megan had the legal right to proceed with donation. However, she goes 
through the usual practice of seeking agreement from the family. This agreement, according 
to the HTA hierarchy, would usually fall to the donor’s wife. However, the letter, describing 
the family’s collective decision and Megan’s puzzlement over the wife’s position 
complicates her ability to ascertain who has made the decision to refuse. She conveys the 
brother’s confrontational introduction: “I don’t know why you want to talk to us” to imply 
that it was the brother, rather than the wife, who was directing the donation refusal. This 
she emphasises by contrasting the wife’s agreement to the brother’s assertion that the 
patient had changed his mind on donation, with her knowledge of the wife’s ignorance of 
her husband’s donor registration.  With this, Megan calls into question the negative 
outcome of this case. 
Megan’s narrative here demonstrates the questions which get asked in practice about who 
is qualified to make a decision on donation. Similar to the way in which ‘BME’ families are 
constructed as a problem for donation negotiations, when their decision-making processes 
fail to conform to standardised notions of consent, the legitimacy of their donation 
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decisions are called into question. In addition, Megan conveys how she did all she could to 
facilitate a decision from the wife – the most appropriate relation to provide consent, 
according to the HTA. This illustrates how donation practice is also responsive to the norms 
and standardised definitions of ‘family’ (Crowley Matoka, 2005), as laid out in the HTA’s 
consent hierarchy. With the above example, we also see, from Featherstone et al. (2006) 
how the family – as decision-makers in organ donation – is far from a “naturally given 
entity” (p. 25) which can be neatly mapped to formal (legal) and biological (scientific) 
notions of relatedness. Instead, relations, and thus the practice of decision-making are 
produced “through the everyday practical work of mutual recognition and interaction” 
(Featherstone et al., 2006: 54; see also Franklin, 2001). For Megan therefore, her ideas 
about how and by whom a donation decision should be made are thrown into relief in the 
encounter with a family who do not conform to these norms (Agar, 2006). 
In this way, the standardised idea of family interacts with health professionals’ 
understanding of donation outcomes, and, in turn, their donation practices around ‘BME’ 
families. This also leads to the implicit categorisation of the ‘’BME’ family’ as a problem for 
donation negotiations, as demonstrated by the example of the consultant who limited the 
number of family members in his discussions. As such, and as I draw out below, I argue that 
the ‘BME’ family do not simply present a problem for health professionals in organ donation 
because they are a problem, but that they become constructed as a problem by the 
bureaucratic norms upon which the donation process, and routine ways of working in 
Intensive Care, are premised. 
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Part 3. The ‘BME’ family as outsiders 
The previous two sections have demonstrated how standardised notions of consent for 
organ donation break down in practice with ‘BME’ families. This occurred firstly during 
discussions about a patient’s diagnosis of death between ICU staff and families, with ‘BME’ 
families’ refusal to accept medical decisions on death; and secondly during donation 
negotiations with ‘BME’ families – conceived as problematic for consent by virtue of their 
extended family set up and the diversity of actors involved in their donation decisions. In 
this way, ‘BME’ families came to be perceived as a particularly problematic group for the 
everyday processes which function as vital stages towards securing donation. The 
understanding that ‘BME’ families presented particular difficulties during the donation 
trajectory was not limited, however, to donation practice. In this section, I argue that 
conceptualisations of the ‘‘BME’ family’ as a problematic group in donation can be traced to 
wider portrayals of the disruption such families present for the routine work of Intensive 
Care medicine; upon which the procedures of donation are premised.   
Intensive care staff often discussed their interactions with ‘BME’ families in wider terms to 
the donation encounter. In my questions to ICU staff about their experiences of withdrawal 
of care with ‘BME’ families, I contextualised their struggles around donation with their 
depictions of the specific problems which ‘BME’, particularly ‘Muslim’ families posed for 
their routine medical work. Here, staff perceptions of large families with demands for 
information about their relative’s condition and certain needs around death – such as 
‘Muslim’ families’ requirements for the quick burial of their relative – were often contrasted 
with the behaviour of ‘white’ families in similar situations. In turn, the needs of ‘BME’ 
families were conveyed as inhibiting the ability of staff to carry out their usual 
responsibilities, such as facilitating legal requirements at the end of life. Such requirements 
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include the involvement of coroners after patient deaths in Intensive Care76 and the need 
for a post mortem on a patient, if a coroner cannot satisfactorily establish the cause of 
death. Coroner involvement also acts as a vital stage for organ donation, since in cases with 
coroner involvement, donation can only proceed with their permission. In situations where 
ICU staff called for a coroner and/or post mortem investigation on dead ‘Muslim’ patients, 
the families of the dead were described in terms which referenced their specific difficulties 
with these practices. These ‘difficulties’, however, were often based on staff presumptions 
about the specific needs of ‘Muslim’ families after death: needs made problematic by their 
comparison with the perceived needs of ‘white’ families.   
One consultant at Hillview, Matthew, described a case where a ‘Muslim’ family became 
distressed when their relative died on a Friday, meaning he struggled to get hold of the 
coroner until after the weekend77. This delayed his ability to issue a death certificate, and 
therefore release the body to the family. Matthew described the family’s distress, however, 
in terms of their specific need for a quick funeral, remarking: “Asian families tend to want 
everything done before sunset don’t they?” This disparaging remark has the effect of firstly 
stereotyping ‘Asian’ families through homogenising notions of their ‘culture’ around death, 
and secondly, reducing their distress to a technicality of their relative’s body being released. 
By conceptualising the behaviour of ‘Asian’ (specifically ‘Muslim’) families in this way, they 
became constructed as a uniform, problematic group for Intensive Care practitioners, as the 
example below further demonstrates.   
Ketu, a PICU consultant at Lakeland, described his general experience of dealing with 
‘Muslim’ families in his routine care of patients and the requirements involved after death: 
                                                          
76
 See chapter 3 for an explanation of the circumstances under which a coroner must investigate a death. 
77
 Weekends were described as particularly slow times for releasing a body, since even coroners have 
weekends! 
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It [in the case of ‘Muslim’ families] does potentially cause a problem for us in 
simple things like who actually comes in and visits the patient, as opposed to 
having twenty people on the corridor of the Intensive Care Unit, or everybody 
wanting to come and everybody wailing when a child’s care is being withdrawn. 
To also the fact that they’re [Muslim families] very keen on having access to the 
child far more so than other families. I mean I’ll give you an example, there was 
a child post-operative surgical patient [who] had lots of problems, Caucasian 
parents, and the child died over the weekend on a Saturday or Sunday. And 
wasn’t amenable to organ donation, but I remember specifically saying to Mum 
and Dad, ‘obviously I’m going to have to speak to the coroner before I can issue 
a death certificate and release the body. And I’ll try very hard to get hold of the 
coroner on Saturday. I can’t promise you anything, it might be Monday’. And 
Mum turned round to me and said, ‘It doesn’t really matter ‘cause she’s gone 
now.’ Whereas Muslim families, my own personal perception, and I’m sure most 
of my colleagues will agree. [....] so one Muslim family I was involved with, 
similar sort of age child, they kept on ringing me every hour on the Unit. The 
nurses were very good at shielding me because I couldn’t do anything until I’d 
spoken to the coroner, and I couldn’t get hold of the coroner. And the family 
were ringing every hour to ask ‘has Ketu spoken to the coroner? Has the body 
been released?’ And that puts a huge amount of pressure on us I think as well. 
(Ketu, PICU consultant at Lakeland) 
Here, ‘Muslim’ families are framed as a problem in the specific context of Ketu’s routine, 
pressured work as a PICU doctor. He positions their needs as overly-demanding, 
demonstrated by his descriptions of their disruptive presence on the ward: large numbers of 
people making a lot of noise, and their requirement for greater access to their relative than 
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he considers usual. In describing his contrasting experience with families after the death of a 
‘white’ patient, compared to that of a ‘Muslim’ one, he affirms his point of the specific 
difficulty ‘Muslim’ families present for his job. He describes the ‘Caucasian’ family’s lack of 
upset when he tells them that their child’s body will not likely be released until after the 
weekend. This he then compares with an example of a ‘Muslim’ family in similar 
circumstances. In contrast to the ‘Caucasian’ family, the ‘Muslim’ family are perceived as 
difficult because of their demands for the body to be released as soon as possible. He 
describes being called every hour, and being “shielded” from the family by nurses, 
conveying the pressure he felt such actions put him under, and his powerlessness to do 
anything further until speaking with the coroner.  
In Ketu’s detailing of two family scenarios, we see how ‘Muslim’ families get specifically 
derived through their comparison with ‘Caucasian’ families; positioned as the unproblematic 
norm. Whilst ‘white’ families allow for routine bureaucracies around death, which, as one 
nurse described, were tied to the usual practice of having a funeral one week after death, 
the needs of ‘Muslim’ families were described as placing specific demands upon health 
professionals at the time of death. Moreover, by referring to ‘Muslim’ families as “they”, 
Ketu, like Matthew, composes them as an aggregate, with certain – assumed – ‘cultural’ 
characteristics, which throw up problems for his everyday work. Medical literature on death 
and dying practices of minority ethnic groups similarly tends to present descriptions of their 
requirements around death according to religious and ‘cultural’ traditions. For example, 
Gatrad (1994) describes ‘Muslims’ in terms of their requirement for a burial before 
sundown, and their preference to die in their own homes; and Gupta (2011: 254) talks 
about the ‘Hindu’ requirement for “a basil leaf, ghee and piece of gold” to be placed in the 
mouth to fulfil the need for wealth and food in the afterlife. In this way, I argue that ‘BME’ 
families are produced as a specific problem in their differentiation from the norms of 
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practice and behaviour around death in the UK context. This not only has the effect of 
homogenising the individual status of minority ethnic families (Bowler, 1993; Atkin et al., 
1998), but also produces them as outsiders to, and deviant from, medical norms, and thus as 
problematic populations (Becker, 1963). 
For Howard Becker (1963), the notion of the outsider – such as the ‘‘BME’ family’ in organ 
donation – comes about when people or groups break with understood norms of behaviour. 
Such rules include those which are “formally enacted into law” (Becker, 1963: 2), which, in 
our case, includes coroner involvement at death. These rules define the standards of 
behaviour in certain contexts, like the agreement to allow a deceased relative to be subject 
to post-mortem, and compliance with the rules of an Intensive Care ward, such as the 
restriction on the number of visitors to a patient. People are therefore defined as deviant 
when their actions are viewed as breaking with normative rules. Since certain – ‘Muslim’ – 
families were experienced as difficult in relation to the norms of Intensive Care medicine, 
they became conceptualised as problematic. According to Becker, this outsider status is a 
process by which people are labelled as different, rather than an inherent “quality of the act 
the person commits” (1963: 9). The status of ‘BME’ families as a problem for organ donation 
practice specifically, and Intensive Care medicine generally, can therefore be understood as 
not so much of a given (they are not innately a problem), but as a result of the difference 
created in the interactions between ‘BME’ families and the norms and infrastructures of 
Intensive Care medicine (Becker, 1963; Agar, 2006; Star and Lampland, 2009).  
In Ketu’s story we glimpse the production of this difference in his description of the 
difficulties with getting hold of a coroner in the case of both the ‘white’ and ‘Muslim’ family, 
and his expectation that families will wait for this process to happen. With this we see the 
assumptions which guide the work of ICU practitioners: that legal authorities, and hence the 
Intensive Care ward, has the right, over a family, to retain a body for further investigation. 
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This throws into relief the expectations about how things should work around death, 
highlighting the artificial construction of the category of the ‘‘BME’ family’ as a problematic 
group.   
Elizabeth Moran, an experienced PICU nurse at Lakeland, was the only participant who 
actively made these assumptions visible, in her insider critique of the clinical ‘culture’ of ICU 
medicine. For Elizabeth, rather than characterising ‘Muslim’ families as inherently 
problematic for her work as a nurse, she described the bureaucracies required by medicine 
and the law – death certificates, post mortem, and coroner examinations – as inhibiting the 
needs of families: 
The difficulty is if a [Muslim] child’s going for a PM [post-mortem]...that they’re 
[family] not going to be able to bury that child in 24 hours. They can’t get the 
child out and it’s like we’re saying to them: we completely respect your religious 
beliefs and what you want to do, but you can’t have your child back because 
we’re going to do a PM and that’s a legal requirement. So the law doesn’t 
actually respect that. [....] [and] when it becomes a coroner’s case, which seems 
to happen more and more often now [...] and it seems a lot more complicated 
and a lot more time consuming now, there’s a lot more times recently that we 
haven’t been able to get children home or to the mosque before sundown. 
There was one family with a newborn baby who’d been sent over from another 
hospital. He [baby] was going to die with an incurable condition. So we withdrew 
treatment and then the coroner agreed that because of the diagnosis, which 
was confirmed, the family could go. But then trying to sort out the red tape to 
get this poor baby back to their town was just a nightmare, because they had to 
register the death over here. Of course they’ve not even registered the birth yet, 
so we had to get dad in a taxi to the registrars, then we helped mum to do 
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everything she wanted to do with the baby and then we had to get the funeral 
directors over from their town and it was...it just seemed to take so long. It’s just 
dead frustrating really. (Elizabeth, PICU nurse at Lakeland) 
In Elizabeth’s highly reflexive account she is less focused on the difficulty of ‘Muslim’ death 
practices (i.e. that their needs inhibit her ability to do her job properly), and more on how 
medical and legal bureaucracies prevent families’ needs being met. She goes so far as to say 
that such processes do not “respect” the needs of certain population groups. In addition, 
revealing her own position in such situations, Elizabeth conveys her own frustration with 
these normative procedures around death. This disquiet is produced in the tension between 
trying to care for recently bereaved families and having to meet the legal requirements to 
release a body. She therefore highlights the assumptions behind standard practices, such as 
coroner involvement after death, which presume a family’s acceptance of the bureaucratic 
processes which legally construct a dead body for burial.  
Here we are given an alternative understanding to the commonly described ‘problem’ of 
‘BME’ families in organ donation. This being that the norms and bureaucracies of Intensive 
Care medicine produce the problematic status of the ‘‘BME’ family’. Importantly, these 
standardised practices, like coroner involvement after death, and the limitation of visitor 
numbers to a patient’s bedside, also background the procedures of organ donation. That the 
standards of Intensive Care medicine form the rules upon which organ donation is 
predicated also has implications for the production of power relations in donation 
encounters (Becker, 1963). According to Foucault, the “systems of relations that are 
established between” elements such as laws, institutions (hospitals etc), and people are 
“always inscribed in a play of power” (1980: 196), since they simultaneously construct the 
norms of discourse, relating to, for example ‘the family’. In this way, the systems in place 
around death and donation in medical institutions not only impact upon the individual 
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experiences of families (Star, 1991; Star and Lampland, 2009), but also construct a 
normalising benchmark upon which families are interpreted and differentiated (Foucault, 
1977: 184; Martin, 2005).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have called into question public and policy representations of what consent 
for organ donation entails, and shown how these break down in encounters with ‘BME’ 
families. As demonstrated, donation refusals can be traced beyond the assumptions made, 
in research and policy, about the unwillingness of ‘BME’ populations to donate their organs. 
Alternatively, donation refusal – and thus consent – can be linked to the struggles between 
health professionals and ‘BME’ families to come to a shared understanding of the death of a 
patient. Donation success is thus premised upon families accepting the medical diagnosis of 
the death or dying status of their relative; an acceptance fostered by the negotiations of 
medical staff to legitimate their decisions to families. In addition, this process illuminates 
wider issues around the moral status assigned to the practice of withdrawing care on dying 
patients, and the place of religion in death: in the challenge by religious figures to the 
authority of medical decisions on death.  
Moreover, ‘BME’ families were not just viewed as problematic in death diagnoses, but were 
also produced as a problematic category in relation to the standardised understanding of 
who has the right to act as a decision-maker and consent-giver in donation. This relies upon 
the delineation of what the normative family is  – a small and thus manageable unit – which 
backgrounds the HTA’s hierarchy of consent. Norms such as these therefore underpin firstly, 
the troublesome status ascribed to ‘BME’ families in donation negotiations; and secondly, 
the way in which their donation decisions – described as an outcome of various actors 
encompassing immediate and extended family, and religious figures – were called into 
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question. In this way, we see how donation practice is responsive to the norms and 
standards of donation procedures. In turn, this contributes to the way in which certain 
populations, such as ‘Muslim’ families, are viewed as disruptive to, and in need of careful 
management during donation negotiations.  
When families did not conform to the definitions upon which they are supposed to act 
within donation contexts, they became viewed as problematic groups. The ‘’BME’ family’ 
are thereby constructed as an issue for donation consent when they fall outside of 
classificatory norms relating to the ‘family’, and fail to conform to the routine practices 
around death in Intensive Care medicine – which buttress the procedures of organ 
donation. In the next chapter, I develop the theme of consent by examining the work done 
to obtain formal consent for organ donation from families. As I will show, this is a stage 
which, whilst vital for making donation happen, also worryingly reproduces the ‘problem’ of 
ethnicity in organ donation.  
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Chapter 6. Consent Practices and the (Re)production 
of Ethnicity in Organ Donation 
Introduction 
In the preceding results chapters I have demonstrated how the ‘problem’ of low donor rates 
in minority ethnic populations goes beyond the presumed ‘cultural’ barriers which ‘BME’ 
‘communities’ present for organ donation. Instead, I have traced the ‘problem’ into the 
organ donation encounter, and the procedures, practices, and decisions of health 
professionals who make donation possible. I also evidenced the way in which ‘BME’ 
donation refusals are related to the difficulties involved in negotiating death diagnoses and 
donation requests with ‘BME’ families. Getting through these stages are vital if a family is to 
provide their formal consent for organ donation. It is this process of gaining ‘valid’ consent 
from a family with which this chapter  takes up, in 2 parts.  
In the first part of this chapter I focus upon the procedures and practices involved in taking 
formal consent for donation from potential donor families. This involves the donation nurse 
taking the family of the deceased through a series of forms, conveying information about 
what, exactly, they are consenting for, and gathering a medical and social history of the 
potential donor, to assess the suitability of their organs for transplant. Using examples of 
this process, I show that the ability to secure consent from a family is contingent upon the 
work of the donation nurse: in their adaptation of formal forms and procedures around the 
perceived needs of recently bereaved families. As such, I argue that consent for donation 
can be considered a precarious process; dependent upon the interpretative practices of the 
donation nurse and their ability to balance families’ needs with the legal requirements for 
consent.  
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However, in part 2, I also highlight the problematic nature of this interpretative process. 
This occurs when the practices of the donation nurse turn upon preconceived notions of the 
characteristics of ‘BME’ potential donors and their families. Here, I argue that the work 
which gets done around consent by the donation nurse – and other health professionals – 
actively constructs ethnicity as a problem, thereby reproducing the assumptions originally 
created in transplant policy, research, and health promotion responses to the ‘BME’ donor 
‘problem’. This leads me to finally argue that the ‘problem’ of ethnicity in organ donation is 
as much about the assumptions which get made around ethnicity and their interaction with 
donation practice, as they are about families simply refusing the request to donate their 
relative’s organs.  
 
Part 1. Formal requests, informal practices: producing donation consent  
During my participation in an organ donation “simulation day” for Intensive Care and 
Accident and Emergency (A&E) nurses – the purpose of which was to train the nurses in the 
procedures of donation – I observed a role play, which demonstrated how donation consent 
is done with families: 
The day is taken by a group of donation nurses from team 2, who guide their 
audience through each and every part of the donation trajectory, using an 
interactively-designed training package. In the afternoon there is a session on 
approaching a family for consent. The donation nurse taking this session begins 
by outlining the consent process for her audience by relaying the standard 
Verble and Worth78 training they now all receive in requesting donation and 
obtaining formal consent from a family. She conveys to her audience how this 
                                                          
78
 See chapter 3 for a further explanation of the donation nurses’ Verble and Worth training. 
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training instructs them to look out for non-verbal cues from a family that would 
indicate any discomfort, and how they, in turn, are told to adopt a relaxed 
posture to put a family at ease during the process. Demonstrating this posture, 
the nurse asserts: ‘we’re taught to sit forwards, legs slightly apart, palms up.’ 
There is much laughter from the group as she performs an exaggerated form of 
this pose; looking like some type of sexual offering is taking place. ‘Can you 
imagine?!’ she exclaims, making fun of the standardised version of what a 
relaxed posture should look like.  
Furthering this parody of their training, the donation nurse then describes to her 
audience how they are told not to touch family members during their 
interaction. She goes on to relate her position on this rule, stating: ‘I’m quite 
touchy feely. I won’t give them a snog or anything, but if they want to give me a 
hug I’m not going to say no’. She then, more seriously, explains their acute 
awareness of everything they do during the consent process, since, as she puts 
it: ‘we have it drummed down our throats’. Another donation nurse pipes up, 
expressing her opinion on the importance of being able to negotiate their formal 
training to ensure each case is dealt with according to the situation. ‘You’ve 
gotta use it as you feel appropriate’ she explains.  (Fieldnotes, February 2011) 
This part of chapter 6 is about the practice of taking formal consent for organ donation, and 
how consent guidelines get adapted by donation nurses in their everyday work. In the above 
example we see that the training which donation nurses receive in taking consent, and the 
standards this imparts – such as exactly how they should act around a family during the 
process – are not necessarily adhered to in practice. Here, the donation nurse takes her 
audience of ICU and A&E nurses through the consent procedure by initially parodying her 
own consent training. For example, she uses comedic effect to demonstrate the absurdity of 
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not being able to touch a distressed family who have just lost their relative. Instead, she and 
her colleague convey how, rather than simply fulfilling standardised consent procedures – 
such as not obliging the request for a hug from a family because it goes against what they 
are taught is appropriate – they use their knowledge of procedure to adapt their practice to 
different situations.  
Taking formal informed consent for organ donation from a family is a complex process for 
the donation nurse. They are tasked with ensuring that the needs of the recently bereaved 
are met, whilst balancing these alongside the requirements of legal consent. To do consent 
the donation nurse must draw upon a vast range of: resources, skills, recognised standards 
and procedures, training, information, and experiential, embodied – by which I mean tacit – 
knowledge and caring practices (e.g. Berg, 1996; Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Singleton, 
2010). As I go on to demonstrate, consent is an interactional process, involving the donation 
nurse’s adaptation of procedure around their interpretation of a family’s characteristics, 
behaviour, and thus needs. By moulding consent to each situation, donation nurses also 
ensure that it gets done, and the act of procuring organs from a donor can thus take place. 
The way in which consent is done for deceased organ donation was formalised with the 
introduction of the Human Tissue Act (HTA) in 2004, and its later Codes of Practice for the 
Donation of Solid Organs for Transplant (2009a) and Consent (2009b). These lay out “how 
the law should be applied to consent for the removal of tissue, including organs, from the 
deceased” (2009a: para. 94). To take consent, donation nurses must draw on these codes in 
addition to further standards, encompassing UK Transplant’s (2004a) Donor Family Care 
Policy79 and the Verble and Worth consent training, described above.  
                                                          
79
 This includes a step-by-step table which outlines the stages for the ‘family interview’, including the initial 
request for donation through to the forms of information which must be provided to the family, and the 
process for doing a social and medical assessment of the donor. 
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The Human Tissue Act was brought into force in 2006 after the UK organ retention scandal, 
which came to public attention in 1999. As discussed in chapter 3, this found that tissues 
and organs were being procured and used in research without proper consent, after the 
post mortems of deceased patients at Alder Hey Children’s Hospital and the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary. During the inquiry it emerged that the ambiguous framing of consent as “lack of 
objection” in the previous (1961) Act, along with the “evasive and paternalistic attitudes 
towards bereaved parents” had contributed towards the “violations” of medical authority 
(Buchner and Vinci, 2001: 309; Hunter, 2001). The focus of the new HTA is therefore upon 
ensuring that donation consent is informed and valid. This is manifested in its conception of 
consent as a process, with the onus on transparency. This means that information needs to 
be provided to a family throughout the donation trajectory, rather than just during the 
procedure to obtain their signature on the consent form (DH, 2005). The implication here is 
that the accumulated provision of knowledge about donation leads up to an informed 
decision by a family to consent to, or refuse, the donation request. Informed consent is 
therefore positioned as a linear, stable process. As we will see, however, it is far from 
straightforward in practice.  
In everyday donation encounters, formal consent is a lengthy process, with the donation 
nurse at the centre of proceedings. The donation nurse is responsible for ensuring that all 
aspects of consent are covered, and that the needs of differently involved constituents are 
met. This includes, for example, ensuring the coroner, if involved, is provided with all 
necessary detail about a potential donor to make a decision on whether donation can take 
place; and keeping the potential donor family informed about such activities along the way. 
Obtaining consent from a family for organ donation usually takes place face-to-face in a 
private space (UKT, 2004a). This most often occurs in the Intensive Care ‘family interview 
room’; designed for sensitive conversations between families and treating health 
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professionals (these rooms I described chapter 5). These formal spaces of request are 
reflected in the consent procedure, where, once a family have initially agreed to donation80, 
the donation nurse will guide them through the process of formal, written consent81. This 
involves what is known in the Verble and Worth training, as the ‘ladder of information of 
consent’. Here, the family are involved in the completion of a standard five-page consent 
form (see fig. 6 for an example page of this form), where each organ/any tissues to be 
donated need to be consented for.  
With the onus on informed consent the donation nurse must also explain what is involved in 
the donation of each organ/tissues. This includes what implications the operation will have 
for the appearance of the donor’s body82; details of exactly what will be removed; the 
length of the donation process; along with the chance that the organs may be deemed not 
healthy enough for transplantation once they are removed (UKT 2004a). In addition, a 
patient assessment form (see fig. 7) is used to assess the donor’s social and medical history, 
to help rule out risk of HIV and Hepatitis transmission to transplant recipients. Questions on 
this form cover the potential donor’s illness history, along with more sensitive queries such 
as: “has [your relative] ever been given payment for sex with money or drugs?”  
 
 
                                                          
80
 This may be a quick decision, or may take hours, with the family being given time to discuss the “option” of 
donation – as described by the donation nurses – and ask questions of the donation nurse about the process. 
81
 Written consent is not actually a legal requirement for organ donation. For donation to be “valid”, the 
consent-giver must “understand what the activity involves and, where appropriate, what the risks are” (HTA, 
2009b: para. 32). The HTA outlines how written consent “serves as evidence of consent, but a signature on a 
form will not itself make the consent valid” (HTA, 2009b: para. 57). In practice, however, consent forms 
seemed to serve as the framework for taking a family through the process of gaining “valid” consent.  
82
 For example, if just the kidneys are donated, the wound on the donor’s body will be restricted to the 
abdomen. If the heart and lungs are consented for, the wound will be much larger and extend to the thorax. 
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Figure 7. Example pages from NHSBT’s Patient Assessment Form 
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Many donation nurses acknowledged the difficulty of completing these forms and fulfilling 
the requirements of informed consent in the context of distressed, shocked, and even angry 
families; recently told their relative was dead, or was to have their care withdrawn. One 
PICU nurse at Lakeland, Maria, who had previously worked as a donation nurse, went so far 
as to say that going through the consent forms with a family felt “barbaric”. For Maria, 
having to mechanically go through a long list of each and every organ with a family 
jeopardised not only consent itself, but also her relationship with families: 
Then you’d have to say, ‘a heart, would you donate his heart?’ and then you’d 
have to give reasons why somebody might want a heart transplant. And then 
you’d have to [...] move on to lungs and then it’d be liver, kidneys and you’d, it 
just seemed like a whole list and once you’d gone through the solid organs then 
you’d have to start on the tissues. [...] So you used to feel quite...as if you were 
just greedy really [...] and sometimes you’d think, Gosh they’re [family] going to 
turn round and say ‘No! Go away, there’ll be nothing left.’ And so that was 
quite...hard, sort of asking them, but trying to do it in a sensitive way so it didn’t 
seem as if you were asking for everything that they’d ever had. (Maria, PICU 
nurse at Lakeland) 
Often, I learnt, families would express their wish to not know any details of the donation 
procedure. This placed the donation nurse in the tricky position of balancing their care for 
the family with the legal responsibilities of consent. In addition, the process of completing 
the patient assessment form, where the intimate nature of asking about drug, alcohol and 
sexual history was understood as difficult for families, was seen as especially problematic. 
To make consent work then donation nurses developed their own strategies for getting 
through the forms and the informational requirements of consent, which I describe below.  
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Obtaining consent: adaptation and adjustment  
One of the ways in which consent with families was managed was by adapting, or tinkering 
with formal consent procedure (Timmermans and Berg, 1997; 2003; Sharp, 2006; 
Struhkamp et al., 2009; Singleton, 2010). This was to, as one donation nurse expressed, 
transform the “cold” process of form filling into a more “humanised” version; sensitive to 
the needs of potential donor families. Ellie, an experienced donation nurse, describes her 
own negotiation of the patient assessment forms:  
We have the same conversation with every single family, we have to. And they 
look very cold the forms. They’re black and white NHS written forms, [little 
laugh] you know. It’s very difficult to have a conversation with this sort of 
paperwork but what I try and do personally is put forms to one side and just try 
and have a chat, and you find that people will volunteer information much more 
easily than if you go to a tick box exercise. So I ask them [family] things like: ‘Did 
they [donor] go on holiday last year?’83 And, ‘where did they go?’ Because the 
instant you ask that, you know, that rules out the: ‘have you been to Africa?’ 
questions and, ‘were they alright when they came back? Did they have a bit of, 
you know, a funny tummy or?’; [family:] ‘Oh yeah they did. She wasn’t well 
when she came back.’ The family rumble you straight away. They know exactly 
what you’re doing. [....] And, you know, there’s a way of, way of doing it. If, for 
example, there’s a section about the sexual health and risk factor questions and 
they’re horrible questions: have you had sex with another man?”  
J: Like really intimate? 
                                                          
83
 One of the questions on the patient assessment forms asks whether the donor has travelled outside the UK 
in the last 12 months. This is to assess their potential for exposure to HIV and hepatitis infections if they had 
visited countries, such as South Africa, with high rates of these diseases. 
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E: Yeah. Really intimate questions. [....] So what I’ll sort of do is just say ‘there’s a 
little section here at the bottom. I’d like you to just read that, and go through it. 
If there’s anything you’d like to speak to me about afterwards then just come 
and grab me’. And you know we found out from one person that [....] [we] had a 
young girl who absolutely idolised her Dad. Wouldn’t hear a bad thing about 
him. And his brother actually grabbed my colleague and he [donor] had indulged 
in some quite high-risk behaviour, and his brother didn’t feel it was appropriate 
to discuss it because he knew the relationship the girl had [with her father]. 
(Ellie, donation nurse for team 1) 
Ellie here begins by describing the standardised nature of consent: “we have the same 
conversation with every single family”. However, this she contradicts with her explanation 
of her informal ways of working around the process. She does this to bring the coldness of 
the “black and white” forms into a more everyday format, receptive to the perceived needs 
of a bereaved family. By asking a family questions such as “did they [donor] go on holiday 
last year?”, rather than using the standard question on the patient assessment form, which 
asks: “Has your relative travelled outside the UK in the last 12 months?” Ellie removes the 
bureaucratic appearance of the consent and donor information gathering process. Instead, 
she provides formal information to, and gains formal information about the donor from the 
family, in an informal way. By incorporating the procedure into conversational form, Ellie 
transforms the standardised forms and thereby the process of consent itself, to make it 
work in practice. (Hogle, 1995; Timmermans and Berg, 1997; 2003; Struhkamp et al., 2009).  
In addition, Ellie conveys how this process has the potential to negatively interact with a 
family’s memory of their dead relative, with the story of the donor whose brother divulged 
his ‘risky’ lifestyle, out of earshot of his adoring daughter. Ellie’s lack of questions around 
the “behavioural risk” section of the assessment form leads paradoxically to the answers 
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she needs to assess the donor’s suitability. Here, her strategies are sufficiently developed 
from experience to get through the tricky, mundane, and potentially distressing consent 
forms, so as to progress towards procurement. The ability of the donation nurse to 
complete the reams of paperwork and information gathering needed for donation, whilst 
maintaining sensitivity towards the family, also attests to their tacit knowledge (Latimer et 
al., 2006; Singleton, 2010) of the consent process.  
Donation nurses therefore drew on diverse “communicative scripts” to adjust practice 
standards around their understanding of a family’s characteristics and needs (Rapp, 1999: 
63; Lutfey and Freese, 2007). In the same way that Singleton (1998) describes how workers 
in a cervical screening laboratory incorporated their diagnostic decisions with information 
about sample-givers’ identities, donation nurses integrate their understanding of potential 
donor families into their consent work. This involves assessing the amount of information a 
family may want or need – with one donation nurse describing a case with an ‘African 
Caribbean’ family, where the donor’s mother specifically asked not to be given a “list of 
things you’re taking” [referring to her daughter’s organs]. It also involves interpreting a 
family’s level of education; the relationship individual family members had with the donor – 
as we saw in Ellie’s description above; or reading their body language and taking regular 
breaks during the process, if a family seem tired or distressed.  
The Human Tissue Authority’s code of practice for consent (2009b) recognises the 
importance of such nuanced practice, stating the imperative for health professionals to: 
[...] tailor the information they provide to each specific situation, as some people 
may insist on in-depth detail, whereas others would prefer to consent having 
only had the basics of the procedure explained to them (HTA, 2009b: para.98).  
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Here, policy is in recognition, rather than in tension (as chapter 5 describes) with practice. 
The “authoritative centre” (Singleton, 2005: 775) of the HTA lays out the boundaries for 
manoeuvre, according to the situated judgement of practitioners during the consent 
procedure. 
Obtaining formal consent for organ donation therefore involves far more than getting an 
individual to place their signature on a form. It is a complex process, which depends upon 
the interpretative work of the donation nurse and their ability to transform formalised 
procedures within practice contexts. In his research on the work of doctors around medical 
records, Berg argues that the “organisational rules inscribed in [...] forms are constantly 
reinterpreted or overridden” (1996: 514) to deal with the contingencies of practice. Similarly 
Struhkamp et al. (2009: 57) name “doctoring” as the mode of performing and knowing in 
clinical contexts – where patient, and in our case, family situations, are far from clear cut. 
And Linda Hogle’s (1995) insights into how procurement professionals construct the viability 
of potential donors – by adapting standardised criteria for donor suitability according to 
their personal interpretations of a patient’s social history – also illustrates this process.  
For the donation nurses, consent guidelines operate as the framework for their practice, 
with their own interpretations brought to the fore in everyday interactions with families. As 
Fujimura tells us, “standardised packages are used as a dynamic interface to translate 
interests between social worlds” (1992: 168). In this way, donation nurses straddle the 
interface between the (legal) interests of medical consent and the needs of bereaved 
families through their interaction with consent procedures. As a result, a family’s initial 
decision on donation is fashioned into a formalised form, and is thus made stable (e.g. 
Callon, 1986) – by which I mean firm – enabling progression towards the actual organ 
procurement.  
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In Ellie’s example, we also see how her informal strategies for consent incorporate her own 
identity into the procedure. She describes how her everyday questions about potential 
donors are “rumbled” straight away by families, who realise they are not simply innocent 
queries but serve a specific purpose for the situation. This tells us that the informal 
strategies around consent are not simply done to meet the needs of families and secure 
their consent, but also to make the formal process of form-filling – described as “barbaric” 
by Maria – bearable for the donation nurses. As John, an experienced donation nurse for 
team 2 described: 
Even though we have like a Verble and Worth [way], we have a standard way 
and we have a spine of how we do things. We’ll all do stuff slightly differently 
because [of] how individually we might work and how we’re comfortable in 
doing it. (John, donation nurse for team 2) 
With John’s description of the different ways in which donation nurses work around 
consent, he imparts that this is also done for their own comfort. Similarly, Ellie and other 
donation nurses asserted the importance of not becoming too “robotic” during the consent 
process. This shows that their strategies ensure they also retain their own humanity during 
consent, allowing them, in turn, to make the best of the process for a family. However, as I 
show below, consent sometimes gets done by actively drawing on standard procedure, 
which, at the same time, highlights its problematic and precarious nature.  
The precarious process of consent: interpreting families  
In addition to their ability to informally work through consent with families, some donation 
nurses described how they actively drew on formal consent procedures to move the process 
forwards with families. This was especially so when it came to conveying certain aspects of 
the donation to families, and asking the more intimate questions on the patient assessment 
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form. Having to provide intricate details about donation and collect detailed personal 
information about a potential donor from grieving families is never easy, especially when 
family members express their desire to receive as little information as possible. To work 
through such difficulties, donation nurses sometimes actively imparted the standardised 
nature of the process to families. This was to rationalise their provision of information to 
families, and justify their requirement for intimate details about the donor’s lifestyle. 
However, as the example below illustrates, the use of procedure also reveals potential 
anxieties around consent and, at the same time, shows how consent practice is 
underpinned by certain assumptions which get made about donor families. 
Stephanie Welsh was less than one year into her role as a donation nurse when she was 
called to facilitate the donation of a young ‘Asian’ woman, who became brain stem dead 
after being admitted to Intensive Care. Narrating this case, Stephanie conveyed her initial 
nervousness at approaching the potential donor’s family because of their medical 
background – they were all doctors – and because they were ‘Asian’. Stephanie described 
her anguish upon realising, some way into taking consent with the family, that the 
information she had provided them had seemingly distressed the donor’s mother: 
I had gone through the standard information you need to tell the family for legal 
reasons and everything, and it was all going quite smoothly until we came to the 
discussion of appearances: funeral arrangements and that sort of thing. I said: ‘I 
need to say so much information for legal reasons, but how much detail do you 
want me to go into?’ She [mum] said ‘Well keep going until I tell you to, to stop.’ 
The conversation came to explaining the appearance of their daughter following 
bone donation, as the family wanted this to happen but I wasn’t convinced they 
knew exactly what they were giving consent for. I went into explaining how bone 
would be taken from the leg, and then mum got very very upset and...started 
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saying ‘I don’t want to know about that. It sounds like you’re mutilating her 
[donor]’. [So] I said, ‘I’m sorry, we’ll stop that train of thought for now.’ And in 
the end they did give consent and to the best of my ability they were informed 
about what they were giving consent to. But later on the mum approached me 
and said she wasn’t happy with the fact that I’d mentioned the appearance of 
their daughter after donation. However, that’s something that we have to say, 
but, in as much detail as the family are willing to hear really. But erm...saying 
that, maybe they didn’t need to know that much information. But at that point I 
didn’t know whether or not the family wanted a burial, whether or not it 
affected their chance to view. All these things matter. [....] Now, from 
experience...now dealing with more families, I ask them what their plans would 
be. Whether or not they planned for a cremation, did they plan for a burial of 
sorts; would you like a viewing because I can give you some more information 
about what to expect if you were to go and see them [donor]. That’s from 
experience. But this was my first time and I was shaking because of the fact that 
it was an Asian family – I’d never come into much contact with people from an 
ethnic minority background; the fact that I’d never done consent before in my 
life; and the fact that they were all medical background. (Stephanie, donation 
nurse for team 1) 
Stephanie’s account here relays her understanding that the mother of the potential donor 
had become distressed as a result of the information she provided to the family about bone 
donation. After asserting her legal responsibilities around consent – pre-empting any 
difficulties the family may have with the information she is about to provide them – 
Stephanie recalls checking how much detail the family might want to hear. With the 
mother’s apparent go ahead, she relays information about the procedure, including details 
248 
 
of bone donation. This she justifies by her understanding that the family might not have 
been totally aware of what they were consenting for. The reason for this being that bone 
donation results in a visible alteration of the appearance of the donor, since it involves the 
removal of bone from below the knees up to the hip joints, leaving stitching down the sides 
of the legs (UKT, 2004a). The mother’s upset at the detail of this procedure stops Stephanie 
in her tracks however. It leads her to reflect upon how she would have done the process 
differently today, in light of her further experience.  
At one level, Stephanie’s story illustrates the fine line donation nurses must walk between 
ensuring the legal conditions of consent for donation are met, whilst being acutely aware of 
how to appropriately meet these conditions in their interactions with individual families. 
With Stephanie’s desire to impart detailed information to the family – with her judgement 
that they might not have known what they were consenting for – this line is dismantled. 
Stephanie puts this down to her relative inexperience at the time. She explains how, as a 
result of this case, she has subsequently shifted her practice to ask certain questions of a 
family, like whether they would want to view the body after donation, prior to providing 
them with information. Here the formal process of consent is revealed as a precarious one, 
which has the potential to both make and unmake a family’s initial decision on donation. In 
the same way that donation decisions may be stabilised by the work of the donation nurse, 
they may also be destabilised during this process. Consent is therefore predicated upon the 
successful interaction of the donation nurse with families, and the capacity for a shared 
understanding around consent to be produced in the process (as I also argued is the case in 
communications around death, in chapter 5). Tell a family too little and the donation nurse 
risks failing the legal requirements of consent; leaving themselves open to accusations of 
malpractice. On the other side, giving too much information, or conveying it in the ‘wrong’ 
way, risks distressing a family further and jeopardising the donation.  
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As we learn from Timmermans and Berg (2003), the enactment of [consent] standards link 
donation nurses to wider public and legal concerns [around organ donation]. This is 
especially pertinent in the context of the legacy of the UK’s organ retention scandal. In 
Stephanie’s account we witness the collision between the legal forms of consent, her 
attempts to meet the needs of this family, and her personal anxiety over covering the 
requirements of consent. This anxiety, I speculate, may be linked to her knowledge of the 
public outcry over the organ retention scandal. Here, the bioethical imperatives of informed 
consent – acutely highlighted since the organ scandal and with the implementation of the 
2004 Human Tissue Act (Sheich Leith, 2007) – are revealed as potentially damaging in 
practice. The imperative to inform a family about all aspects of the donation is witnessed in 
Stephanie’s example as abstracted from everyday consent relations, such as relatives’ 
concerns over bodily wholeness (Sheich Leith, 2007). In addition, it has the potential to 
disrupt the relations between those giving and those taking consent (Corrigan, 2003), and 
therefore the consent process itself.  
At another level, Stephanie’s account also shows how the consent practices of donation 
nurses are sometimes driven by assumptions about potential donor families, in their 
attempts to make the process fit with a family’s anticipated needs.  As she later went on to 
explain, Stephanie perceived that the family’s medical background meant they were 
knowledgeable about the details she was giving them about donation. She described how 
the family would: “say something that made me understand that they knew what I was 
talking about from a medical point of view, in more detail than a lay person would have 
done”. Here, I argue that her understanding of the family’s medical knowledge partly 
underpinned her anxiety to impart such detail about the donation; with the implication that 
their medical status equated to a requirement for in-depth information. In addition, 
Stephanie explains how her nervousness during this case also stemmed from the family’s 
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‘Asian’ status, since, as she put it, she had “never come into much contact with people from 
an ethnic minority background”. She describes how she was unaware of their needs after 
death: whether they wanted to view their relative and have a burial after the donation, 
leading to her provision of the details about bone donation. At the same time, her lack of 
questions to the family about their needs also highlights her discomfort in taking consent 
from an ‘Asian’ family. This simultaneously reveals – as I go on to develop in part 2 – how 
preconceived ideas about ethnicity interact with the consent practices of health 
professionals.  
 
Part 2. Ethnicity and expectation: (re)producing the ‘BME’ donor  
The complex practice of securing donation consent from families was described as 
sometimes more difficult in the case of minority ethnic families, as the account of Ruth, a 
relatively new donation nurse, illustrates. 
Ruth was on call one evening when she was referred to a potential donor from a large 
hospital that, in her words, “does everything the right way round”84. The potential donor’s 
family, who Ruth describes as being “Hindu”85, were initially approached about donation by 
Intensive Care staff, after being given time to “absorb” the diagnosis that their daughter, 
whilst on a University night out, had sustained a “catastrophic brain injury”.  
However, what began as a well-laid out starting point for Ruth – with the patient also 
identified on the donor register – soon involves various problems, which end up delaying 
                                                          
84
 She is referring to the way that the hospital adheres to donation procedure, such as referring potential 
donors to the donation nurse team at the earliest opportunity. 
85
 I regrettably never asked Ruth how she knew the family were ‘Hindu’. She describes how the parents of the 
donor were originally from India and had lived in the UK for a number of years, yet I never found out whether 
their ‘Hindu’ status was from their own identification, or one she had assumed. 
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the eventual donation. Among the issues which crop up along the way, including a delay in 
being able to contact the coroner, Ruth also organises her account of this, as she describes, 
“difficult” donation experience, by placing the “very large” family of the potential donor at 
the centre of her narrative. This begins with her description of the family’s disbelief that 
their daughter was on the donor register. Ruth explains how she had to request a faxed 
copy of the woman’s registration from NHSBT before the family accepted this information; 
eventually indicating their willingness to donate.  
With the family’s initial agreement to donate, Ruth begins to take them through the process 
of formal consent. She discusses their specific difficulty with aspects of the patient 
assessment forms, which she evaluates by drawing on assumptions about the family’s 
‘Hindu’ faith. In contrast, Ruth interprets their decision to donate as a product of their faith:  
And the family wanted some time to discuss this [the donation], and then came 
back after half an hour to say, well yes, she was a giving person in life, it’s very 
fitting that she should be a giving person in death. And I think from reading the 
religious information about Hinduism, not that I’m any great expert, that 
basically this is their kind of take on donation. It’s about giving in life and giving 
in death, and that’s how their religion supports it. So they wanted to talk more 
about donation, so I said that I would go back in and bring the consent papers 
with me to go through with them. Which I did. It was a very very very long 
conversation, and the family had a lot of difficulties with a lot of the questions 
that were being asked. We do need in the patient assessment to ask about 
things such as erm habits really. Not just smoking: drinking, drug taking, sexual 
habits. Which obviously, I mean I think mum and dad thought that she was a girl 
who was living very much by the Hindu faith: didn’t drink, no sex before 
marriage etcetera. Erm, however, it seemed that she was leading quite a 
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westernised life really from some of the information that we did come across 
[Ruth later describes how one of the cousins told her the donor liked an 
“occasional drink”, and how her GP records revealed she had been prescribed 
the morning after pill]. Certainly the longest and most in-depth consent process I 
have ever done. Coupled with the family saying [puts on slightly irritated voice] ‘I 
can’t believe you need to ask all these questions. I can’t believe that you need to 
put us through all this [...]. Can we not just say yes or no?’ And explained about 
informed consent and why I need all this information. (Ruth, donation nurse for 
team 1) 
In her account, Ruth initially contemplates the family’s agreement to donate through their 
justification of their daughter’s generous character. This character she relates to her 
perception of the Hindu religion. Here, Ruth’s knowledge about Hinduism leads her to imply 
that the family’s decision to donate is a result of their Hindu faith. However, her 
understanding of their faith as a factor which initially aids her task of securing donation is in 
tension with her later description of the struggle the family had with the consent process. 
She describes the “very very very long conversation” (she estimated it lasted around 5 
hours) this involved, and emphasises the difficulty the family presented by questioning the 
relevance of the queries she was making about the donor. She imparts how the family 
became distressed with her queries from the patient assessment form about their relative’s 
sexual and substance use history. However, their upset she relates to the discrepancy she 
sees between the ‘Hindu’ status of the donor’s parents and the questions relating to their 
daughter’s lifestyle “habits”, like drinking alcohol – activities which she perceives as going 
against their ‘Hinduism’. She subsequently deals with their discomfort by relying on the 
standardised nature of the questions: utilising consent procedures as a “strategic resource” 
(Castel, 2009:743) to get through the “difficult” process. 
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The questions on the patient assessment form which ask about “habits” such as drinking 
and sexual activity, Ruth also implicitly relates to a “western” lifestyle. We see this with her 
explanation of her discovery of the donor’s “western life”: her drinking of alcohol and her 
medical records indicating she had taken the morning after pill. As Ruth later went on to 
explain, this, for her, meant the donor was not “leading a Hindu kind of lifestyle”. Ruth 
therefore assigns the family’s difficulty with the consent process, and thus the difficult 
consent process itself, to their ethnic (‘Hindu’) status. She projects her interpretations about 
the ‘Hindu’ faith on to the family, which, at the same time, turns them into an issue to be 
dealt with. This effaces any alternative understandings of the family’s upset during the 
process, such as the fact that being asked about your daughter’s sex life is not something 
many parents would wish to discuss, no matter what their ethnicity or faith! In so doing, 
Ruth also links the family’s religious identity to norms and rules (see chapter 5 also), rather 
than identities which are “negotiable and contingent” (Atkin et al., 2008: 77) upon broader 
contexts and everyday experiences, as recent work on the medical decision-making of 
families’ from faith backgrounds tells us (Atkin et al., 2008; Shaw, 2009). We therefore see 
how, as Stephanie’s story also illustrated, the interpretative process of consent also involves 
working from certain assumptions about the ethnicity of a potential donor family.  
Ruth then continued to describe further difficulties in this case, which ended up delaying the 
donation operation until the following morning. After finally completing consent with the 
family late in the evening, Ruth discovers that the consultants on the previous shift had 
been unable to get in touch with the coroner to gain permission for the donation to go 
ahead86. To Ruth’s chagrin, the ICU consultant in charge of the evening shift then refuses to 
contact the coroner, telling her that the approval – and thus the donation – would have to 
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 See chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation of coroner involvement in organ donation. 
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wait until the morning87. Ruth describes the family’s distress at finding out about the 
prospect of the operation being postponed, and subsequently tasks herself with gaining the 
necessary approvals. This involves her waking the coroner up at home and sending a police 
car round to the senior police officer’s house88 in the middle of the night, before she finally 
gains all the necessary, legal approvals for the donation. Here, as demonstrated in part 1, 
we witness consent for donation as a precarious and knotty process. As this case 
additionally shows, however, formal consent also involves other actors, beyond that of the 
potential donor family and the donation nurse. Even when a family’s legal consent has been 
documented, this far from secures a donation. As we see here, the donation nurse must 
ensure a family’s consent, and thus the donation itself, is made a reality by gaining the 
further consent of authority figures, such as the coroner. Consent is thus contingent not 
only upon the interactional process of form filling with families, but also on wider 
practicalities, such as being able to contact authority figures in time; a family’s preparedness 
to wait for further approvals; and, as I describe below, the clinical suitability of the 
deceased.  
Ruth describes it being the early hours of the morning when she discovers yet another 
complexity, which further interrupts the donation. With the return of the donor’s blood and 
urine test results89, Ruth discovers she has tested positive for pregnancy on a urine test90. 
                                                          
87
 See chapter 4 for my analysis of how clinical hierarchies affect the ability of the donation nurse to do their 
job properly. 
88
 The accidental circumstances of the donor’s death meant police permission was also necessary for the 
donation. In such circumstances, the police will only agree to donation if it is not seen to interfere with their 
investigations. 
89
 These are routine clinical tests which are used as one way of assessing the donor’s clinical suitability for 
donation, by ruling out the presence of transmittable diseases, such as HIV. 
90
 In the case of a potential donor being pregnant, this has implications for their clinical management and the 
donation itself. If the pregnancy is far enough advanced, attempts will be made to clinically manage the donor 
for a number of weeks or even months, to enable the baby to be delivered. Donation may be possible after 
this has occurred, or in the case of intrauterine foetus death (Esmaeilzadeh et al., 2010). 
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Horrified at the thought of breaking this news to the donor’s parents, and sure of her 
knowledge that brain stem death can lead to a surge of hormones which may indicate false 
pregnancy, Ruth sends for an emergency blood test to rule out the pregnancy:  
Basically we did this pregnancy test and it was...positive. [I was] like, Oh my God. 
And then I suddenly said to my colleague that was with me, ‘I’m sure, for some 
reason [...] that when you’re brain stem dead the surge of different hormones 
and things can give you a false positive pregnancy test.’. Erm..so I said [...] ‘I’m 
sure we need to do a blood test.’ So we organised an urgent blood test through 
the lab, and one of the student nurses on the unit like ran it down there. By this 
time the embedded donation nurses had arrived [to relieve Ruth, as she had 
been working through the night on this case] and the [organ] retrieval had been 
delayed because there was someone in the operating theatre. The surgical 
teams had all arrived [to carry out the retrieval] but someone was in theatre, 
which was kind of thankful because we had a reason to tell the family about the 
delay, [since] I didn’t want to tell them about this pregnancy thing until we got 
to the bottom of what was happening. (Ruth, donation nurse for team 1) 
Here, Ruth describes her relief at how a backlog of procedures in the operating theatre 
provided her with an alternative explanation for the family about their further wait for the 
donation to go ahead. However, when the GP records arrive, detailing the donor’s morning 
after pill prescription, the treating consultants decide they should tell the family about the 
pregnancy test before the blood tests return. This went against Ruth’s explicit request for 
them to wait for the test results. Ruth describes her frustration at this turn of events, which 
she could do little about with her shift coming to an end: 
Another donation nurse arrived with the policy, which basically says, although 
we’ve contested this, that you should say to a family: is there any chance that 
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your relative could be pregnant, because we’ll need to do a pregnancy test [if 
so]. But if the family say no they couldn’t be pregnant then you don’t do a 
pregnancy test. Now in this situation, if the donor had been pregnant her family 
would have said no, she couldn’t be pregnant anyway. [...] And then the blood 
tests came back negative, so the team had to tell the family [that] actually the 
pregnancy was a false positive. So the family were then fairly annoyed: it had 
been a smear on her [daughter’s] name really, and they were saying: ‘she 
wouldn’t have done that kind of thing, and you’ve said she’s pregnant and she’s 
not actually pregnant at all.’ (Ruth, donation nurse for team 1) 
In addition to witnessing Ruth’s powerlessness to assert her authority over the decisions of 
the consultants here91, we also see how her actions reproduce the problematic status which 
she has already assigned to this ‘Hindu’ family. Ruth impresses that she did everything she 
could to prevent the family from being told about their daughter’s possible pregnancy. This 
included: rushing through a blood test to the lab, asking the consultants to wait for the test 
results to return before speaking with the family, and contesting the hospital’s donation 
policy. According to Ruth, the policy of assessing the need for a pregnancy test, by asking a 
family about the likelihood of their relative being pregnant, would not have worked with the 
‘Hindu’ family in this case. In her view, they would have denied any possibility of their 
daughter being pregnant since, as Ruth saw it, they believed their daughter to be following a 
‘Hindu’ lifestyle.  
Ruth here gives the impression that her actions to prevent the family from discovering the 
potential pregnancy were linked to her understanding of their ‘Hindu’ identity. As I 
described earlier, this identity, for Ruth, turns upon ideas of a certain lifestyle, involving 
chastity before marriage and abstinence from alcohol. These characteristics Ruth constructs 
                                                          
91
 I discuss the lack of authority of the donation nurses as a general issue for donation in chapter 4. 
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as barriers in her attempts to secure donation consent – assigning the family’s struggle with 
the process to their ‘Hindu’ identity. With her attempts to delay their discovery of the 
pregnancy test results, we also see how her assumptions about the family’s ethnicity 
interact with her practice. As a result, I argue that Ruth simultaneously constructs and 
reproduces the problematic ‘ethnic’ status of the family through her consent and 
subsequent donation practices.  
With Ruth’s example we see the way in which reductive understandings of a family’s 
minority ethnic status become embodied – by which I refer to the concrete form given in 
practice – and enacted in the everyday consent work of the donation nurse. These 
reductions, however, did not just relate to the donation nurses’ practice. I was told time and 
again by the donation nurses that minority ethnic families were not as readily approached 
by ICU staff about donation as white families. This, they explained, was due to staff 
expectation that ‘BME’ families would say no to donation. In turn, these assumptions were 
conveyed in the narratives of ICU staff, who, like Ruth, drew on particular inferences about 
‘BME’ groups to reflect on their donation interactions with minority ethnic families.  
A few health professionals went so far as to explain their failings to secure organ donation 
from ‘BME’, particularly ‘Muslim’, families by explicitly framing them as a barrier for 
donation. One consultant at Lakeland described the “brick wall” that ‘Muslim’ families 
presented for donation requests. Another ICU nurse at Hillview puzzled over ‘Muslim’ family 
refusals, suggesting that – with racist undertones – they might see donation requests as an 
“insult” akin to “showing the soles of your feet to them”. Moreover, ICU staff and donation 
nurses often described ‘BME’ families who did consent to donate their relative’s organs as a 
“westernised” minority. Here, ‘western’ was implicitly related not just to the privileged 
default of whiteness, as the unexamined, unproblematic category (Dyer, 1997; Byrne, 2006; 
Garner 2010) for donation (see chapter 5), but also to families who were judged to be 
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educated and of ‘professional’ status, such as doctors and solicitors. It was also linked to the 
lack of any apparent religious appearance, such as the wearing of a hijab, which indicated 
‘Muslim’ identity; to a small family set-up (as discussed in chapter 5); and families’ existing 
knowledge of donation. In this way, minority ethnic families were distinguished from each 
other as a barrier, or lack of, for donation by perceptions about the obviousness of their 
‘ethnic’ status, and whether or not they fulfilled their (ethnic) responsibility to donate 
(Gilroy, 1987; 2004; Rose and Novas, 2005).  
Some ICU staff and donation nurses – as we saw with Stephanie’s example – also admitted 
their personal discomfort with requesting donation from minority ethnic families. This was 
especially the case at Hillview, where the hospital’s poor track-record for securing any 
donations from ‘Asian’ families became part of usual expectation. Matthew, one of 
Hillview’s ICU consultants, spelled out this feeling: 
[Be]cause I myself am happier asking a Caucasian family for donation than I am 
an Asian family, and honestly my heart sort of sinks a little bit. I know I’ve gotta 
have the conversation...but I know it’s going to be a lot harder [with an ‘Asian’ 
family] and then, if [there is] any sort of excuse to shy away from it, I think [I] do. 
And ultimately [the] majority of [‘Asian’] people say no, in my experience. I 
mean, unfortunately these things happen at the moment on such a rare basis 
that I can’t think of any specific examples, but I know that if it happened today 
and there’s an Asian family and we were sort of thinking of DCD donation, I 
know I would go and have the conversation with a weight on my shoulders, 
because I know it will be an uphill struggle trying to convince. (Matthew, ICU 
consultant at Hillview) 
Here, Matthew describes how his expectations of refusal prior to approaching an ‘Asian’ 
family get embodied in his dread at the approach. He communicates the heart sinking 
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feeling he experiences if he knows the potential donor family are ‘Asian’, admitting that he 
would try and get out of doing the request if he could. His assumption of the “uphill 
struggle” that a donation request to an ‘Asian’ family would entail is therefore carried 
through in to his donation approach with ‘Asian’ families.  
In documenting the various ways in which ethnicity gets acted out in donation practice – as 
Ruth and Matthew highlight – we see how ethnicity is both a script which gets drawn on in 
the course of health professionals’ work, and a construction which is produced as a result. In 
other words, understandings of the categories of the ‘BME’ organ donor and the ‘BME’ 
donor family – as an automatically assumed problem for organ donation – overlap with the 
decisions and actions of health professionals (e.g. Jeffery, 1979; Bowler, 1993; Atkin et al., 
1998; Atkin, 2003). Since we know that the way in which donation is introduced, and 
discussions are done with families has influence over their donation decisions (Siminoff et 
al., 2001; Bellali and Papadatou, 2007; Simpkin et al., 2009), I argue that the structuring of 
donation practice around reductive perceptions of ethnicity, may have very real 
consequences for attempts to increase ‘BME’ organ donation rates.  
The practices of health professionals around minority ethnic families therefore 
problematically reflects and reproduces the ‘problem’ of ethnicity in organ donation, as 
originally assigned by transplant policy, donation campaigns, and research. As drawn out in 
chapter 1, these frame certain population groups as both the source of, and solution to, 
transplant inequalities. These we saw in donation promotion campaigns which assigned 
responsibility for ‘BME’ individuals to help their ‘community’ by becoming an organ donor 
(see figs. 2, 3 and 4); and research which positions religious beliefs as a barrier to donation 
(e.g. Exley et al., 1996; Alkhawari et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2008). The outcome of these 
approaches has resulted in the construction, and thus naturalisation, of ethnicity as a 
‘problem’ for organ donation – which carries through into the work of health professionals. 
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As Bowker and Star, drawing upon the work of Thomas and Thomas explain, in their work 
on classification and its consequences: 
We know that things perceived as real are real in their consequences [...]. So 
even when people take classifications to be purely mental, or purely formal they 
also mould their behaviour to fit those conceptions. When formal characteristics 
are built into wide-scale bureaucracies [...] then the compelling power of those 
beliefs is strengthened considerably. They often come to be considered as 
natural”. (Bowker and Star, 1999: 53) 
In this way, the category of ethnicity in organ donation is maintained and reproduced by 
practitioners, who construct reductive notions of the ‘BME’ potential donor and the ‘BME’ 
potential donor family in their donation request and consent practices with minority ethnic 
families. As such, I argue that donation nurses and ICU staff also make up the very parts of 
the machinery which have transformed ‘ethnicity’ into a problem to be solved for transplant 
medicine.    
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated the tangled and difficult nature of the stage of obtaining 
formal consent for organ donation. As evidenced, securing consent involves far more than 
simply acquiring material evidence of a family’s agreement by obtaining a signature on a 
form. Instead, it is dependent upon, and is actively generated by the ability of the donation 
nurse to balance the needs of recently bereaved families with the legal requirements for 
donation. Consent is thus a situated, interpretative process, involving the adaptation of 
standardised procedures and forms, to ensure a family’s decision on donation is formalised. 
In other words, the donation nurse makes consent happen in practice; thereby making the 
prospect of organ donation a reality.  
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However, as I also showed, just as donation nurses have the ability to secure a family’s 
consent, there is also the potential for unmaking a family’s decision during the procedure. 
This was seen when donation nurses let their preconceived assumptions about the (‘BME’) 
donor and their family drive their consent practice. Whilst the consent process was 
described by donation nurses as more difficult with minority ethnic families, they also 
demonstrated reductive expectations about what a family’s ethnicity meant for their 
routine consent practice. Here, ethnicity was drawn on as a script to understand families’ 
behaviour during consent, and their donation decisions as a result.  
In this way, we saw how the micro practices of consent between donation nurses and 
potential donor families link in to macro constructions of ethnicity in organ donation – as 
ascribed by transplant policy, research and health promotion campaigns. Whilst donation 
nurses occupy the vital role of agent for fulfilling the ODT’s biopolitical aims to increase 
donation rates (see chapter 4), they also demonstrate problematic treatments of ethnicity 
in their practice. Moreover, assumptions about ethnicity were also traced to the work of ICU 
staff. ‘Ethnicity’, as an issue for donation, is thus constructed and reproduced by those 
responsible for making the possibility of organ donation a reality. In other words, donation 
nurses and ICU staff form part of the ‘problem’ itself. They make up parts of the very 
machinery which has transformed diverse groups of people into the category of ‘BME’, and 
framed them as an ‘issue’ for donation and transplantation. In turn, I argue that this has 
implications for how individuals are treated in practice, and the donation decisions they may 
make as a result.    
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: Re-Thinking Ethnicity and 
Organ Donation 
Introduction 
Despite the iconic status of transplantation as a life-saving measure (Sharp, 2006) for organ 
failure, it remains enmeshed in complex bioethical tensions and debates. The most 
prominent of which, and the conundrum which underpinned the focus of this study, is in 
how to meet the ever increasing demand for organs. Since transplant medicine relies upon 
the public to provide its materials for functioning, it has concentrated upon securing the 
public’s willingness to donate their organs after death. This has resulted in the 
representation of organ donation as a moral imperative: an act vital for the wider public 
good. As this study has demonstrated, however, expectations on the public to donate their 
organs are not always evenly distributed.  
This research has focused upon the donation imperative with which the UK’s ‘BME’ 
population has been drawn upon as a particular concern. With waiting times to transplant 
almost twice as long for ‘BME’, compared with ‘white’ patients, and low organ donor rates 
from ‘BME’ groups, policy and health promotion campaigns have conveyed the urgent need 
for more people from minority ethnic backgrounds to donate their organs, for the sake of 
their ‘community’. In the same way that ‘BME’ patients are subject to inequalities of 
transplant access, individuals assigned to the categories of ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ have 
been handed unequal responsibility to solve a problem, which – as I argued in chapter 1 – 
originated within the practices of transplant medicine itself. Policy, health promotion, and 
research responses to this ‘problem’ have therefore focused less on transplant medicine, 
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and more on understanding the ‘cultural’ ‘barriers’ which ‘BME’ groups present for organ 
donation.   
In this study I have offered a recalibration of this ‘problem’. Instead of scrutinising ‘BME’ 
‘communities’, I steered my line of vision towards ethnographically examining the organ 
donation encounter: where potential donors are decided on, and families’ decisions on 
whether or not to donate their relative’s organs are made. Consequently, I have illustrated 
that the phenomenon of organ donation and ethnicity is less of an innate ‘problem’; solely 
produced as a result of the ‘culture’ – such as religious beliefs and traditions – of ‘BME’ 
populations. Rather, it is an ‘issue’ which can be alternatively understood from within the 
institutional settings of transplant medicine itself. Here, organ donation is evidenced as a 
negotiated and embedded process, contingent upon assemblages of diverse procedures, 
practices, people, and things (Kierans, 2011). These include government policy; donation 
guidelines;  ICU staff; donation nurses; coroners; potential donor families; religious 
representatives; negotiated practices underpinned by professional hierarchies; 
understandings of death and the ontological status of the brain dead; legislation; 
mechanical ventilators; and consent and patient assessment forms. Together these make 
‘BME’ decisions on donation, and donation itself, possible.  
However, at the same time as these assemblages construct organ donation and organ 
donors, they also problematically (re)produce the status of the minority ethnic donor, 
thereby maintaining ethnicity as a ‘problem’ for donation. This work has therefore provided 
an important methodological, conceptual, and moral re-interpretation of a ‘problem’, which 
has thus far isolated understandings of inequalities around minority ethnic groups. Below, I 
draw out these insights, to firstly highlight the processes and practices which construct 
organ donation. Secondly, I explain how these processes lead to production of the ethnic 
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donor, before arguing for the wider contribution this research has made to the contentious 
area of organ transplantation.  
 
Making donation possible: negotiated practices and the production of 
decision-making 
This thesis has demonstrated the way in which organ donation is structured within 
institutional settings, by the negotiated practices of health professionals. These are actors 
who work at making donation happen against a backdrop of government policies and 
procedural guidelines. Within these settings, the donation nurse acts as the key agent of 
governance – in their work at implementing recommendations to increase donor rates 
within local practice settings. Here, the biopolitical project to secure more deceased organ 
donors – and thus more ‘BME’ donors – involves instilling new norms of practice around 
dead and dying patients and their families. These are responsive to, among others: the 
‘cultural’ workings of an Intensive Care Unit and its existing patient population; prevailing 
clinical hierarchies; everyday practice contingencies; staff anxiety at handing over decisions 
on dead or dying patients to donation teams; and wider emotional and bioethical concerns 
with donation. Organ donation is not, therefore, something which solely happens as an 
outcome of an individual’s willingness to donate. Instead, it is structured, and made possible 
by the negotiated practices of ICU consultants, ICU nurses, and donation nurses, and 
through the integration of policy imperatives into everyday decision-making processes 
around dead and dying patients – who only become organ donors by virtue of these 
interactions.  
My work has thus established the contentious and contingent conditions under which ‘BME’ 
individuals become organ donors in the first place, and is corroborated by ethnographic 
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insights into the production of organ donors in institutional domains (e.g. Hogle, 1995; 
1996; Lock, 2002; Sharp, 2006). In turn, I have revealed the paucity behind existing 
approaches to solving the donation and ethnicity ‘problem’, which concentrate upon selling 
the message of donation to the ‘BME’ public. Far from the ‘culture’ of ‘BME’ populations 
having foremost bearing upon donation rates, I have established that the decisions and 
practices of health professionals are what initially structure the inclination or reluctance to 
donate (Healey, 2004) – and thus the fate of the bodies of ‘BME’ potential organ donors and 
transplant recipients.  
Moreover, just as decisions on donation begin long before the request is made to a family to 
donate their relative’s organs, I have evidenced consent for organ donation as a multiply 
constituted, interactional process. Instead of a simple matter of an individual placing their 
name on the donor register, or gaining the signature of a family member on a form, 
donation consent involves the negotiations of different individuals, including the immediate 
and extended family of potential donors; religious figures; ICU staff; donation nurses; and 
coroners. As demonstrated, consent starts with the decisions of clinical staff over a patient’s 
dead or dying status, and in their discussions about their diagnosis of death with a patient’s 
family. For donation to become a possibility, a shared understanding of death must 
therefore be reached between families and health professionals.  
Since death is the precondition for deceased organ donation, a family’s acceptance of the 
clinical diagnosis of death thus acts as an informal form of consent in the donation pathway. 
It also allows for the “ontological switch” (Hadders, 2007: 218) of a patient’s status from 
‘living’ to ‘dead’ (Sudnow, 1967), and thus a potential donor. Gaining a (‘BME’) family’s 
agreement to the dead or dying status their relative, however, often involves health 
professionals working to legitimate their medical decisions with a family, as sociological and 
anthropological research into medical communication with families at the end of life, has 
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also attested (e.g. Johnson et al., 2000; Kaufman, 2005; Russ and Kaufman, 2005; 
Timmermans, 2005; Aldridge and Barton, 2007). My results have illustrated the way in 
which these negotiations also served a specific purpose for organ donation, in that they 
smoothed the pathway towards donation consent. Decisions on donation are therefore 
actively fashioned in the early stages of the donation pathway: in clinicians’ management of 
families’ understandings, and thus acceptance of death. 
The interactional process of consent also continues into the stage of acquiring formal 
consent for donation, where consent is additionally witnessed as an interpretative 
procedure. Here, families’ decisions on donation are actively fostered and generated by the 
donation nurse, in their work at securing donation consent. Donation decisions are thus 
formalised by practice strategies which transform formal procedures into an accessible form 
(Berg, 1996; Timmermans and Berg, 1997; 2003); responsive to the needs of recently 
bereaved families. This develops findings from research with donor families, which links 
family consent for donation to the appropriate tailoring, by health professionals, of 
information to their needs (Sque and Payne, 1996; DeJong et al., 1998; Shih et al., 2001; 
Haddow, 2004; Bellali and Papadatou, 2007; Sque et al., 2007). However, my research has 
gone beyond simply looking at families’ reasons for donation. It shows how donation 
decisions hang upon, and thus are actively constructed by the multiple processes, 
interactions, negotiations, and practices which characterise consent.   
Consent for organ donation cannot, therefore, be predicted by assessing the attitudes of 
‘BME’ groups towards donation, as past research has done (e.g. Hayward and Madhill, 2003; 
Davis and Randhawa, 2004; Morgan et al., 2008). It needs to be alternatively understood as 
a process in which family’s decisions are actively managed, and thus produced. Moreover, in 
the same way that donation consent is made in practice, I also showed how donation 
refusals can be linked to these processes. Like consent, donation refusal is an interactive 
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process – contingent upon different actors and situations along the donation pathway. This 
includes how ‘BME’ families’ disagreements with ICU staff over the diagnosis of their 
relative’s death leads to them being unable to contemplate the possibility of donation. 
Refusal also travels into the decisions of coroners and police, who have the authority to 
prevent a donation going ahead. In addition, refusal does not necessarily relate to the 
negative answer to a donation request. In this research, negative donation outcomes were 
back-grounded by the subjective decisions of ICU staff about the unsuitability of a patient 
for donation; and the evidenced power struggles between donation nurses and ICU 
consultants.  
These findings undermine the assumptions underpinning existing research, which tries to 
understand low ‘BME’ donor rates and high levels of donation refusals from ‘BME’ families 
by focusing upon the ‘cultural’ barriers these populations present for organ donation (e.g. 
Exley et al., 1996; Alkhawari et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2008). In contrast, my research has 
illustrated that ‘culture’, and thus donation refusal or consent, is created in the interaction 
between different groups of people – such as ICU staff and families – settings, and things – 
such as the mechanical ventilator which keeps brain dead patients breathing (Rosaldo, 
1993; Agar, 2006). For example, medical understandings of death are made visible when 
they clash with (‘BME’) families’ conceptualisations of their relative as still socially alive 
(Sudnow, 1967). ‘Culture’ may therefore be linked to donation refusals in terms of the 
disjuncture between family and clinical understandings of death, but it is not a concept 
which should be used as a pre-defined marker of population groups by which to predict 
donation outcomes.   
My findings here do, however, build on wider research, which has linked low donor rates 
from minority ethnic populations to donation practice. Specifically, US survey research has 
evidenced the lack of referral of ‘black’ patients as potential donors, and inequities in the 
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quality of discussions about donation with ‘white’ and ‘black’ families as potential factors in 
donation disparities (Guadagnoli et al., 1999; Siminoff et al., 2003). In addition, interview 
research with donor and non-donor families has related donation decisions to the way in 
which information about brain death and donation was delivered to families; and to the 
relationship between families and the professionals delivering the request (e.g. Sque and 
Payne, 1996; Haddow, 2004; Bellali and Papadatou, 2007; Sque et al., 2007). Different to 
this research, however, which gives little insight into the background of these interactions, 
my study has provided a rich view of the practices of donation professionals, and the 
procedural standards and environments which structure this work.  
By providing insights into the micro-practices around the donation encounter, this research 
has therefore offered a perspective on the conceptual character of organ donation – as a 
negotiated, embedded process, contingent upon a variety of procedures, practices, and 
interactions. In so doing, it evidences how donation decisions, and thus donation refusals, 
are actively produced in practice. Importantly though, by highlighting the institutional 
constitution of organ donation, we also witnessed the way in which these processes feed 
back into the biopolitical project of transplantation, and thus the phenomenon of ethnicity 
and organ donation itself, as I explain below. 
 
The production of the ‘BME’ donor and the ‘BME’ donor family 
Within the procedures which make organ donation possible, we additionally saw how the 
category of ethnicity was explicitly constructed by health professionals, who defined ‘BME’ 
potential donors and their families as problematic populations for organ donation. Rather 
than taking this status for granted – as existing research and policy has done – this study 
traced the classification of ethnicity into the standards which background the work of 
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donation. These include the Human Tissue Act’s (2004) consent hierarchy, which defines 
who has the right to make a decision about donation on behalf of the deceased.  
When ‘BME’ families did not conform to these standards – as we saw with the involvement 
of extended family members and religious leaders in donation decisions – they were 
understood by health professionals as outsider populations (Becker, 1963), in need of 
careful management during donation procedures. ‘BME’ families are thus constructed as a 
problem for organ donation, not because they necessarily are a problem, but because they 
fell outside of the frameworks by which ‘good’ and ‘bad’ donors and their families are 
defined. The differentiation of ‘BME’ families in organ donation is therefore constituted in 
the collision between the norms and routines which underpin institutional processes with 
the actions of individual families (Foucault, 1980). In turn, health professionals’ 
preconceptions about what a family’s ethnicity meant for their work – i.e. assumptions 
about the automatic difficulties ethnicity presented – interacted with their everyday 
donation practice, such as in gaining formal consent for donation.  
In this way, the classification of ethnicity as a negative variable for donation – mobilised 
within transplant medicine (Hacking, 2006), and taken up by policy, health promotion and 
research – is reproduced by practitioners, who work from the basis of ethnicity as a 
preconceived ‘problem’. This builds on work which has looked at the ways in which the 
categorisation of individuals – such as ‘BME’ – feeds back into medical policies, practice, and 
thus health outcomes (Duster, 2003; 2005; Hacking, 2006; Smart et al., 2008; Avera, 2009). 
The institutional infrastructures and micro-processes of health professionals around ‘BME’ 
families thus reflects and reifies the focus of the transplant project, which categorises ‘BME’ 
organs as resources for solving inequalities. In other words, those responsible (ICU staff and 
donation nurses etc) for solving the ‘issue’ of low donor rates, paradoxically maintain it at 
the same time.  
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This study not only therefore speaks to the immediate issue of ethnicity and organ donation, 
but also provides an important contribution to ethnographic work on the growing, yet 
contentious domain of transplant medicine. My research has characterised transplant 
medicine as a technology which, in its quest to save lives, also simultaneously produces the 
very inequities it sets out to tackle. Wider ethnographic work has testified to the way in 
which these inequalities are formed by the promotion of transplantation as a desirable form 
of treatment; as a result of procurement and allocation practices; and in the differential 
distribution of organs within diverse socio-economic and political settings (e.g. Gordon, 
2002; Lock, 2002; Crowley-Matoka, 2005; Parry, 2008; Yea, 2010; Kierans, 2011; Kierans and 
Cooper 2011). These insights are furthered by this thesis, which argues that ethnicity comes 
to be classified, produced, and thus knotted to unequal outcomes in transplantation by the 
structures, practices, and policies of transplant medicine itself.  
My work has also drawn attention to the social actors – like the donation nurse – who, in 
their work towards optimising donor rates also produce the very disparities they are 
charged with reducing. This draws together different spheres of ethnographic influence by 
depicting the ways in which the micro practices of donation are underpinned by the macro 
concerns of governance. Here, existing work on the ways in which practitioners negotiate 
standards to bring about donor organs (Hogle, 1995; 1996; Sharp, 2006) is brought together 
with wider research in science and technology studies, which reveals how standards are 
made to work in specific practice communities, and the policy imperatives which underpin 
these (e.g. Mol, 2002; 2008; 2009 Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Struhkamp et al., 2009; 
Singleton, 2005; 2010). Much like how organ donors are produced in the work done around 
dead and dying patients, the category of the ‘BME organ donor’ is thus constructed within 
practices which are buttressed by a multiplicity of policy concerns – which pre-define 
ethnicity as a ‘problem’.  
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In conclusion then, this research has evidenced the fact that we cannot any longer conceive 
of ‘BME’ populations as the precondition for transplant inequalities. When surveyed with an 
ethnographic gaze, and from an alternative angle to the focus of the past, we have seen that 
the category of ethnicity – as a seemingly stable factor in low donation rates – collapses 
(Bowker and Star, 1999; Hacking, 2006). Instead, medicine is revealed as an integral actor in 
the production of the very inequalities it sets out to solve. From this perspective, I also offer 
an additional, moral call for researchers, policy makers, and practitioners to interrogate the 
ways in which minority ethnic health inequalities are interpreted, and the processes by 
which certain groups of people come to be reified as the source of these disparities. In 
taking a more nuanced approach towards understanding health inequities, we might 
prevent the continued reduction of diverse groups of people to the status of a label, like 
‘BME’, and the suffering which is engendered as a result.   
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Epilogue: Reflections on the Research Process 
Every piece of research is done within a certain amount of constraint, and a PhD study like 
mine is no exception. In the final part of this thesis I want to offer some reflections on the 
research process, the implications of the study’s results for policy and practice, and ideas by 
which the research could be enhanced in further study.  
As the sole researcher approaching the complex phenomenon of organ donation and 
ethnicity, I encountered numerous issues in gaining access to the domains, settings, and 
people which were connected to this problem. Whilst providing insight into the experiences 
of practitioners involved in donation, limited resources, and the bounded duration of the 
field work meant I did not get the chance to speak with donor and non-donor families from 
minority ethnic backgrounds92. Whilst my work would have been enormously enhanced if I 
had spent the same amount of time with families as I did with health professionals, it might 
also have led to a subsequent anaemia of insight into the different experiences. As Hannerz 
(2003) has pointed out, the difficulty of doing a multi-sited ethnography is in following the 
ideal of the multi-sited method into to the field, without spreading yourself, or the depth of 
findings too thin.  
In addition, in relation to the presentation of my findings, I initially highlighted in chapter 2 
how I came to adopt an ANT approach during the analytical stages of my research. In this 
theoretical approach materials, such as mechanical ventilators and consent forms, are 
central to an understanding of  the ‘problem’ of organ donation and ethnicity and the 
categorisation of ‘BME’ groups as problematic populations for transplant medicine. In 
arriving late to ANT, whilst I did, subsequently, incorporate materials into my analytical 
process and theoretical discussion of my findings, materials do not feature as prominently 
                                                          
92
 see chapter 2 for my reasons for not being able to find these families. 
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as they may have done had I utilised ANT throughout the study. For example, whilst I 
emphasise the centrality of consent and patient assessment forms in the production of 
‘BME’ families as troublesome groups for donation (chapter 6), I did not explicitly draw out 
the relationship between the mechanical ventilator and conflicts over decisions on death 
between families and ICU staff. In an ANT approach the mechanical ventilator would occupy 
a crucial role in the performance of different realities of death (Latour, 2005; Law, 2008) for 
health professionals and families. This analytical and theoretical utilisation of materials 
could be developed to greater effect in subsequent publications; and would add further 
depth to the recognition of the diversity of actors involved – beyond ‘BME’ ‘communities’ – 
in donation decision-making. 
I am also acutely aware of the fact that I privileged my institutional data – observations and 
interviews with health professionals – to report my findings, over the interviews I conducted 
with ‘community’ participants. Whilst not explicitly presented in the results, these were, 
however, drawn on during my analyses to inform the findings. This I did firstly because my 
institutional data presented the opportunity to fully explore the organ donation encounter. 
And, secondly, in structuring my findings around the encounter, any attempts I made to 
incorporate the ‘community’ material turned into a shoe-horning exercise, which would 
have done the data an injustice. By concentrating upon health professionals, I was able to 
gather rich detail about the institutional production of ethnicity, thus providing novel 
findings about the phenomenon. In addition, by studying up (Nader, 1969) – focusing upon 
institutions instead of ‘communities’ – I have avoided the reifying gaze which has so far 
been used to characterise ‘BME’ communities, thereby opening the ‘problem’ out to 
different interpretation.  
However, my focus upon the institutional aspects of organ donation also meant there was 
the potential for me to adopt too sympathetic a stance towards my research subjects; in 
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particular towards the donation nurses, who were key actors for helping me gain insight 
into the ‘world’ of organ donation. As discussed in chapter 2, my eventual familiarity with 
the processes involved in organ donation and the practices of the donation nurses may have 
influenced my analysis and subsequent findings, such as by representing the donation 
nurses in an uncritical way, and taking their work for granted. In addition, this relationship 
also presented conflicts within my own research objectives. In other words, whilst I set out 
to critically examine how the ‘problem’ of organ donation and ethnicity occurs within the 
donation encounter, my close relationship with some donation nurses had the obvious 
potential for my analytical gaze to become subsumed under their agenda to increase ‘BME’ 
consent rates. 
Jessica Mesman (2007) highlights such concerns in reflecting on her ethnographic work on 
patient safety in a neonatology ward. She articulates how the collaborative nature of her 
study held the possibility for her research agenda to be integrated into the interests of her 
participants. These included the hospital ‘risk managers’, who initially saw her as a potential 
ally in their project to strengthen patient safety by elimitating practice errors (whereas 
Mesman was interested in the strengths of safety practices). However, Mesman documents 
how her fears failed to manifest in practice: she was able to find common ground with the 
managers and develop a relationship of mutual respect. She subsequently argues that the 
roles and responsibilities of the researcher are always fluid in research, with the 
unavoidable entanglement in “multiple engagements, conflicting feelings of loyalty, and a 
multitude of positions” (p.293). In this way, I could alternatively reflect on my relationship 
with the donation nurses as both a constraint and as a way by which my analysis was 
opened out with the realisation of my – and my research subjects’ – multiple positions in 
relation to the topic. For example, the donation nurses’ stories about the difficulties placed 
upon their work by ICU staff meant I drew attention to how their ability to obtain donation 
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consent was constrained by institutional relations, alongside pointing out their role as 
agents of biopolitical governance in implementing organisational changes around donation. 
As Mesman argues, research constraints thus also hold the possibility for transforming into 
“corridors for collaborative work” (2007: 282 and 293). 
One of these ‘corridors’ is the realisation of my responsibility to not only widely disseminate 
my results, but additionally highlight how my research can impact upon the practices and 
policies of organ donation. In making recommendations my work becomes of obvious ‘use’ 
to donation professionals and organisations, such as NHSBT, whose agenda is to secure 
more ‘BME’ donors. Whilst this is not something I set out to do, my findings mean that I do 
have a responsibility to intervene in the ‘issue’ in some way. Such intervention will only be 
possible with my ability to disseminate the findings to a diversity of audiences. These 
include policy-makers, practitioners, and social scientists (working with similar concerns 
such as categorisation, medical practice, and organ donation). This dissemination will (and 
has) include(ed) the production of publications for both social science and medical journals 
and conference presentations, alongside distributing my findings in clinical training days for 
donation nurses and ICU staff; in presentations to the ICU and donation nurse teams I 
worked with; and in the production of formal research summaries, as required by the NHS 
ethics committee and NHSBT. 
The policy and practice implications of this research work on three levels. Firstly, in 
evidencing donation consent as a multiply constituted, interpretative process, there is a 
need to widen current policy presentations of what consent for organ donation entails. 
Whilst emphasising consent as a process, the Human Tissue Act’s (2004) legislation on 
consent largely concentrates upon who qualifies to give valid consent for donation. This fails 
to encompass the fact that consent occurs all along the donation trajectory (such as in 
relation to decisions on death); and is a product of the decisions and interactions of multiple 
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actors (families, health professionals, coroners, and the materials – mechanical ventilators, 
local donation policies, consent and patient assessment forms – which mediate these 
decisions). Broadening out policy explanations of consent would also act as a step towards 
changing the debate on organ donation and ethnicity (which I discuss in the third 
implication).  
Secondly, the research illustrates the importance of bringing the organisation of donation 
services and the practices of health professionals into policy discussions of, and 
interventions towards ‘solving’ low ‘BME’ donation rates93. As this thesis has demonstrated, 
separating the donation decisions of ‘BME’ individuals from the decisions, practices, and 
policies of procurement services is an impossible task, since donation decision-making is 
situated and actively produced within institutional contexts. Incorporating institutional 
practice into the ‘problem’ might involve the development of training packages for donation 
nurses and ICU staff, which would focus upon specific cases of organ donation with minority 
ethnic families (this could include the narratives told in this research). These cases could be 
used to convey the complexity of the ‘problem’ to health professionals, and resituate the 
focus of practice away from a concentration upon the family as sole decision-makers, to an 
explicit recognition of the diverse constituents and processes involved in obtaining donation 
consent. 
Finally, and most importantly, it is imperative to advocate a shift in how the debate on 
organ donation and ethnicity has been framed94 by research, policy, and health promotion. 
                                                          
93
 As discussed in chapter 1, this is something which the ODT’s (2008) recommendations failed to do, since the 
recommendations isolated the ‘BME’ issue from discussions about the reorganisation of donation services. 
94
 This argument is influenced by the work of Mol (2008), who argues for a resituation of the logic of choice in 
healthcare to one of a logic of care. For Mol, the logic of care – which acknowledges how care, and thus illness, 
are negotiated within the practices of patients, providers, and medical technologies – offers a more 
appropriate way of thinking about good care than the logic of choice, which frames care in terms of the patient 
as ‘good’ consumer and responsible citizen. 
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By disseminating the study’s findings I aim to resituate the debate on the ‘problem’. This 
would move from one which concentrates its reifying gaze upon communities, towards one 
which acknowledges the nuanced, negotiated process of organ donation. In turn, the policy 
focus upon donation rates and securing consent might shift to a focus upon donation 
decision-making, where the ‘problem’ becomes understood as a dynamic and multiply 
constituted process, rather than a question of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the donation 
request. 
Reflecting on the potential constraints and policy implications of this research also offers 
openings for thinking about how its findings could be enhanced by future work. Whilst this 
study portrayed the practices of donation as vital to understanding the construction of 
ethnicity, my phenomenological approach mean I largely concentrated upon how these 
practices were made sense of in participants’ narratives. In this way, I did not directly see 
these practices as they played out since I was not present during doctors’ communications 
of death to families, and nor did I witness the interactions between donation nurses and 
donor families during the consent process. Additional research might, therefore, focus upon 
the daily actions within ICU and A&E wards to observe the encounters between ‘BME’ 
potential donor families and health professionals.  
Such an approach would also enable access to the minority ethnic families I was unable to 
speak to in my research. However, this would require the jumping of numerous ethical 
hurdles, like how to gain informed consent to observe families who are in the midst of 
finding out that their relative is dead or dying. To ensure the likelihood of accessing ‘BME’ 
families, it would also mean being situated in a hospital with both a neurological centre 
(where patients who eventually become brain stem dead are often sent) and a high minority 
ethnic patient population. Doing such a piece of research would further open up 
opportunities to observe the donation scenarios of ‘white’ families. This would enable 
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comparison of how potential donor families are communicated and interacted with – which 
would build on the US survey research, described previously (e.g. Siminoff et al., 2003). 
Owing to the insights I made in chapter 1, about how organ allocation policies have 
traditionally disadvantaged ‘BME’ patients waiting for kidney transplants, another research 
avenue might include examining how organs are allocated in practice. This would be 
pertinent in light of changes to the kidney allocation policy in 2006, which aimed to reduce 
disparities of access for ‘BME’ patients (Johnson et al., 2010). It could investigate how these 
changes have had an effect in practice, and how these processes affect the lives of ‘BME’ 
patients on the transplant waiting list. Such research might involve observing the work of 
laboratory staff who carry out tissue matching tests; speaking with policy makers 
responsible for the allocation criteria; and spending time with kidney patients from minority 
ethnic backgrounds.  
Research like this would also further one of the original reasons for doing my study. This was 
to undermine the blame discourse which has been placed upon minority ethnic groups for 
transplant disparities by integrating medical knowledge and practice into understandings of 
the ‘problem’. This I believe I have achieved with my research. By casting the net further – 
beyond catching the obvious sources of inequalities, like ‘BME’ groups themselves – I have 
started the process of removing the ‘problem’ of ethnicity in organ donation from its black 
box; one with which I fully intend to continue. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Example Literature Search Strategy  
JSTOR database (using advanced search option) 
Search Terms used Results (number 
of hits) 
1 Organ donate£ OR organ transplant* 6670 
2 1 AND Asian 692 
3 1 AND African 1223 
3 1 AND black 2253 
4 1 AND minority ethnic 440 
5 1 AND ‘BME’ OR ethnic* 87382 
6 Organ donor family OR organ donor relative 3779 
7 6 AND Asian OR  black OR African 913903 
8 1 AND health professional OR doctor OR nurse 180228 
9 8 AND request OR communicate 142500 
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Appendix 2. Advertisement for Recruiting ‘Community’ Members 
 
Liverpool study wants to find out about the experiences of South Asian and 
African-Caribbean families who were asked to donate their relative’s organs 
after their death 
If you were asked about organ donation after your relative’s death, and if you are from a 
South Asian/Asian British (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, or Sri Lankan heritage) or African-
Caribbean/Black British (Caribbean heritage) ethnic background, living in the North-West of 
England or Yorkshire, would you be willing to discuss your experiences with us?  
 
 We are looking for people who decided not to donate their relative’s organs, as well as 
people who consented to donation. The experiences of both donor and non-donor 
families and individuals are equally important to us.  
 All participation would be fully confidential and anonymous.  
 The interviews will be participant directed, meaning that there are no set questions: you 
talk to the researcher about your experiences in your own words.  
 We would also like to talk to any members of the community who are interested in 
discussing this subject. 
 
If you are interested in taking part in the study, or are generally interested in discussing the 
research, you can find out more by calling Jessie Cooper on: 0151 794 5272 or 07516067657 
or emailing her at jessie21@liv.ac.uk. Any help would be hugely appreciated.  
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Appendix 3. Participant Covering Letters, Information Sheets and 
Reply Slip 
Covering Letter – BME donor and non-donor families 
 
 
An exploration of organ donation among Black and Minority Ethnic communities 
and involved health professionals 
 
Dear  
A research study is being carried out at The University of Liverpool by Jessie Cooper, who is 
a PhD student in the Division of Public Health.  
The study wants to explore the experiences of individuals/families from Black and Minority 
Ethnic (BME) backgrounds who have been asked to donate their relative’s organs after their 
death. It will also be finding out about the experiences of health professionals who are 
involved in asking for organ donation.  
As you were involved in being asked to donate your relative’s organs after their death and 
have identified yourself as being from a BME background, we would like to invite you to 
take part in this study. Please find enclosed an information sheet which explains what the 
study is about in more detail, and what your role in the research will be if you choose to 
take part. Please read through this carefully.  
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If you would like to participate we would be grateful if you could send the completed reply 
slip and contact details form back to Jessie (an SAE is enclosed), so that she can get in touch 
with you; or contact her directly, using the details given on the information sheet. If you do 
not wish to participate we would be grateful if you could send the reply slip back to Jessie 
declining this invitation.  
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter. If you have any questions Jessie will be 
happy to chat with you before you make up your mind about the study (her contact details 
are provided on the information sheet). 
Kind Regards, 
 
Donor-Transplant Coordinator    Jessie Cooper (PhD Student) 
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Participant Information Sheet – BME donor and non-donor families 
 
 
An exploration of organ donation among Black and Minority Ethnic 
communities and involved health professionals 
Participant Information Sheet 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether you want 
to be involved, we would like to explain the research study to you  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and feel free to ask us if you 
would like more information or if there is anything that you do not understand.  
Feel free to discuss this with your friends, relatives and GP if you wish. We would like to 
stress that you do not have to accept this invitation and should only agree to take part if you 
want to. 
Who is doing the research? 
Jessie Cooper: who is a PhD student in the Division of Public Health at the University of 
Liverpool. 
Dr. Ciara Kierans: who is a lecturer at Liverpool University and will be supervising the 
research.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
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The purpose of this study is to understand the experiences of families and individuals who 
have been asked to donate their relative’s organs; as well as the experiences of health 
professionals who are involved in asking for organ donation.  
We are doing this because there has been a large amount of publicity and research on 
attitudes towards organ donation within Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities in 
the UK. However, there are no studies on the experiences of donor and non-donor families 
(those who said ‘no’ to donation) from these backgrounds. Because of this, we feel that it is 
important to gain an understanding of how people experience this process. 
If possible, we will also be asking the health professionals who were involved in requesting 
the donation of your relative’s organs to take part in the study. This study will run until 
October 2011.  
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You have been asked to take part in this study because you were involved in being asked to 
donate your relative’s organs after their death, and also because you have identified 
yourself as being from a BME background. Your experiences are therefore very important to 
us. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is completely up to you. You only take part if you decide you want to. If you do decide you 
would like to take part in the study you will be asked to sign a consent form to say that you 
agree to take part when you first meet the researcher.   
If you decide later on that you no longer wish to take part then you can leave the study at 
any time and do not have to give a reason.  
What will happen if I take part? 
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This research study will be asking you to be involved in a few ways, depending upon what 
you feel comfortable with: 
*In-depth interviews: You will be asked to take part in two interviews. You can choose to be 
interviewed on your own, or with your family/a friend present.  
The interviews will involve you talking to the researcher about your experiences of being 
asked to donate your relative’s organs. These interviews will last for as long as you would 
like to talk about your experiences. With your permission, these interviews will be audio-
recorded.  
*fieldwork and informal interviews: If you agree to it, the researcher may also spend some 
time with you to chat informally about your experiences and your life in general. From this 
she will take field notes, which is like a research diary. 
Where will the research take place? 
The research will be carried out at a time and place of your choice. You may like this to be 
your home, a public setting (e.g. a cafe), or even at Liverpool University. It is up to you to 
decide. 
Are there any disadvantages or risks in taking part? 
We do not expect there to be any risks associated with participating in this research study. 
However, we realise that the topic is very sensitive, so if you feel uncomfortable or 
distressed at any time then you can stop the interview. You can also leave the study without 
having to give a reason. 
Are there any benefits in taking part? 
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You will be helping with a new area of research. Your experiences will help us to better 
understand how families from Minority Ethnic backgrounds experience the process of being 
asked for organ donation.  
What if I am unhappy with the research or there is a problem? 
If you are unhappy or there is a problem, please feel free to let us know by contacting the 
researcher, Jessie Cooper on 0151 794 5272 or by email: jessie21@liv.ac.uk, who will try to 
help. If you are still unhappy or have a complaint which you feel you cannot come to us 
with, then you should contact the Research Governance Officer, Sarah Fletcher, at Liverpool 
University on 0151 794 8290 (ethics@liv.ac.uk).  
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
All the information that you give us will be kept strictly confidential. The procedures for 
handling, processing, storing and destroying the data will comply with the Data Protection 
Act of 1998.  
This means that only the researcher will see what you have said. All the information which 
you provide us with during the study will be stored in locked filing cabinets or password 
protected computers. Anything about you, including any quotes which are used in the write-
up of the study, will have your name removed and a different one put in place, so that you 
will remain anonymous. At the end of the study the research data (consent forms, 
anonymised interview transcripts, field notes, and your contact details) will be kept in 
locked filing cabinets and/or password protected university computers. The data will be 
kept for ten years.  
Please note that if you did tell us something that meant you were in danger or could come 
to any harm, the researcher would have a duty to tell her supervisor about this.   
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What will happen with the results of the study? 
After the study has finished, the results will be put together as part of the researcher’s PhD. 
The research will be stored at The University of Liverpool. The research will also be 
published in academic journals and presented at conferences. 
During the study we will ask you about your opinions on its findings, to get your ideas, and 
criticisms of what the research has found. You will also be provided with a summary of the 
findings at the end of the study and you can have a copy of the final research report if you 
would like it.  
What will happen if I want to stop taking part? 
If you decide at any point that you no longer wish to be part of the study, then you can stop 
and do not have to give a reason for this. You can also ask for your data to be destroyed if 
you decide to stop being in the study. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a research 
ethics committee to protect your safety, rights and dignity. This study has been viewed and 
given approval by Liverpool NHS Research Ethics Committee. It is also being sponsored by 
The University of Liverpool. 
How can I find out more? 
Just get in touch with the researcher, Jessie Cooper (PhD student): 
Tel: 0151 794 5272 
Email: jessie21@liv.ac.uk 
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Participant Information Sheet – ‘community’ members 
 
 
An exploration of organ donation among Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 
communities and involved health professionals 
Participant Information Sheet 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether you want 
to be involved, we would like to explain the research study to you  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and feel free to ask us if you 
would like more information or if there is anything that you do not understand.  
Feel free to discuss this with your friends, relatives and GP if you wish. We would like to 
stress that you do not have to accept this invitation and should only agree to take part if you 
want to. 
Who is doing the research? 
Jessie Cooper: who is a PhD student in the Division of Public Health at the University of 
Liverpool. 
Dr. Ciara Kierans: who is a lecturer at Liverpool University and will be supervising the 
research.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
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The purpose of this study is to understand the experiences of families and individuals who 
have been asked to donate their relative’s organs, as well as the health professionals who 
were involved in asking for these organs. It is also interested in talking to members of BME 
communities who are willing to discuss the issue of organ donation/have been involved in 
organ donation or transplantation in some way. 
We are doing this because there has been a large amount of publicity and research on 
attitudes towards organ donation within BME communities in the UK. However, there are 
no studies on the experiences of donor and non-donor families (those who said ‘no’ to 
donation) from these communities. Because of this, we feel that it is important to gain an 
understanding of how people experience this process. 
This study will run until October 2011.  
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You have been asked to take part in this study because you have expressed a willingness to 
talk about your views on/any experiences you have of organ donation and/or 
transplantation as a member of a BME community. Your thoughts and experiences are very 
important to us. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is completely up to you. You only take part if you decide you want to. If you decide you 
would like to take part in the study the researcher will ask you to sign a consent form to say 
that you agree to take part.   
If you decide later on that you no longer wish to take part then you can leave the study at 
any time and do not have to give a reason.  
What will happen if I take part? 
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You will be asked to take part in an informal interview as part of the researchers’ fieldwork. 
You can choose to be interviewed on your own, or with your family or a friend present. The 
researcher may also spend some time with you to chat informally about your experiences 
and your life in general. From this she will take field notes, which is like a research diary. 
The interviews will involve you talking to the researcher about your thoughts on organ 
donation and any experiences you have had relating to organ donation. These interviews 
will last for as long as you would like to talk about your experiences. With your permission, 
these interviews will be audio-recorded.  
Where will the research take place? 
The research will be carried out at a time and place of your choice. You may like this to be 
your home, a public setting (e.g. a cafe), or even at Liverpool University. It is up to you to 
decide 
Are there any disadvantages or risks in taking part? 
We do not expect there to be any risks associated with participating in this research study. 
However, we realise that the topic is very sensitive, so if you feel uncomfortable at any time 
then you can stop the interview. You can also leave the study without having to give a 
reason. 
Are there any benefits in taking part? 
You will be helping with a new area of research. Your experiences and opinions will help us 
to better understand organ donation in relation to Minority Ethnic Communities in the 
North of England.  
What if I am unhappy with the research or there is a problem? 
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If you are unhappy or there is a problem, please feel free to let us know by contacting the 
researcher, Jessie Cooper on 0151 794 5272 or by email: jessie21@liv.ac.uk, who will try to 
help. If you are still unhappy or have a complaint which you feel you cannot come to us 
with, then you should contact the Research Governance Officer, Sarah Fletcher, at Liverpool 
University on 0151 794 8290 (ethics@liv.ac.uk).  
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
All the information that you give us will be kept strictly confidential. The procedures for 
handling, processing, storing and destroying the data will comply with the Data Protection 
Act of 1998.  
This means that only the researcher will see what you have said. All the information which 
you provide us with during the study will be stored in locked filing cabinets or password 
protected computers. Anything about you, including any quotes which are used in the write-
up of the study, will have your name removed and a different one put in place, so that you 
will remain anonymous. At the end of the study the research data (consent forms, 
anonymised interview transcripts, field notes, and your contact details) will be kept in 
locked filing cabinets and/or password protected university computers. The data will be 
kept for ten years.  
Please note that if you did tell us something that meant you were in danger or could come 
to any harm, the researcher would have a duty to tell her supervisor about this.   
What will happen with the results of the study? 
After the study has finished, the results will be put together as part of the researcher’s PhD. 
The research will be stored at The University of Liverpool. The research will also be 
published in academic journals and presented at conferences. 
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You will also be provided with a summary of the findings at the end of the study and you can 
have a copy of the final research report if you would like it.  
What will happen if I want to stop taking part? 
If you decide at any point that you no longer wish to be part of the study, then you can stop 
and do not have to give a reason for this. You can also ask for your data to be destroyed if 
you decide to stop being in the study. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a research 
ethics committee to protect your safety, rights and dignity. This study has been viewed and 
given approval by Liverpool NHS Research Ethics Committee. It is also being sponsored by 
The University of Liverpool. 
How can I find out more? 
Just get in touch with the researcher, Jessie Cooper (PhD student): 
Tel: 0151 794 5272 
Email: jessie21@liv.ac.uk 
Thank you for reading this 
This information sheet is for you to keep 
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Participant Information Sheet – health professionals 
 
An exploration of organ donation among Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 
communities and involved health professionals. 
Taking Part in Research: 
Information for Health Professionals 
You are being invited to participate in a research study. Before you decide whether to 
participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and feel free to ask us if you 
would like more information or if there is anything that you do not understand. Feel free to 
discuss this with your friends, relatives and colleagues if you wish.  
Who is doing the research? 
Jessie Cooper: who is a PhD student in the Division of Public Health at the University of 
Liverpool. 
Dr. Ciara Kierans: who is a lecturer at Liverpool University and will be supervising the research.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to explore the relationship between ethnicity and organ donation 
by finding out about, and understanding the experiences of families and health professionals 
who are involved in the process of organ donation. It will do this by talking to BME donor/non-
donor families (those who said ‘no’ to donation); health professionals who are involved in 
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requesting organs from these families; as well as speaking with a range of health professionals 
generally involved in organ donation/transplantation. It is doing this is response to the lack of 
in-depth research in this area. This study will be running until October 2011.  
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You have been asked to take part in this study because you have expressed a willingness to be 
interviewed about your experiences of being involved in asking for organ donation from 
families of a BME background; and/or about your experiences of being professionally involved 
in organ donation (or transplantation) generally. Your experiences are very important to us. 
Do I have to take part? 
You only take part if you decide you want to. If you do decide you would like to take part in 
the study you will be asked to sign a consent form to say that you have agreed to take part 
when you meet the researcher.  If you decide later on that you no longer wish to take part 
then you can leave the study at any time without giving a reason.  
What will happen if I take part? 
This research study will be asking you to be involved in a few ways, depending upon what you 
feel comfortable with.  
*Narrative interviews: You will be asked to take part in at least one narrative interview 
(preferably two if possible). The interview/s will involve you talking to the researcher about 
your experiences of the organ donation process, as well as any experiences you have of being 
involved in asking BME families to donate their relative’s organs (if applicable). These 
interviews will last for as long as you would like to talk about your experiences for. With your 
permission, these interviews will be audio-recorded.  
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During her time spent with you the researcher will also take field notes from her observations, 
which acts as a research diary. 
During these interviews, the researcher may also ask you about your thoughts on promotional 
and media material about organ donation. 
*Fieldwork and informal interviews: If you agree to it, the researcher may also spend some 
time with you in your place of work to chat informally about your experiences of organ 
donation and explore your role as a health professional. From this she will take field notes, 
which is like a research diary  
Where will the research take place? 
The research will be carried out in a place of your choosing. This will be negotiated with you at 
your discretion.  
Are there any disadvantages or risks in taking part? 
We do not expect there to be any risks associated with participating in this research study. 
However, if you feel uncomfortable at any time, then you can stop and/or leave the study 
without having to give a reason. 
Are there any benefits in taking part? 
You will be helping with a new area of research. Your experiences and opinions will help us to 
better understand organ donation in relation to BME families, from the perspective and 
experiences of a health professional. It is aimed for the research to be used to inform health 
policy on the issue.  
What if I am unhappy with the research or there is a problem? 
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If you are unhappy or there is a problem, please feel free to let us know by contacting the 
researcher, Jessie Cooper on 0151 794 5272 or by email: jessie21@liv.ac.uk, who will try to 
help. If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel you cannot come to us with, 
then you should contact the Research Governance Officer, Sarah Fletcher, at Liverpool 
University on 0151 794 8290 (ethics@liv.ac.uk).  
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
All the information that you give us will remain confidential. The procedures for handling, 
processing, storing and destroying the data will comply with the Data Protection Act of 1998.  
What this means is that only the researcher will see what you have said. All the information 
which you provide us with during the study will be stored in locked filing cabinets or password 
protected computers. Anything about you, including any quotes which are used in the write-
up of the study, will have your name removed and a different one put in place, so that you will 
remain anonymous. The hospital in which you work will also remain anonymous. At the end of 
the study the research data (consent forms, anonymised interview transcripts, field notes, and 
your contact details) will be kept securely in locked filing cabinets and/or password protected 
University computers. This will be kept for ten years.  
Please note that if you did tell us something that meant you were in danger or could come to 
any harm, the researcher would have a duty to tell her supervisor about this.   
What will happen with the results of the study? 
After the study has finished, the results will be put together as part of the researcher’s PhD. 
This will be marked by two examiners. The research will also be published in academic journals 
and presented at conferences. 
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If you want, you will be consulted throughout the study about the findings to get your ideas, 
opinions and criticisms of what the research has found. At the end of the study you will be 
provided with a summary of the findings, and you can request the final report if you would like 
it.  
What will happen if I want to stop taking part? 
If you decide at any point that you no longer wish to be part of the study, then you can stop 
and do not have to give a reason for this.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been viewed and given approval by Liverpool NHS Research Ethics Committee. 
It is also being sponsored by The University of Liverpool. 
How can I find out more? 
Just get in touch with the researcher, Jessie Cooper (PhD student): 
Tel: 0151 794 5272                       Email: jessie21@liv.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for reading this! 
This information sheet is for you to keep 
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Reply Slip (donor and non-donor families) 
Jessie Cooper, PhD Student 
Division of Public Health 
School of Population, Community and Behavioural Sciences 
2nd Floor, Block B , Waterhouse Building 
1-5 Brownlow Street 
Liverpool 
L69 3GL. 
Tel: 0151 794 5272 
Reply Slip 
An exploration of organ donation among Black and Minority Ethnic 
communities and involved health professionals 
I would be grateful if you could complete this form (along with the contact details form, if 
you are interested in taking part) and send it in the stamped addressed envelope provided. 
 
Name: __________________________________ 
 
Please tick the box which applies: 
  
I am interested in taking part in the study and would like to be  
contacted about it. 
 
I do not wish to take part in the study  
 
Signature: _____________________________ 
 
Thank you. 
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Appendix 4. Consent Form 
 
Centre number:  
Participant identification number for this study:  
 
Consent Form 
An exploration of organ donation among black and minority ethnic 
communities and involved health professionals 
Name of researcher: Jessie Cooper 
                                Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information           
      sheet dated__________for the above study. I have had the  
      opportunity to consider the Information, ask questions and  
      have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am  
      free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason,  
      without my legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that quotes from what I say during the study  
may be used where necessary, on the condition that my  
      identity will remain anonymous. 
 
4. I agree to being audio-recorded during the study interviews.   
  
5. I understand that, under the Data Protection Act,  I can at any  
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           time ask for access to the information I provide and I can also  
           request the destruction of that information if I wish. 
 
6. I agree to the research data being stored. I understand that  
      the anonymised data (interview transcripts and notes) may be  
shared with other researchers in the future.  
 
7. I agree to the researcher taking my contact details (name,  
telephone number etc) and contacting me during  
the study to arrange interview times.  
                                    
 
8. I agree to take part in the above study.                                                           
 
    
                                                                                                                                         
 
Name of participant           Date        Signature 
 
The contact details of the researcher are: 
Jessie Cooper: 
Email: jessie21@liverpool.ac.uk  Tel: 0151 794 5272 
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Appendix 7. Narrative Interview Guides 
Interview guide for initial interview with health professionals 
The Interview 
Brief the participant as of some of the reasons for wanting to talk to them. Ensure they have 
read and understood the information sheet and ask if they have any questions. Get them to 
sign the consent form.  
Explain that I will be doing a narrative interview – basically just one question which aims 
to find out about their own experiences of working as a coordinator/health professional 
involved in organ donation. The interview is in their control and I will only intervene, or ask 
additional questions if necessary. I may occasionally ask for more detail about an event, or 
an example of what they describe to clarify something that you have told me, but, apart 
from that, it is up to them to talk about what they want and in any order they want. 
Question focused upon experiences with asking BME families – for Health Professionals 
Can you tell me the ‘story’ of your experiences of being involved in requesting organ 
donation from families of a Minority Ethnic background, as well as any other experiences 
you have of organ donation that you wish to talk about. By this I mean any events and 
experiences related to this which are important to you. 
Begin wherever you like 
General Question for health professionals (for those who have had no experience of asking 
BME families) 
Can you tell me the ‘story’ of your experiences of being involved in the process of 
requesting organ donation in your role as a health professional? By which I mean any 
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events and experiences you have had of this process which were, and are important to 
you. 
Begin wherever you like 
If I need more detail, or am only getting opinion rather than stories of events/situations use 
narrative-return questions such as: 
 Could you give me an example of that? 
 Can you remember an event in which this occurred? 
 Have you ever had an experience which is completely unlike that? 
 Can you tell me in more detail how that happened? 
 Are there any other things you remember happening? 
 Do you remember/recall anything else about that? 
If they want more guidance on what they are talking about I can resort to prompts such as: 
 Experiences of deciding to approach families; 
 What it is like to ask families for organs?/how do you ask families? 
 What is it like to be closely involved with treating a patient and then, after their 
death, involved in the process of organ donation? 
 Are there any particular things going on now that you see as important to your role? 
 Who is involved in the process? 
 How they reflect on the decisions made by themselves, fellow health professionals 
and the families? 
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Interview guide for initial interview with families/ ‘community’ members 
Donor/non-donor families 
Can you tell me the ‘story’ of your experience of being asked to donate your relative’s  
organs after their death? By this I mean any events, or anything else related to the 
experience which are important to you. 
You can begin wherever you like. 
If they need prompting: 
 What happened leading up to them being asked to donate? 
 Their experiences of being asked to consent to donate 
 Who was involved in the process? 
 How they made their decision and who was involved in this  
 How they reflect on these decisions in their lives now 
‘Community’ members 
Questions aimed at their general experience of transplantation/donation, or, later on, in the 
case of religious leaders, their experiences of being involved over discussions over 
withdrawal of care between families and health professionals. For example, questions 
included: 
Can you tell me the ‘story’ of your experiences of being a transplant recipient/live 
donor/Imam (e.g.)/donor activist? By this I mean any events, or anything else related to 
the experience which are important to you. 
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Appendix 8. Example Section of a Narrative Analysis Table 
Excerpt from Ruth’s narrative, donation nurse for team 1 (main story can be read across the first 2 columns) 
Complicating Actions Evaluations Further Interpretations My Interpretations 
(line numbers) 1.126:And 
er, it was decided that I was 
going to go in and speak to 
the family. Erm, which 
basically I did do erm, but 
when I mentioned the 
organ donor register they 
were a bit dubious as to 
whether she was actually 
on the organ donor register: 
‘How can you prove that to 
me?’ 
 F.1.419 J: Yeah, yeah. And then you had all the, then 
you had this drawn out consent process and then 
you had all the, the kind of, you know, the trouble 
with the coroner. 
R: Coroner issues. 
J: And how did you, so, it sounds like, cause I know 
you had your colleague, it sounds like you were 
having to do a lot of this. 
R: Yeah, but my colleague was kind of concentrating 
on doing, we have a lot of erm computer data to 
input for..er, you know, like offering database. Erm, 
he was doing a lot of that and erm, doing a few 
conversations with erm retrieval teams and referral 
centres and things like that. Erm, we do tend to have 
two of us at, erm, someone who’s donation after 
cardiac death to try and speed things up a bit. In that 
situation you just needed one person with the 
family. 
Describing the actualities of the donation set up here - There 
are two coordinators on the scene; Ruth and her colleague. 
Ruth is able to tell the story from her perspective of being the 
one that was front of house - she spoke to the family, dealt 
with all the other authority figures necessary for the donation 
to go ahead. In the background you have her colleague, doing 
all the administrative tasks necessary for actually allocating 
the girl's organs. Ruth is the one that takes centre stage in this 
story though, being the one who actively talks about taking 
responsibility for the family (she mentions this later on with 
asking to be the one to follow them up). However, at the start, 
the decision as to who talks to the family, she puts in passive 
terms, as if the original set-up was not wholly her choice 
(something which she later rectifies through stories of her 
taking charge of the situation.) 
2.129: So basically I had to 
get a faxed copy from erm 
NHSBT to show she was on 
the organ donor register to 
show them. 
2.130: Very large family...erm, Mum, Dad 
looked quite a bit older, er, Dad spoke English 
but Mum didn’t really speak very much English 
at all. A lot of erm brother’s stroke cousins, I 
think it turned out they were cousins, er it did 
turn out they were cousins but at one stage I 
think one person said he was a brother. Erm, 
however you know, soon realised that a cousin 
was, was good enough: we will speak to you 
all, it doesn’t matter if you’re a brother, cousin, 
you know, you’re all next of kin, it’s fine. Erm, 
and basically erm communicated with all the 
family that, you know, this is the information 
that shows she’s on the organ donor register. 
F.2.454 J: (laughs) And you said as well, you said this 
was like a big family as well, and you wanted to kind 
of talk to, you know, the cousins and the immediate 
family, and the brothers. 
R: Yeah, yeah everybody was in the room really, 
yeah. 
J: How did you like, so how did you, can you tell me a 
bit more about that like how you kind of.. managed 
to get everybody involved. 
R: Yeah, yeah, I think..there were in the end certain 
people who you ended up focusing on: the aunty 
because she kept interjecting with questions and 
comments. And I kept looking at Dad quite a lot of 
the time, although I wasn’t positioned ideally for Dad 
Ruth here names the complicating action of having to prove to 
the family that their daughter was on the ODR. She follows this 
up by describing and evaluating the set up of the (large) 
family, as if to show what she was up against in her attempts 
to take consent. Here then, consent does not just relate to one 
person, but to many: Mum dad, aunties, cousins etc, and then 
the University friends in the background. And it is this group of 
up to 15 people that Ruth is having to communicate with and 
mediate consent. The family she conceptualises as a large 
mass of people, who, at first she struggles to work out who is 
actually direct family - what they refer to as brothers, she 
understands as cousins (different perspectives on what 
constitutes family for each side). She names two people as 
being those who she most focused upon: the aunty, because 
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There were a couple of vocal males sort of 
representing the family. One was one of the 
cousins and the other was erm...a friend who 
was in the medical profession, and he was, as 
he said, feeling very guilty because he was 
supposed to be looking after her; looking out 
for her while she was up at University here. 
However, she was living with friends so 
obviously what could he do? Erm, and the 
friends, some of the friends were actually 
there, the University friends, and erm they 
spoke to parents, the parents and the family 
and said ‘Well yes, she did join the organ donor 
register at fresher’s week. And she spoke to us 
about it and said ‘Well this is why I’m doing it. I 
really do think I should be on the organ donor 
register.’’ 
because I went into the room and then Mum went to 
bring Dad in and he kind of chose to sit round here 
towards me [indicates the position by her side], so I 
was a bit like this [indicates having to look both 
ways] with the aunty over here. And then I just kept 
scanning the room really (I laugh). You just do the 
best you can don’t you to be honest with you. They 
obviously felt a lot of support from being all together 
and wanted everybody in there. It was their choice 
who they wanted in there. It was a big enough room 
to accommodate it, it wasn’t like a little tiny sitting 
room, it was a proper big private sitting area, so, you 
know we could accommodate it. 
J: How many people are we talking? 
R: Erm, God, it would have been ten, fifteen. 
she was very vocal, and the Dad, who Ruth seems to focus 
upon rather than the Mum (we later learn of this decision due 
to Ruth interpreting the Mum as willing to do whatever Dad 
wanted), and whom Ruth describes as actively trying to 
engage with. The large family are seen by her as providing 
support to each other, which she doesn't see as an issue: she 
perceives it as their (Mum and Dad's) choice to have everyone 
in the room. 
3.145: And the family 
wanted some time to 
discuss this, and then came 
back after half an hour to 
say, well yes, she was a 
giving person in life. It’s 
very fitting that she should 
be a giving person in death 
E.148 And I think from reading the 
religious..information erm, about 
Hinduism, not that I’m any great expert, 
that basically this is their kind of, kind of 
their take on donation. it’s about giving in 
life and giving in death, and that’s how 
their religion supports it. 
F.3.720 However, they are missing some, such as the 
IV drug user and erm...the ethnic minority family 
who couldn’t possibly understand if we explained 
brain stem death. 
J: That was actually in some notes that said? 
R: Yeah, yeah. Yeah, it was erm an Asian doctor who 
said that, so whether he’d like assessed this family 
and just felt that they wouldn’t. I do know that..in 
my experience there’ve been quite a lot of Asian 
families, I’d say more than..families with like 
Caucasian background, it might be a sweeping 
generalisation cause obviously I’ve not done a study 
on it and collated figures, but a lot of..especially 
from working in London, there were a lot of Muslim 
groups round there, a lot of resistance to withdrawal 
of treatment, you know where they just want it in 
the hands of God: you can’t turn the ventilator off, 
they will die when they’re ready. So maybe he 
picked up on this from the family.                                                   
F.748 R: Yeah well I’d just started here erm, basically 
there was a lady who, I think was Afro-Caribbean. 
She’d been in the country I a good few years and it 
Here Ruth talks of the family’s decision and their justification 
of their decision through believing their daughter to be a 
generous person. Ruth then goes on to make a large leap, 
interpreting this as meaning that it was linked to the 
daughter's and their status as Hindu. In other words the 
decision is reduced to and conceptualised in terms of their 
traditionalism - they decide to donate because it fits in with 
Ruth's reading of Hinduism's "take on donation". Here, Ruth 
has unwittingly made assumptions about Hinduism (what it 
means) as well as the family (in terms of them being 
traditional and making decisions based on their religion, rather 
than anything else in their lives). This is interestingly 
contrasted with Ruth's descriptions about Consultants missing 
potential donors, or not asking families about donations 
because of the assumptions they have made about that family, 
or about a patient's suitability to be a potential donor (IV drug 
user: assumption that they are too risky because of potential 
for HIV or hepatitis transmission). However, she then almost 
contradicts her discussion about assumptions by again leaping 
to conclusions about a large different population 
groups/families - Maybe the Dr. didn't ask a Muslim family 
because Ruth knows that they struggle with accepting 
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was quite a sad story, she’d lost a lot of members of 
her family, er through some kind of civil unrest, and 
she had some kind of cardiac condition..that had 
caused her to collapse and become hypoxic, er, and 
we approached, well I didn’t, the Consultants 
approached the family about organ donation. [....] 
768  Erm, but the family did come back and say no 
and it very much seemed and I can’t remember 
exactly why, but, it very much seemed that the 
reason was that they didn’t understand what organ 
donation was. I think it was pretty much, they didn’t 
have organ donation in their country. What is organ 
donation?; What do you mean?  
withdrawal of treatment because of their religious beliefs; She 
had not been approached to talk to an African Caribbean 
family about donation because of their lack of understanding 
about organ donation (she contradicts herself with this story, 
because she argues that they had not had the opportunity to 
speak with someone knowledgeable about donation, like 
herself. 
4.150:Errm, so they wanted 
to talk more about 
donation, so I said that I 
would go back in and bring 
the consent papers with me 
to go through with them, if 
they did want to consent to 
donation I would give them 
more information. Erm, 
which I did. 
E.153 It was a very very very long 
conversation, erm, they had a lot of difficulties 
with a lot of the questions that were being 
asked. We do need in the patient assessment 
to ask about things such as erm, as erm habits 
really. Not just smoking, drinking, drug taking, 
sexual habits.  
J: Is that the one that has very intimate 
questions? 
R: Yeah. Erm, which obviously erm, I mean I 
think Mum and Dad thought that she was a, a 
girl who was living very much by the Hindu 
faith: didn’t drink, didn’t, no sex before 
marriage etcetera etcetera. Erm, however erm, 
it seemed that she was leading quite a 
Westernised life really from some of the 
information that we did come across. 
F.4.405 R: No, I mean when we do the assessment 
erm we ask the family is there anybody else that 
would be able to give us more information. Now it 
wouldn’t have felt appropriate to have gone to her 
friends behind her families’ back, er, and the, the 
cousins were there and present when we were 
asking questions. And did kind of make..a comment 
that [quietly] ‘I think she does enjoy a little bit of a 
drink of alcohol sometimes’, you know, a little bit 
more awareness. Erm...and, you know, we were 
gonna get the GP fax...about, yeah, and I think the 
friends had gone by now anyway, so, you know, it 
just didn’t feel appropriate to try and source other 
people to give us information for the purpose of the 
assessment. And we just documented that..the 
family, a lot of the family members feel that she’s 
been living a Hindu lifestyle, please refer to GP fax 
also. And just kind of left it that way really. 
 
Ruth begins to describe and interpret some of the many 
complexities involved in this particular case: The family had 
trouble with being asked the more intimate questions on the 
consent form, about lifestyle. We learn a number of things from 
this: the questions can be perceived as being sensitive, because 
they involve asking about taboo subjects like sex and drug habits; 
the consent form is far from a simple matter of yes and no: the 
family are actively involved in creating a picture of the individual 
so that the DTC can assess their likely risk to a potential recipient 
(links to Hogle 1995 here); the DTC is responsible for deciding who 
might be the best source of information about lifestyle, with the 
knowledge that families aren't always aware of their relative's 
private lives, and how to 'ask' the families the questions. IS IT 
ACTUALLY RUTH THAT IS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE 
QUESTIONS? We also learn that Ruth makes the assumption that 
the family were uncomfortable with the questions because of their 
Hinduism. She polarises the Mother and Father as traditional, with 
her assessment of their daughter as 'Western' by the fact that she 
drunk and had had sex before marriage; information which came 
from her cousins and from the GP information about her taking 
the morning after pill. She talks about the cousins as having "a 
little bit more awareness" from their comments about the donor's 
drinking, which links back to her assessment of the Mum and 
Dad's lack of awareness of the life their daughter was actually 
leading. Sees Hinduism and Westernised as diametrically opposed: 
they mean very specific things for Ruth, one implying living by a 
code of traditions and rules, the other in terms of freedom and 
living an individual life. 
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Appendix 9. Initial Categories and Analytical Questions from the 
Narrative Analysis 
Categories: 
1. Procedural accounts/practical negotiations: donation contingencies (including the 
procedures of other authorities, which may inhibit the progression of a case). 
2. Conceptualising ethnicity and anticipating families – How ethnicity is worked 
through in stories: families’ decisions and behaviour come to be understood through 
notions of ethnicity; how these understandings feed into donation practice. 
3. Caring and role responsibility: meeting the needs of families – qualify their caring 
and fulfilment of their roles in terms of discursively constructing the donation as 
offering something positive for the families – and that it was what they wanted. 
Through this understanding of the donation as a need, the DTCs do all they can to 
ensure that their wishes are fulfilled. 
4. Consent complexities – Large families of BME potential donors, coroner difficulties, 
withdrawal of care struggles discussed in terms of inhibiting the potential for 
donation. 
Negative outcomes of donation requests in relation to BME families often come to be 
attributed to a family’s ethnicity, rather than the actions of health professionals 
themselves. When there is a story of the donation going ahead, the focus tends to shift 
from the family to the difficulties of negotiating donation in the context of other 
professionals. 
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Analytical Questions used to interrogate remaining data, and develop 
initial categories and final findings: 
1. What does the process of donation look like?  
a. How is it characterised in the different stories/settings?  
b. What are its complexities and how do the actors experience the process? 
c. How and what decisions are made during the process? 
d. How can I tell the story of donation? 
2. How is ethnicity worked through by people?  
a. What does it mean to them (how/ is this manifested in their practice)? 
b. How do they experience interacting with people of different/same 
backgrounds to themselves? 
c. How is difference defined? 
3. What can we learn and understand about the role of the coordinator from 
donation stories/observations, in the context of their role as mediator between each 
side (family/health professionals; public/medicine – as institution)? 
a. How do coordinators mediate the needs of different parties in the donation 
process/their role generally? 
b.  What are the relational and practical issues they encounter in their role? 
 
 
 
 
